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ABSTRACT 
DONNA R. DINKIN: Organizational Crises In Local North Carolina Public Health 
Agencies: A Crisis Typology and Assessment Of Organizational Preparedness 
(Under the direction of Bruce Fried) 
 
The serious outcomes of crises, such as diminished public confidence and the death of 
people and wildlife, illustrate the importance of preparing for organizational crises. Serious 
threats of terrorism, rapid advances in medical technology, increasing complexity of social 
problems, and increased scrutiny of public agencies suggests that public health organizations 
are ripe for organizational crises. This study aimed to explore the levels of crisis preparedness 
in local North Carolina public health departments.  
The first phase of this study included the creation of a crisis typology by public health 
practitioners. The resulting typology revealed 7 categories of organizational crises: Disasters, 
Personnel, Quality Assurance, Legal, Public Relations, Political, and Plant/ Equipment. The 
second phase of the study used a comprehensive systems model of crisis preparedness (DTP 
Model of Preparedness) to assess the level of preparedness of local health departments to 
prevent and respond to the different types of crises. Health departments considered crisis 
prepared have human, cultural, and structural characteristics that support crisis prevention 
and response activities. They also have written strategies, such as crisis plans and media 
relations procedures, which provide a systematic framework for responding to a variety of 
crisis situations.  
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A written survey sent to local health directors and interviews and document reviews at 
5 public health departments provided valuable insight into the level of crisis preparedness of 
health departments. Key findings included an over-estimation of organizational preparedness 
by health directors and seven significant gaps in the dimensions of the preparedness model. 
Local health directors felt most prepared to deal with situations related to quality assurance, 
legal issues or personnel concerns and least prepared to manage emergencies such as terrorist 
acts or kidnapping. Health departments did have some crisis preparedness structures and 
policies in place but they lacked integration and comprehensiveness.  
One indicator of the ability of public health agencies to respond to community-wide 
disasters is the extent to which they are prepared to handle a variety of crisis situations that 
could impact their own organization. Pandemic flu or some other major crisis is inevitable. 
More than ever, local health departments must be prepared to deal with crises. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The world will not evolve past its current crisis by using the same thinking that created the 
situation.” Albert Einstein  
 
Organizational crises can rival natural disasters in their destructive outcomes. Crises 
such as the space shuttle Challenger explosion, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster, the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska and Union Carbide’s deadly chemical gas 
release in Bhopal, India, are often cited for the harm that they caused. Death of people and 
animals, contamination of the environment, diminished public confidence and huge economic 
losses are just a few of the consequences that these events have had. The impact of an 
organizational crisis may be so significant that it cripples the organization, making it 
impossible to effectively meet organizational goals and mission. And for some organizations, 
it may end their very existence.  The serious outcomes of organizational crises illustrate the 
importance of preventing and preparing for them.  
In the last two decades a disturbing trend has emerged. The number of organizational 
crises has been rising (Mitroff, 2005).  The 2003 Annual Report for the Institute for Crisis 
Management reported that 2001 and 2003 were the most crisis-prone years since their 
organization began collecting data on business crises. Over 18,000 separate corporate crises 
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were recorded by business-news editors during this three-year period. Among these are the 
explosion of the West Pharmaceutical Services plant in Kinston, NC (2003), the fall of Enron 
and WorldCom (2001), the attacks on the World Trade Centers (2001) and deaths and 
injuries from the intentional exposures of anthrax (2001). While natural disasters, such as 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Southeast Asian Tsunami in 2004 continue to impact 
organizations, the recent increase in crises appears to be the result of two other causes.  
The first is related to the growth in complex systems. In the 1980’s businesses began 
to experience the negative effects of the increased complexity of technologies and systems 
used in organizations. This complexity increases the risk of system overloads and 
malfunctions, which can lead to crises (Perrow, 1984). Recent examples of this type of crisis 
include the Northeast / Canadian power outage (2003) and the space shuttle Columbia 
explosion (2003) (Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003).  
The second factor contributing to the recent growth of organizational crises is more 
troubling. The 1990’s saw an increase in events caused by people with intent to do evil, such 
as bombings, extortion, terrorism and cyber-attacks (Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003). 
Unfortunately, this disturbing trend has continued into the 21st century. Recent examples of 
this include the Wendy’s chili scare (2005), the events that took place on 9/11 (2001) and the 
bombings of buses in London, UK (2005).  
The variety of events that have occurred demonstrates that no organization, regardless 
of size, nature of operations, or type of industry, is immune to crises (Kuklan, 1986). Even 
federal, state and local public health departments have experienced devastating organizational 
crises. For example, in Oklahoma a state health officer resigned after pleading guilty to 
conspiracy to defraud the state (“Health Unit’s Former Chief,” 2001), in San Francisco a 
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public health worker was charged with knowingly spreading the HIV virus and in 
Washington DC, the inspector general for the Department of Health and Human Services was 
investigated for keeping a gun and life-sized human target in her office (“Janet Rehnquist 
Resigns,” 2003). Local health departments in North Carolina have also had to respond to 
various types of organizational crises. Accusations of employee bribery, forced resignations 
of local health directors for misconduct, and mismanaged infectious disease outbreaks are 
just a few of the situations that have occurred (Guilford Officials Seize, 1990; “Dr. K’s 
Parting Gift,” 2005; Jacob vs. Onslow County, 2002). Crises can affect any organization.    
While empirical data are limited, business scholars and public relations practitioners 
agree that the degree to which an organization is affected by a crisis is directly related to its 
crisis-preparedness efforts (Fink, 1986, Booth, 1993; Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1987; Runyan, 
2006). One indicator of the ability of public health agencies to prevent and respond to 
community-wide disasters is the extent to which they, themselves, are prepared to handle a 
variety of crisis situations that could impact their own organization. Crisis-preparation will 
help organizations prevent some crises from occurring and will minimize the impact of those 
that do occur by enabling the organization to implement a quick and effective crisis response. 
Mitroff and Alpaslan (2003) claim that in contrast to crisis-prone organizations, crisis-
prepared businesses experience fewer crises, stay in business longer, fare better financially 
and are regarded more highly. Runyan (2006) also found this to be true of small businesses 
affected by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Given the potential catastrophic nature of crises, 
organizations should be engaging in the efforts needed to prevent and respond to a wide 
range of events.  
  Despite the importance of crisis prevention and response, the existing literature 
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offers an uneven and incomplete picture of organizational crisis preparedness. The current 
literature is not only weak in its development and integration of crisis management theory but 
it is also limited in its inclusion of research on practical applications of the existing theory.  
Specific weaknesses of the existing literature include a lack of clear definitions, a lack of 
consensus around a crisis typology and a comprehensive model of crisis management, a lack 
of empirical research on crisis management in small, public organizations and an absence of 
studies that compare organizational crisis-preparedness models with other emergency-
preparedness frameworks. The limited scope of the existing crisis management literature 
leaves much room for future research.  
 
1.1 Purpose of Study 
This study, unlike much of the early crisis management research, is not a case-study 
description of an individual crisis situation. Instead it is an exploratory study designed to 
uncover information about how local health departments in North Carolina are viewing and 
preparing for various types of crises. Specifically, this study sets out to answer the following 
four questions:  
1. What are the types of organizational crises that might be experienced by local public 
health departments in North Carolina?  
2. Can these various crisis situations be categorized to form a useful framework to aid in 
crisis management?  
3. How well prepared are health departments to prevent and respond to the various 
categories of crises?  
4. What are the major gaps in crisis preparedness for these health departments?  
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During the five year period of 2001 to 2006 the federal government spent an 
estimated $5 billion towards efforts to enhance the public health system’s ability to respond 
to community emergencies (Lurie, 2006). Despite this investment, government officials, 
public health scholars and local health leaders are questioning whether or not the public 
health system has really made much progress in its levels of preparedness (Fraser, 2007; 
Trust For America’s Health, 2005). One indicator of the ability of public health agencies to 
prevent and respond to community-wide disasters is the extent to which they, themselves, are 
prepared to handle a variety of crisis situations that could impact their own organization. This 
study provides a framework for public health administrators to systematically prevent and 
prepare for large-scale organizational crises.  
 
1.2 Definition of Key Terms 
In November 2003, a newly appointed health director of a large urban 
public health department was arrested and charged with a DWI (Driving 
while intoxicated). He subsequently lost his driving license, his monthly 
travel allowance and use of a county car. Fourteen months later he 
resigned. (“Dr. K’s Parting Gift,”  2005)  
   
In October 1993 a health director of a local North Carolina Department of 
Public Health was accused of improperly using public money to purchase a 
table saw, fatigues, arctic-style boots, binoculars, ready to eat meals, duffel 
bags and other federal surplus items. In September he had also pleaded 
guilty to 52 misdemeanor charges of authorizing nine septic tank permits 
without proper certification. The health director was fired that fall. 
(“Decision on Health Director,” 1993)  
 
Events that are labeled as crises typically are described as having significant 
consequences, low probability of occurrence, a high degree of ambiguity and a sense of 
urgency for decision-making. This paper will focus on organizational crises, the type of 
events “that can bring your organization down” (Pearson, classroom presentation, 1994). The 
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two examples above illustrate some organizational crises that have occurred in local North 
Carolina health departments. Health departments are routinely faced with many other events 
that require urgent action, such as infectious disease outbreaks, tobacco use in children and 
bioterrorism threats. These events, however, are not encompassed in the definition of 
organizational crises used in this study. While serious, these situations are considered to be 
within the normal scope of work for a public health department. That is, the activities 
associated with preventing and responding to these scenarios fall within the responsibility of 
a public health department. These events can become organizational crises, however, when 
not handled well or when they directly affect the public health staff or facilities. This 
distinction will be described in more detail later in this paper. 
Since the focus of this study is at the organizational level, the term “crisis 
preparedness” is also defined at the agency level versus the community level in which public 
health practitioners conduct their work. Here it is defined as an organization’s ability to 
prevent, respond to and learn from organizational crises. An organization that is considered 
crisis-prepared will have more than just a crisis plan. The theoretical model for organizational 
crisis preparedness used in this study is outlined in chapter 3. 
 
1.3 Assumptions 
To gain benefit from this study, it is necessary to believe two underlying assumptions. 
The first is that it is possible to prepare for organizational crises and the second is that public 
health organizations are multi-dimensional like other organizations. 
  It is important to assume that an organization can influence the occurrence and 
impact of a wide variety of crises. Even in instances where it is impossible to prevent an 
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event from happening, such as a natural disaster, individuals must believe that there are 
things they can do to limit the harm or destruction that is possible. 
While it is difficult to prove, it is believed (Alpaslan, 2004; Mitroff et al., 1989) that 
organizations that have a crisis-preparedness mindset may prevent crises from occurring. In 
addition, there is some empirical data that shows that organizations that prepare for crises are 
more likely to successfully resolve events than organizations which have not prepared. In his 
study of British organizations, Booth, for example, found evidence that the effects of crises 
on firms was less for those firms that had systems for crisis management than for those 
without systems (Booth,1993). Murat Can Alpaslan (2004) also found in his research of 
Fortune 1000 companies that organizations that adopted a proactive approach to crisis 
management achieved greater crisis management outcomes.  
It is also important to accept that public health organizations, like other organizations, 
are multi-dimensional. Organizations are comprised of technical, human and social, 
administrative and external dimensions (Kovoor, 1991). In a health department, a crisis might 
affect the buildings and grounds, the financial resources, the stability of staff, the opinions of 
the public, the functioning of equipment, the organizational culture and the infrastructure of 
the organization. Since crises can arise from and impact on any area of an organization, an 
effective crisis-management strategy must address all dimensions of an organization 
(Kovoor, 1991). Despite differences in mission, public health departments are similar to 
private corporations in that they function by integrating multiple systems. This premise 
supports the use of a multi-dimensional crisis-preparedness model derived from the business 
literature. 
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1.4 Setting Description 
To date, much of the crisis management literature has focused on private sector 
industries that deal with hazardous processes such as chemical plants and tightly-coupled 
technologies such as airline industries (Kovoor, 1991; Kovoor-Misra, 1996; Shrivastava, 
1987). However, all organizations may find themselves in a crisis situation (Spillan & 
Crandall, 2002). “Immunity from the trauma of such events is not guaranteed and the public 
sector is coming under increasing scrutiny with regard to its levels of crisis preparedness” 
(Smith, 1993). What is ironic, however, is that the public sector is the ‘home’ of a number of 
organizations which exist either to manage crises or to ensure that other organizations facing 
such events can recover from the intense trauma that accompanies them (Smith, 1993). For 
example, governmental agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), County Emergency Services, and City Police and Fire Services all have as their 
primary mission to assist communities in times of crisis. Local public health departments also 
have a critical role in responding to community disasters and other public health crises. Yet, 
there is little evidence in the literature that suggests that any of these agencies utilize their 
crisis management skills to include preparedness for their own organizational crises. Given 
the importance of crisis preparedness and this apparent paradox within the public sector it is 
important to ask “what is the state of crisis preparedness in the public sector?” The context 
for this research is one agency within the public sector, the local public health department.  
Public health departments in North Carolina have broad authority to protect and 
promote the health of the citizens within their jurisdictions. The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention National Public Health Performance Standards Program lists the following as 
core public health functions: 
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1. Monitor health status to identify and solve community health problems.  
2. Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the community.  
3. Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues.  
4. Mobilize community partnerships and action to identify and solve health 
problems.  
5. Develop policies and plans that support individual and community health efforts.  
6. Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety.  
7. Link people to needed personal health services and assure the provision of health 
care when otherwise unavailable.  
8. Assure competent public and personal health care workforce.  
9. Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based 
health services.  
10. Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems.  
 
CDC, Core Public Health Functions Steering Committee, 1994  
 
Public health departments provide an interesting setting to study crisis preparedness 
because they are not only increasingly vulnerable to organizational crises, but also because 
the consequences for poor performance are so high. At least three environmental factors are 
contributing to an increase in the risk of crisis in health departments. These are instability and 
complexity of the health system environment, reduction of both financial and human 
resources and increasing public distrust in government and governmental agencies.  
The health system is changing. There have been several events over the last ten years 
which have forced many health care organizations to re-examine their purpose and scope. 
One of these events was the discussions around health care reform at both a national and state 
level in the early 1990’s. At this time, health organizations scrambled to redefine their place 
in the health care system. This confusion, along with the national reports by the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM Future of Public Health, 1988) which claimed that the public health system is 
in disarray, pushed many public health agencies to rethink how they carry out their mandate 
of promoting health. More recently, the fear of terrorist attacks has contributed to significant 
changes in the service priorities of many health agencies. This is certainly true in public 
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health departments. However, many public health employees feel that the funds for bio-
terrorism-preparedness efforts are directly reducing the funds that are available for other 
programs which address more significant community health issues. Changes and confusion 
make an organization more vulnerable to crisis (Smart et al., 1984).  
Acts of violence against public employees such as the bombing of the federal building 
in Oklahoma, shootings within the US Postal Service and the anthrax scares across the nation 
also suggest that there is an increasing possibility that public health departments may 
experience certain types of crises. Growing anger over governmental regulations and 
increasing taxes has caused some individuals to target their frustration toward public agencies 
and public employees. This trend has created an increased awareness in public agencies of the 
potential for incidences of workplace violence, sabotage and negative media coverage.  
Unfortunately, sometimes the fear of violence can also create other kinds of 
crises. Such is the case of the federal-level investigation of the inspector general at the 
Department of Health and Human Services. Janet Rehnquist was investigated in November 
2002 for keeping an unauthorized 9mm handgun and a poster of a target in her office (Janet 
Rehnquist Resigns,” 2003). Well-documented acts of violence within public agencies suggest 
that health departments are at risk and should prepare for these kinds of incidents.  
Public health agencies are also interesting to study because, despite their value to the 
community and the increase in complexity of their services, they have a continuously 
decreasing availability of resources. For example, as public health agencies try to define their 
place in the rapidly-changing health system, politicians with limited knowledge of public 
health are cutting the budgets of health departments (Late, 2006; OMB Watch, 2003). 
Wisenblit’s (1989) survey of 166 firms shows that larger organizations have both the need 
 11 
and the resources to be better prepared for crisis. Smaller organizations have the need, but 
often lack the resources. Local health departments, when faced with the choice of having a 
nurse to give immunizations or a public relations specialist, will choose the former. Small 
local health departments, struggling to keep staff to maintain needed health programs, may 
limit the attention they put towards planning for situations they feel are rare and unlikely.  
The consequences of failure to prepare are high for a health department. Health 
departments are very vulnerable to public opinion. In fact, trust and credibility are the most 
important resources that public health agencies have. If members of the community perceive 
the health department as less-than-professional or less-than-capable, then they will not see the 
health department as a leader of health for their community. Without this, they are virtually 
ineffective in working with the community to promote its own health. Health departments 
that are seen as community leaders are able to organize strong community coalitions, they are 
able to garnish strong support for the promotion of healthy public policies and they are able 
to network with other community agencies to assure health services for all those in need. 
Health departments cannot afford to be unprepared.  
 
1.5 The Study 
This study of crisis preparedness was conducted in two phases. Phase I used focus 
groups to develop a typology of the crises faced by public health agencies. Phase II used 
multiple methodologies to obtain data on the level of crisis preparedness of local health 
departments in the state of North Carolina. These methods include key informant interviews 
and document reviews from five local health departments and a written survey given to all 
local health directors in the state. The various types of data were necessary to provide insight 
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into the very complex nature of organizational crises.  
Prior to the collection of data for this research an extensive examination of the 
literature on organizational crisis was conducted. Chapter 2 provides a review of this 
literature and its limitations. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework used to conduct 
this study. Definitions of key terms and a more in-depth description of the crisis preparedness 
model are provided. The methods used for this study are described in chapter 4. This includes 
a brief description of the methodologies used for each phase of the study and a review of the 
methods used for analysis of the data. The results of the study are presented in chapters 5, 6 
and 7. Chapter 5 presents the formation of a crisis typology from a list of potential worst-case 
scenarios. Chapter 6 summarizes the results of the written survey given to all health directors 
and chapter 7 highlights the themes that emerged through the key informant interviews and 
document reviews in each of five local health departments. Chapter 8 includes a summary of 
the key findings of the study and discusses the limitations of the research design. Finally, 
chapter 9 presents the implications of the findings and ideas for future areas of study.  
 
CHAPTER 2  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
“Thus the wise win before they fight, while the ignorant fight to win”   The Art of War  
 
The word “crisis” is derived from the Greek word krisis, meaning “decision”. In early 
Greek writings the term was used to describe a political conflict or to explain the 
developmental process of an illness. After being relatively forgotten for some centuries, the 
notion of “crisis” came back in the study of political economy. From that time on, the notion 
of crisis has been increasingly used in different fields, such as economics, political science, 
philosophy, psychology, history and public health (Pauchant & Douville, 1993; Pearson & 
Clair, 1998; Boin, 2004).  
The formal study of crises in the field of management began with the release of a 
landmark publication in 1963 by Hermann. This article identified the effects of crises on the 
viability of organizations. Despite Hermann’s interest in this topic, little more was published 
by other authors during the following two decades. It wasn’t until the late 1980’s, after the 
historic Johnson & Johnson Tylenol crisis (Mitroff, Diamond & Alpaslan, 2006), that the 
literature on this topic began to develop (Pauchant & Douville, 1993). Crises affecting major 
organizations, such as the tire recall for Ford Firestone (2000), the bankruptcy case for Enron 
(2001), the failings of FEMA after Hurricane Katrina (2005) and the recent toy recall by 
Mattel (2007), have prompted more interest in this field of study. Despite this interest there 
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are still some issues and gaps in the literature on the topic of organizational crisis. The 
following section provides an overview of the existing literature on organizational crisis and 
the limitations of this literature. This literature is reviewed to provide the theoretical 
background for the study of crisis preparedness in local health departments.  
 
2.1 Limitations of the Literature 
The literature on organizational crisis reveals that the research suffers from three 
major deficiencies. First, the literature is limited by inconsistent terminology and incomplete 
theoretical models. Second, the existing empirical research on organizational crisis 
preparedness is limited in its comprehensiveness, often using a single method of data 
collection, typically a written survey. Finally, most studies of crisis preparedness have been 
directed at large, private corporations. There have been few studies on small, governmental or 
nonprofit organizations and virtually nothing on the types of organizational crises faced by 
small, local public health agencies.  
One of the most apparent weaknesses of the literature on organizational crisis is the 
lack of a generally agreed-upon common language for this field of study. The literature 
provides no generally-accepted definitions for the terms crisis and crisis management (Reilly, 
1989; Shaw & Harrald, 2004; Boin, 2004) and the field still lacks an overall, integrated 
paradigm (Pauchant & Douville, 1993; Pearson & Clair, 1998). The multidisciplinary nature 
of crises has contributed to the confusion as separate disciplines have conducted their own 
research and created their own language around the same topic (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Boin, 
2004).  
The limited literature on organizational crisis shows that many terms have been used 
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as synonyms for “crisis”. For example, terms such as disaster, threat, problem, emergency, 
incident and catastrophe have been used to describe crisis events. Despite the lack of 
consensus regarding a definition of crisis, many believe that in order to effectively prepare for 
and respond to crises, administrators must know what constitutes a crisis. Billings et al. 
suggest that “a useful model of crisis should allow us to understand the consequences of 
crisis more fully and to manage crises better” (Billings et al., 1980).  
The research on crisis is also limited by the confusion over how a crisis is viewed. 
Some researchers have lumped all crises into a single phenomenon (Nystrum & Starbuck, 
1984; Boin, 2004) while others have examined different types of crises (Barton, 1993; 
Kovoor, 1991; Sipka & Smith, 1993) or have examined only one manifestation of crisis 
(Marra, 1992; Doepel, 1991; Lagadec, 1987; Alpaslan, 2004). Different types and forms of 
crises have entirely different implications for organizations and for their crisis management 
strategies. The lack of consistency on the issue of crisis suggests that there is a need for an 
overriding classificatory framework which allows for the study of organizational crisis and 
crisis management (Richardson, 1994, Mitroff et al., 2004).  
Most prior studies also fail to clearly discriminate between the concepts of crisis 
prevention, crisis preparedness, mitigation, business continuity and crisis management 
(Reilly, 1989; Shaw & Harrald, 2004). Adding to the confusion, various authors have used 
the same term to discuss different phases or dimensions of a crisis. For example, Reilly 
(1989) uses the term crisis management to describe the process of effective resolution of a 
triggering event. Pearson and Mitroff (1993), however, use the term ‘crisis management’ to 
describe not only crisis resolution, but also crisis prevention and preparation. Crisis 
prevention, crisis preparation and crisis management appear to be different concepts and 
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imply different activities on the part of the organization (Reilly, 1989). Shaw and Harrald 
(2004) have decided to blend the terms crisis management and business continuity since these 
terms are often used interchangeably in the field. A comprehensive model of organizational 
crisis which differentiates between these terms may be useful for managers and practitioners 
as they assess their organizations' strengths and weaknesses regarding crisis preparedness.  
The existing literature on crisis is further limited by the methodologies used to study 
organizational crises and their management. At the time of this study, crisis research relied 
heavily on a single method of study: the post-mortem case study (Gottschalk, 1993; Kurzbard 
& Siomkos, 1992; Shrivastava, 1987; Wise, 2003; Paraskevas, 2006). Examples of this 
include in-depth descriptions of the Challenger disaster, the Perrier product contamination, 
the Three Mile Island meltdown and the Johnson & Johnson Tylenol case. Case studies can 
provide substantial depth of analysis yet they are difficult to compare (Reilly, 1989; Robert et 
al., 2002). Case studies are also limited as a teaching tool since some organizations find it 
difficult to learn from the unique experiences of other organizations (Booth, 1993) while 
others recognize that it is not possible to prove that a different approach to the crisis being 
studied would have resulted in different outcomes (Robert et al., 2002).  
Despite the need for a more comprehensive study of crisis, the nature of crisis makes 
it difficult to study in a systematic manner. By definition, crises are rare, unique events 
(Robert et al., 2002). Situations such as the murder of an employee or the bombing of a 
building do not occur every day, nor do they occur in the same way in different organizations. 
These characteristics of crises make them more difficult to compare or study across 
organizations. Crises are also very complex and often impact several dimensions of the 
organization in which they occur. A thorough case study of the Union Carbide disaster in 
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Bhopal, India illustrates the complexity of this crisis. Shrivastava suggests that this crisis was 
caused by a failure of human, cultural, financial, technological, political and environmental 
factors (Shrivastava, 1987). A comprehensive study of organizational crisis requires an 
understanding of how different types of crises impact the various dimensions of an 
organization at different stages of their development. The unusual and complex nature of 
crises makes them difficult to study in a systematic manner. Because of these challenges there 
is limited empirical research on the nature of crises and how an organization might prepare 
for them.  
More recent studies have tried to explore organizational preparedness in different 
industries prior to the occurrence of a crisis. Unfortunately, many of these studies use only a 
single method of data collection, typically, a written survey of top managers (Loosemore et 
al., 2006; Penrose, 2000; Zdziarski, 2001; Mitroff et al., 2006). Written survey instruments 
allow for a quick retrieval of data from a large number of people. However, their value to the 
study of organizational crises is limited since they don’t allow for a full understanding of the 
respondents' perceptions and how their perceptions differ from the perceptions of others 
within the same organization or how closely they match reality. More studies that use 
multiple methodologies will help further the development of a comprehensive model of 
organizational crisis.  
In addition to the limitations of the methodologies used to study preparedness, another 
gap in the literature is that, of the studies that exist, most are focused on large organizations, 
typically private corporations. The potential for catastrophic crises that affect many people 
makes these organizations an appealing target for the study of crisis management. 
Researchers such as Pauchant and Mitroff focused on Fortune 1000 companies in the US, 
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Canada and France in their study of crisis preparedness. These organizations had, on average, 
50,000 employees and often employed an expert on crisis management (Pauchant & Mitroff, 
1992). Reilly studied the crisis management activities of thirty-five banking organizations 
with an average asset size of $14 billion and Fink (1986) surveyed chief executive officers of 
Fortune 500 companies in the United States to assess their attitudes about crises and crisis 
management. Others have studied technologically-based organizations (Perrow, 1984; Sarah 
Kovoor, 1991; Kovoor-Misra, 1996) or other high-reliability organizations such as aircraft 
carriers and nuclear power plants (Medvedev, 1990; Vaughan, 1996). More recent research 
has included a broader group of organizations, such as small businesses (Runyan, 2006), 
nonprofit organizations (Spillan, et al., 2002) and universities (Mitroff et al., 2006, Zdziarski, 
2001).  
Despite the emergence of new studies and research, there has been almost no research 
on the topic of organizational crises in local governmental organizations. This is particularly 
true for public health departments. For instance, a literature search of the most influential 
public health professional journal, the American Journal of Public Health, did not identify a 
single article or editorial on organizational crisis management over the ten-year period prior 
to this study (1985-1995). Since that time, only the work of Louis Rowitz, from the 
University of Illinois, links the study of organizational crises to the practice of public health. 
In his book, Public Health for the 21st Century: The Prepared Leader (2006), he suggests 
that the prepared public health leader is a leader that can handle a variety of crises, including 
those that are caused by or impact various parts of a public health agency. The increased 
vulnerability of public agencies to crises as highlighted by several recent crises only 
highlights the need for crisis preparedness research which focuses on public organizations.  
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In general, the study of organizational crisis in the field of management still has 
significant gaps. The existing crisis literature is uneven in scope and hindered by the lack of 
clear constructs and theory-based models. Despite these limitations, the previous work of 
others is helpful in setting the background for this study. The remainder of this chapter 
provides a review of the crisis literature.  
 
2.2 Organizational Crises 
2.2a Crisis Defined  
Although crises are becoming increasingly common, little is known about how a 
situation becomes defined as a crisis (Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980). In public 
health, the term “crisis” has been used for decades to describe when an undesirable health 
condition becomes widespread such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic, teen smoking rates or 
childhood obesity levels. Many professionals feel like they deal with crises every day. They 
are often confusing crisis with other negative situations such as conflicts or other routine 
business problems. There is much debate over the differentiation of crises from ordinary 
business challenges. Yet having to deal with a new competitor in the marketplace or having 
to fix a leaky water heater is not the same kind of “crisis” as people dying because of your 
product or service. Barton (1993) differentiates business problems from organizational crises 
by suggesting that “problems” require a shorter timeframe to be addressed, they tend not to 
arouse much public attention and they need limited human resources to be handled. Crises, 
on the other hand, take a considerable amount of time and resources to be handled and often 
arouse regulatory and public attention.  
One of the best known models for crisis is that of Hermann (Billings, Milburn, & 
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Schaalman, 1980). Hermann’s model suggests that a crisis can exist if three variables are 
present. These are: threat to valued goals, short decision time, and surprise. Threat is a 
potential hindrance to some state or goal desired by the unit and only occurs if the decision 
makers recognize it and believe that it will hinder attaining goals. Decision time is short 
when the situation will be altered in the near future, after which no decision can be made or 
the decision can be made only under less favorable circumstances. Surprise refers to a lack of 
awareness by the decision makers that the crisis situation is likely to occur but is not equated 
with the lack of planned response to the situation (Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980).  
There has been limited support for Hermann’s model (Billings et al., 1980). 
Specifically there has been little empirical support of the importance of the variable of 
surprise as a determinant of a crisis. A revised model of crisis devised by Billings, Milburn 
and Schaalman suggests that this variable be dropped and that the variable of time can be 
refined. Other definitions of crisis have included characteristics such as low probability 
(Weick, 1988; Shrivastava et al., 1987; Pearson & Clair, 1998), severe consequences (Irvine 
& Millar, 1997; Mitroff et al., 1987), multiple stakeholders (Shrivastava et al.,1987), 
ambiguity of cause and resolution (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Boin, 2004), high magnitude 
(Reilly, 1989), and requiring responses outside of the typical operating frameworks (Reilly, 
1989).   
While much of the research on organizational crisis takes the perspective that a crisis 
is a detrimental situation that has the potential to destroy the organization, some stress that a 
crisis can be an opportunity as well. Fink highlights in his book on crisis management that the 
Chinese symbol for the word “crisis”, called wei-ji, is actually a combination of two words, 
“danger” and “opportunity” (Fink, 1986). While a crisis can be dangerous and cause harm, 
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crises can also open up new possibilities, can liberate innovative ideas (Booth, 1993) and can 
be a catalyst for risk-taking and thinking in new ways (Robert et al., 2002). In public-sector 
organizations, Bryson states that crises are often necessary to bring about basic changes 
(Bryson, 1981) and therefore can have a positive outcome. For example, a local health 
department which has requested more staff for years might finally be given additional 
employees when a mismanaged public health situation highlights the need for them.  
Whether a crisis is seen as a threat or an opportunity depends on the perspective of the 
decision maker. What is seen as a crisis by one person may not be seen as a crisis by another 
(Kuklan, 1986; Boin, 2004; Conte et al., 2007). Goldstein (1994) claims that this perception 
is determined by the self-efficacy of an organization’s leader. For example, leaders who view 
a situation as manageable are more likely to see an opportunity than those who feel that a 
situation is uncontrollable. Billings et al., (1980) suggests that a model for crisis should 
include this fact. They defined a crisis by a set of variables (probability of loss, value of loss, 
extent of time pressure) perceived by the decision maker. Therefore, crisis resides not only in 
the situation, but in the person as well.  
 
2.2b Crisis Types  
Nightly news programs highlight the variety of negative events that can and do occur. 
Many of these situations, such as product tampering, embezzlement, sexual harassment, 
fraud, and workplace violence, have the potential to devastate an organization. These 
different types of crises can lead to different organizational impacts and will demand 
different management techniques (Booth, 1993).  
“Since the number of potential crises seems endless, no organization, even with the 
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healthiest of budgets could plan for all possible contingencies” (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). A 
framework which groups similar crises together, may allow organizations a realistic model 
for preparing for the variety of situations that may occur (Mitroff, 1988). According to 
Newsom et al. (1993), “Crises are like plays; there are only so many basic plots. Everything 
else is a variation.” These ‘basic plots’ can be found in an effective categorization system.  
A review of the crisis management literature reveals a wide range of ways to 
categorize the list of potential crisis situations (Coombs, 1994). Booth (1993) suggests that 
there are three general types of crises: creeping crisis, periodic threat, or sudden threat. A 
creeping crisis is defined as a gradually increasing threat to an organization. A creeping crisis 
for public health organizations may be changes in the health care environment, such as the 
discussions around health care reform in the 1990’s. The second type of crisis, the periodic 
threat, is seen as routine, expected situations. Situations such as budget-cutting mandates or 
regular political changes in government would be included here. The third type of crisis 
described by Booth is the one that most scholars of organizational crises consider as a 
‘crisis’. This is the sudden threat which puts the whole organization in immediate danger.  
Studies that attempt to categorize the events included in Booth’s third type of crises 
tend to rely upon a set of dimensions for generating categories. With the exception of the 
typology created by Mitroff (1988), these dimensions have typically been determined by the 
researcher. Lipman-Blumen (1973) has created the most complex categorization system. She 
has identified at least ten dimensions in which to view crises. These are: (1) externality-
internality; (2) randomness-expectability; (3) natural generation-artificial generation; (4) 
chronicity-transitoriness; (5) pervasiveness-boundedness; (6) intensity-mildness; (7) scarcity-
surplus; (8) perceived solvability-perceived insolvability; (9) precipitate onset- gradual onset; 
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and (10) substantive content. She suggests that cross-categorization of these dimensions 
characterizes the exact nature of a given crisis (Lipman-Blumen, 1973). Most others have 
suggested less complex typologies of crises.  
Coombs (1994) selected two dimensions for the characterization of crises: internal-
external and intentional - unintentional. The internal-external dimension indicates whether 
the crisis was precipitated by something the organization did (internal) or by actions from 
some group outside of the organization (external). The intentional-unintentional dimension 
indicates whether the crisis event was triggered purposefully or not committed purposefully 
by some actor. Newsom et al. (1993) offers a slightly different scheme by replacing Coombs’ 
internal-external dimension with the dimension of violent-nonviolent. They also further 
differentiate unintentional crises by separating acts of nature, such as earthquakes or forest 
fires, from other unintended system breakdowns such as explosions, leaks or other accidents.  
In their book, Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization, Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1992) share a categorization system that was developed by grouping crises that often 
occurred at the same time together into a “crisis family.” Figure 2.1 highlights this model 
(Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). The families labeled as External Information Attacks, External 
Economic Attacks, Mega Damage, Breaks, Psycho and Occupational Health Diseases 
(Mitroff, 1988) are differentiated based on two dimensions: severity and cause. The 
horizontal dimension represents severity. The crises on the left hand side fall outside the 
range of normal, rational human behavior. Those on the right are more easily understood and 
can be handled by existing institutions, for example, the legal system, or technical 
knowledge, for example, plant design. The vertical dimension differentiates between those 
crises that are caused or influenced by relatively impersonal economic or technical factors 
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and those caused by human factors such as organizational miscommunication, employee 
sabotage, etc. (Mitroff, 1988). 
 
Figure 2.1 Crisis Typology 
 
 
 
 
 
Pauchant, T. & Mitroff I. (1992). Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 
Inc. Reprinted with permission from John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
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this neat. They don’t always fit into one box. Crises can originate in any dimension of an 
organization and can affect any and all dimensions of an organization. Any one crisis 
situation typically requires multiple responses including a legal response, a public relations 
response and facility response. The anthrax crisis in the US Postal Service provides a nice 
example of the reality of organizational crises. The deliberate act of mailing this toxic 
substance through the US Postal Service created a variety of worst-case scenarios for this 
federal organization. It impacted the physical and mental health of employees, it closed down 
some postal facilities and it required that the organization investigate a criminal act. Despite 
the messiness of crises, categorizing crises by identifying their similarities and differences 
can help leaders appreciate the variety of situations their organizations may face and can help 
them more effectively plan for preventing and responding to these multidimensional 
situations.  
 
2.2c. Causes of Organizational Crises  
Scholars in the field of crisis management believe that our world is becoming more 
crisis-prone (Richardson, 1994; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Robert et al., 2002). There has 
been a significant increase in the number of devastating crises experienced by major 
American corporations in the past several years, from product tampering to environmental 
disasters, from acts of terrorism to employee sabotage (Wisenblit, 1989; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 
2003; ICM Report, 2005). One indication of the rising frequency of corporate crises is the 
number of product injury lawsuits filed. In just ten years the number increased dramatically. 
In 1974 there were less than 2,000 suits filed. By 1984, that number had jumped to 10,000 
(Mitroff, 1988). Similarly, an analysis of corporate crises conducted by the Institute for Crisis 
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Management (2006) identified over 10,100 newsworthy crises in both 2005 and in 2006. 
During the years of 1997-1999, this number was an average of 6,500 distinct crises. To assure 
that appropriate response strategies are used to manage these crises and to prevent these 
crises from occurring in the future, organizations must understand the nature and cause of 
particular crisis situations.  
The literature shows that the perceived cause of a crisis affects how the situation is 
viewed by the stakeholders. In a crisis, observers make judgments about the cause of a crisis 
and about the level of organizational responsibility (Coombs, 1994). The perception of the 
cause often influences the amount of support an organization receives from its stakeholders 
when a crisis occurs. Crises that are thought to have originated within the organization 
generally have less support than those felt to be caused by forces outside of the organization’s 
control. For example, the public reacts more favorably towards crises caused by a natural 
disaster such as an earthquake than they do to crises that are human-induced such as product 
defects or abuse of public trust.  
The way the crisis is perceived by the stakeholders should be an important factor in an 
organization’s response. Coombs (1994) suggests that in situations when the organization is 
considered responsible for the crisis, the response strategy should include a communication 
message of acceptance and asking for forgiveness. In situations of ‘accidents’ where the 
organization is not held responsible for the crisis, Coombs suggests that a ‘distance strategy’ 
may be more appropriate. This communication strategy includes an acknowledgment of the 
crisis with an attempt to weaken the link between the organization and the crisis (Coombs, 
1994).  
A number of authors have written on the causes of crises. A review of this literature 
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reveals that most researchers believe that organizational crises occur because of the 
simultaneous breakdown of the technical, organizational and human systems of an 
organization (Kovoor, 1991; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Boin, 2004). Pearson and Clair (1998) 
suggest that social-political forces also contribute to the creation of crises while Milburn et 
al. (1983) suggest that crises arise from an organization-environment mismatch. That is, the 
organization is unable to meet the demands of the environment or the environment is not able 
to serve the goals of the organization. In situations where there is a mismatch between the 
environment and the organization, the organization seeks to restore equilibrium. This 
unstable situation could precipitate a crisis (Milburn et al., 1983).  
Crises do not occur in isolation (Fink, 1986; Pearson et al., 1993). Because they are 
the result of complex systemic interrelationships among many different variables, one crisis 
often triggers other crises (Pauchant, et al., 1993). Research conducted by Pearson et al., 
(1993) showed that the simultaneous occurrence of multiple crises was actually more the 
norm than single-crisis situations. The triggering of multiple crises is more likely to occur if 
one crisis is poorly managed or if the system affected by a crisis is ‘tightly coupled’. Tightly 
coupled systems are systems in which the variables of the system are tightly linked; that is, a 
change in one variable causes changes in another (Perrow, 1984). Tightly coupled systems 
ensure that a failure in one component will move throughout the system and will result in 
damage beyond the immediate initiating event. The speed of this interactive cascade of 
failures is determined by the degree of coupling in the system. The closer the coupling, the 
less time will be available to ensure that remedial action or containment can be initiated 
(Smith, 1993). One example of how a crisis event can affect a tightly coupled system is the 
Challenger space shuttle explosion. In this disaster, the failure of one part (O ring) of the 
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system caused the entire system to fail. The tightness of coupling between the different 
components of this system made it virtually impossible to stop the one defect from affecting 
the whole spacecraft. In addition to the loss of the Challenger shuttle, seven human lives were 
lost and the very existence of the United States Space Program was severely challenged 
(Vaughn, 1996).  
While some crises are unavoidable, some scholars of organizational crises believe that 
organizations play a role in creating and shaping their own crises (Mitroff, 1988; Alpaslan, 
2004; Wise, 2003). Mitroff et al. suggest that organizations that are unaware or intentionally 
ignore the complex interactions between the different dimensions of their organization are 
‘crisis-prone’. They suggest that the culture, values and management style of crisis-prone 
organizations actually contributes to the types of crises experienced by these organizations. In 
addition, Mitroff claims that organizations also shape the crises they face by the kinds of 
early warning, prevention, damage limitation, recovery, and learning mechanisms they 
institute. The manner in which an organization prepares for crises is a crucial factor in 
determining the kinds of crises with which they will ultimately be faced (Mitroff, 1988).  
 
2.2d Impact of Crises 
Regardless of the cause, crises can have a severe impact on an organization, on its 
stakeholders, and on the community in which it resides. Organizational crises can inflict 
considerable losses. They can negatively affect an organization in tangible ways such as 
decreased profit or loss of manpower and in intangible ways like the loss of reputation or the 
infliction of emotional stress (Udwadia et al., 1991; Pearson & Clair, 1998). Crises, if 
handled well, can also have a positive impact on an organization and its stakeholders. They 
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can create heroes, they can improve organizational image, and they can lead to much-needed 
change. It is the potential of these consequences that makes organizational crisis an important 
topic to study.  
Crises can affect all aspects of an organization. The literature on organizational crisis 
contains discussions of how crises can affect image and financial stability, managerial 
decision-making, and physical and emotional well-being of employees and other 
stakeholders. Some of the potential negative impacts of crises are described below.  
 
Human and Social 
The potential for loss of human life is one of the most severe outcomes of 
organizational crises. Crises such as the mass shooting at Virginia Tech University (2007), 
the crash of a USAir aircraft in Pennsylvania and the death of a child from contaminated beef 
at a Jack-in-the-Box Restaurant have shocked us all. While the potential for physical injury is 
well-documented, the mental or emotional effects of crises on individuals are often 
overlooked (Doepel, 1991). Employees involved in a crisis can suffer severe trauma, stress, 
depression, withdrawal from social interaction, inability to concentrate, fear, anxiety and 
sleeplessness. Doepel (1991), in his work on the psychological aspects of crises, states that 
stress on individuals may originate from at least three sources: 1. the nature of the crisis and 
their action or inaction during the event, 2. their lack of experience in dealing with such 
events, leading to feelings of uncertainty about appropriate responses, and 3. the expectation 
placed upon them by the various stakeholders to reestablish control, safety and confidence in 
the organization. The ability of individuals to deal with stressful situations varies. The 
emotional consequences of crisis can appear at any time during the crisis and may continue 
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well after the situation has resolved (Doepel, 1991).  
 
Administrative 
Most people are aware of the negative impact crises can have on the financial status 
and the public image of an organization. However, a crisis can also impact other 
administrative activities in an organization, e.g., managerial decision-making and 
communication. The literature suggests that these activities are more difficult to effectively 
carry out during a crisis than during routine business and that an organization’s inability to do 
either in times of crisis has severe consequences (Pearson & Clair., 1998).  
Tackling crisis issues places exceedingly difficult demands on decision makers’ 
ability to reason effectively (Stubbart, 1987; Tjosvold, 1984). The types of decisions, the 
amount of stress and the use of available information are all factors which influence a 
manager’s ability to make decisions in times of crisis. Crisis decisions are “wicked problems” 
with characteristics such as uncertainty, complexity, and conflict (Stubbart, 1987). Dealing 
with these types of issues under the pressure of time creates the stress that is often associated 
with large-scale crises. In periods of high stress, decision makers make more errors and suffer 
from impaired intellectual functioning (Dutton et.al, 2002). Part of this is due to the fact that 
during a crisis decision makers may become preoccupied with the potential for loss and may 
seek premature closure (Tjosvold, 1984). In an attempt to rapidly solve issues, decision 
makers become cognitively rigid (Tjosvold, 1984) and rely more on prior experience than on 
available information to make decisions. They also will tend to increase control, by 
centralizing decision-making. This makes it less likely that the people with the most 
information have input into making critical decisions (Milburn et al., 1983). The resolution of 
 31 
crisis decisions may be difficult to accomplish yet it is key to the successful management of a 
crisis situation. Decision makers that become cognitively narrow and disregard useful 
information will be less able to resolve the numerous issues that occur during these times.  
The importance of an organization to effectively communicate in times of crisis has 
also been reviewed in the literature. Scholars and authors who have written on crisis 
communication stress the need for timely and effective communication with both internal and 
external stakeholders (Werner, 1990; Fink, 1986; Seeger et al., 2003). Quality information 
shared in a timely manner can promote the implementation of effective crisis management 
strategies and can prevent information distortion. In the absence of information, people are 
likely to create their own. This can lead to the formation of harmful rumors which have the 
potential to magnify the crisis situation (Blohowiak, 1987).  
Despite the need for information, individuals and organizations are often unwilling to 
share bad news (Robert et al., 2002). Sociologists Rosen and Tesser call the phenomenon of 
individuals being reluctant to share negative information with particular audiences the 
‘MUM’ effect (Rosen et al., 1970). Research has shown that in some crisis situations, there is 
reluctance on the part of the organization to share information. For example, in a study of the 
banking industry managers reported that they perceived their organizations as more likely to 
be reticent than forthcoming with information during a crisis (Reilly, 1991).  
While there may be a reluctance to share bad news, being the first to communicate an 
event is necessary for effective crisis response. The first few hours after a crisis has occurred 
is the time when public opinion begins to develop (Wisenblit, 1989; Newsom et al., 1993). 
Stakeholders that are unable to the get the information they need from the organization may 
draw their own conclusions about the situation or may go elsewhere for information. This is 
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particularly true of mass media. The media is often identified as a key external stakeholder, 
yet many organizations resist interacting with them. Scholars on crisis communication stress 
the importance of communicating with the media in times of crisis (Fink, 1986; Blohowiak, 
1987; Mallozzi, 1994). While crises may vary in their cause and their impact, Dalzell and 
Castillo, state that one fact remains consistent; the media will be banging on the door (Dalzell 
& Castillo, 1993). An organization that is quick to communicate information about a crisis to 
its many stakeholders will convey a sense of confidence, control and honesty.  
 
Technology  
Organizations are becoming more dependent on high technology. Computers, 
advanced medical equipment, transportation systems and rapid communication systems are 
examples of technologies used in everyday business. These technologies and systems are now 
so complicated that it is difficult to anticipate all of the possible interactions and inevitable 
failures (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). Failures of these systems can have severe consequences 
for an organization, including disruption of normal business. Crises that could affect an 
organization’s technological dimension include natural disasters, such as the flooding of a 
computer room, employee sabotage of equipment or unpredicted mechanical breakdowns. 
Well-documented crises which affected the technological dimension of an organization 
include the nuclear accident at Chernobyl and the 2003 Northeast blackout. Examples of 
technological failures that have the potential of severely disrupting the business of a public 
health department may include interrupted telephone service, computer failure or defective 
laboratory equipment.  
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External Impacts 
A number of articles in the literature discuss the effects of particular crises on people 
and communities external to the organization (Pauchant et al., 1990; Perrow, 1984). Most 
notable are the cases of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound and the Union 
Carbide chemical leak in Bhopal, India. These situations not only contaminated the physical 
environment, they also contributed to the death of a significant number of people and 
destroyed wildlife. In addition, these crises also had a negative impact on other social 
systems, such as the political and economic interactions between countries. The physical 
effects as well as the social impacts of these situations will undoubtedly be felt by subsequent 
generations.  
Crises are very complex. They can impact all dimensions of an organization, 
including the human/social dimensions, the administrative dimensions, the technological 
dimensions and the external dimensions. The nature of the crisis and the effectiveness of the 
organizational response will ultimately determine the outcome of the situation.  
 
2.3 Crisis Management 
 
“Plan for what is difficult while it is easy, do what is great while it is small. 
The most difficult things in the world must be done while they are still 
easy; the greatest things in the world must be done while they are still 
small. For this reason sages never do what is great, and this is why they 
can achieve that greatness.”   Sun Tzu, The Art of War  
 
It is commonly believed that the faster one responds to a crisis situation the more 
positive the outcomes. The response time appears to be influenced by how much or how little 
an organization prepares for crises. Advance planning by an organization can ultimately help 
minimize the damaging impact of a crisis since key issues have already been anticipated and 
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therefore can be more effectively managed (Gottschalk, 1993).  
The terms crisis management, crisis preparation and crisis readiness are often used 
interchangeably in the literature to describe the process of preparing for organizational crises. 
These terms, however, are different and imply different activities for the organization.  
Crisis management has been defined as organizational efforts to prevent, react to, and 
learn from crises (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). Prevention is the proactive component of crisis 
management which is concerned with reducing the likelihood of crisis. The reactive 
component is concerned with the rapid containment of and recovery from crisis situations. 
The learning component includes the process of continuous learning from all other phases of 
the crisis management process.  
Despite this broad definition of crisis management, many of the articles written on 
this topic in the 1990's focused on only one component, crisis containment (Pauchant & 
Mitroff , 1992) or “what-to-do-when-the-worst-happens’. Some call this “business 
continuity” (Shaw & Harrald, 2004). Pauchant et al. calls this part of crisis management, 
‘crash management’ (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). “Crash management” includes a reactive 
approach to crisis management. A large body of knowledge has been created to help 
practitioners deal with the outcomes of crises, including methods for responding to medical 
emergencies, dealing with the media, and organizing the volunteers at crisis sites. These types 
of activities are implemented after a crisis has occurred, in an attempt to contain its damage 
and recover from its effects (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).  
Authors that view crisis management as the rapid containment of a crisis typically 
suggest that organizations develop comprehensive crisis plans which anticipate and plan for 
the worst-case scenarios. Since 99% of the policy decisions affecting how the crisis is 
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handled are made by the company in the first seventy-two hours, a completed crisis 
management plan (CMP) is imperative to provide orderly guidance for timely and effective 
interaction with the media and public affected by the situation (Wisenblit, 1989). A CMP is 
“built upon rational expectations about how a crisis will manifest itself and how the 
organization will respond to it” (Paraskevas, 2006). Wisenblit suggests that crisis 
management plans contain seven key elements. These are:  
• a mechanism for determining potential crises;  
• identification of the audience that would be affected;  
• procedures to follow during a crisis;  
• contingency plans for continuity of business during the crisis;  
• appointment and training of a crisis management team;  
• development of a crisis communication plan; and  
• evaluation and revision of the plan in response to simulated scenarios and actual 
crises.  
 
In the 1980’s relatively few companies reported having a crisis management plan. For 
example, in 1984 a survey commissioned by the Western Union Corporation found that 45% 
of the nation’s largest corporations had no provisions for handling crises (Wisenblit, 1989). 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) found that fifty-seven percent of their sample of companies 
made no or only fragmented efforts to plan for crisis. More recent studies highlight an 
increase in the percentage of organizations that have a plan or some pieces of a plan. For 
example, Zdziarski’s study of four-year colleges and universities found that 86% had 
prepared a plan for at least one type of crisis (2001). Mitroff and colleagues (2003) also have 
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found an increase in preparedness efforts by corporations following the events of 9/11.  
While most support the need for crisis plans (Fink 1986; Booth, 1993; Kovoor-Misra, 
1996), there have been few empirical studies conducted to demonstrate the impact of written 
crisis plans on crisis outcomes. What exists is mostly anecdotal and based on the perceptions 
of those being interviewed. For example, studies conducted of both British (Booth, 1993) and 
US corporations (Fink, 1986) found that individuals in organizations with crisis management 
plans reported that the effects of crisis were less than those without. This included shorter 
crisis duration and fewer after effects. These studies support the hypothesis that the existence 
of crisis plans will positively impact the outcome of a crisis.  
More recent opinions of crisis scholars is that the real indicator of success is not that a 
company has a plan, but that when the plan is in action it is effective in helping the 
organization prevent or rapidly contain the crisis. A written plan can help employees within 
an organization think out, ahead of time, many of the questions that will arise during a crisis 
such as what resources need to mobilized and what stakeholders need information. However, 
recent case studies of crises, such as the one conducted by Paraskevas (2006) on a hotel 
chain, are showing that a plan alone does not necessarily guarantee an effective crisis 
response. There now appears to be growing agreement with the views of Mitroff and 
colleagues (1988, 1992); there is more to organizational preparedness than just having a plan 
(Clarke, 2004; McConnell & Drennan, 2006).  
 
2.3a Organizational Dimensions - Systems Approach  
Since crises are complex phenomena, it is now believed that preparedness cannot be 
completely understood by linear models and single disciplinary frames (Paraskevas, 2006, 
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Kovoor, 1991; Pearson & Clair, 1998.) Ian Mitroff and colleagues (1992) were early 
contributors to the theory that a multi-dimensional approach was needed for the study and 
management of organizational crises. Pearson and Clair (1998) further specify that 
psychological, social-political and technological-structural issues should be recognized and 
managed while preventing or responding to crises.  
Using a systems view of preparedness, Mitroff et al. (1989) suggest that two types of 
organizations exist. First there are organizations with individuals, cultures and structures 
unfavorable to crisis management. They call these organizations crisis-prone. These 
organizations employ individuals with high defense mechanisms and self-inflated or self-
deflated egos. The cultures of these organizations also hinder effective crisis management. 
Crisis-prone organizations are seven times more likely to use faulty rationalizations, such as 
“our size will protect us” or “someone else will rescue us” and are unlikely to allow decisions 
to be made nearest to where they need to be made (centralization of decision-making) 
(Milburn et al., 1983). The structure of these organizations also acts a barrier to crisis 
management. These organizations have not incorporated crisis management activities into 
individual job descriptions and have not included crisis training or emergency drills as part of 
ongoing staff development.  
The second type of organization described by Mitroff et al. is the ‘crisis-prepared’ 
organization. These organizations have healthy defense mechanisms, realistic assumptions 
and well-established structures and written plans for crisis management throughout the 
organization. They strategically identify threats and weaknesses. They employ individuals 
that are open to continuous quality improvement and ongoing learning. These organizations 
include crisis management activities into their normal work and proactively communicate 
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with key stakeholders.  
Since human, cultural, technological and structural systems can affect an 
organization’s vulnerability to major crises and they can have an impact on the manner in 
which an organization carries out its crisis management strategies, these systems should be 
included in a crisis-management model (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). The Onion Model, 
devised by Mitroff, Pauchant Finney and Pearson (1989), provides a framework for crisis 
management which includes these systems (see Figure 2.2). In this model all four layers of 
the organizational system are important to crisis preparedness.  
 
Figure 2.2 Onion Model of Crisis Management  
 
Pauchant, T. & Mitroff I. (1992). Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 
Inc., Reprinted with permission from John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
2.3b Crisis Phases  
Mitroff et al. further suggest that organizations can increase their ability to manage 
crises by properly managing each phase of the crisis process (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). 
While crises can arise from different causes and may require different solutions, nearly all 
Layer 4 – Policies / Plans 
 
Layer 3 – Organizational Structure 
 
Layer 2 – Organizational Culture 
 
Layer 1 – Human Characteristics 
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crises pass through the same set of phases or stages. Most agree that these stages include, at 
minimum, a pre-crisis phase, a crisis phase and a post-crisis phase. Fink (1986) describes 
four stages of crisis: the prodomal stage when there are early warning signals, the acute stage 
when the crisis event occurs, the chronic stage of the crisis when recovery takes place and the 
resolution stage when it's business as usual. The most commonly used model is one that 
contains five phases: signal detection, preparation and prevention, damage containment, 
recovery and learning (see Figure 2.3). Others, in an attempt to integrate the cross-
disciplinary knowledge of crisis preparedness, have added to the depth to this five-stage 
model. Pearson and Clair (1998) added a contextual component which includes political, 
technological, social and psychological aspects to each of the stages. Shaw and Harrald 
(2004) integrated their knowledge of business procedures to the model and Pelfrey (2007) 
applied this staged model to community preparedness efforts for terrorist attacks. Each of the 
five phases proposed by Pauchant and Mitroff are briefly described below and expanded to 
include some of the new knowledge from these other crisis scholars.  
 
Figure 2.3 Crisis Phases  
                
 
Pauchant, T. & Mitroff I. (1992). Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 
Inc. Reprinted with permission from John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
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Signal Detection  
With very few exceptions, all crises leave a repeated trail of early warning signals  
(Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). These may include patterns of customer and client 
complaints, financial inconsistencies or threatening notes sent to employees. The challenge 
for managers is to differentiate these warning signals from the mass amounts of information 
they are faced with each day (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). Avoiding these signals can lead an 
organization into a devastating crisis, such as the case with the Virginia Tech University 
Massacre. Ronald Rhody, Senior Vice president of Bank of America, claims that 'when an 
organization fails to spot a crisis in the making, it’s usually due to four shortcomings, 
'ignorance, arrogance, bad judgment, negligence' '' (Newsom, 1993).  
Organizations should conduct deliberate searches for warning signals, including 
conducting procedural audits, vulnerability/ risk assessments, and ‘worst-case scenario’ 
discussions (Mitroff, Alpaslan & Green, 2004, Shaw & Harrald, 2004). Early recognition of a 
problem will have an impact on the outcomes. Situations effectively managed at this phase 
typically become business problems or challenges and do not progress into full-fledged 
crises.  
 
Preparation and Prevention  
This phase of the model involves doing as much as possible to both avert crises and 
assure readiness for those that may occur. Much of the early literature on this pre-crisis phase 
focused on identifying the types of activities that are needed to demonstrate readiness. These 
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activities are typically implemented at the same time as assessing the potential for various 
crises and as conducting the activities for identifying the early warning signals of new 
problems. Some examples of activities that would fall in this phase for preparing for possible 
crisis situations include training key staff in media relations, nurturing relationships with key 
stakeholder groups, identifying a chain of command and conducting routine crisis scenario 
drills and exercises. Activities which may help to mitigate or prevent future situations from 
occurring include repairing building or technology breakdowns, creating personnel policies or 
advocating for safe and healthy workforce practices.  
Trigger Event  
The trigger event is the situation that people most equate with a crisis. Fink (1986) 
calls this the ‘point of no return’. Notable examples include the disintegration of the space 
shuttle Columbia over Texas in February, 2003 and the seventy-four deaths/injuries from fire 
at the Imperial Chicken Plant in Hamlet, NC. The dramatic occurrence of the trigger event is 
typically the announcement that a crisis is unfolding. It is important at this point to quickly 
acknowledge the event and define the actual crisis. Time is of the essence.  
 
Containment and Damage Limitation  
This phase of the crisis model consists of the implementation of strategies to resolve 
the crisis and to prevent it from spreading to other areas of the organization (Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992; Mitroff, Alpaslan & Green, 2004). In some crises, this is the period when lives 
are on the line. Blythe (2002) outlines ten immediate actions that need to be taken following 
the recognition of a triggering event. These include evaluation of continuing danger, 
notification of response team members, securing the crisis site (if appropriate), 
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implementation of prevention strategies and implementation of communication plan.  
With or without a plan, Reilly (1989) suggests that there are five key activities that 
must occur for an organization to effectively contain a crisis: problem-sensing and diagnosis, 
decision response, resource mobilization and implementation, internal information flow and 
external information flow. These activities emphasize the importance of the organization’s 
ability to recognize crises, to make timely decisions, to identify and mobilize necessary 
resources such as money and equipment and to communicate effectively and quickly to the 
appropriate stakeholders.  
One of the major difficulties in managing a crisis during this phase is the intensity and 
time limitations that often accompany and characterize this stage (Fink, 1986). The very 
nature of crisis can impede one’s ability to act quickly and effectively.  Boin (2004) claims 
that both the excess of and the lack of information can make it difficult to determine the real 
crisis. Others have discussed the limitations on cognitive abilities such as decision making in 
times of stress (Tjosvold, 1984; Stubbart, 1987; Pearson & Clair, 1998). The speed at which 
an organization makes decisions and mobilizes resources after the crisis occurs will 
determine the outcomes. Organizations that mismanage a crisis situation run the risk of 
having the crisis spread or of prolonging the negative effects of the crisis, such as poor public 
image.  
 
Recovery  
This phase involves an organization’s attempts to recover from a crisis. This includes 
the recovery of both tangible and intangible assets (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). It is also a 
period of self-analysis, of self-doubt and of healing. Short- and long-term strategies may 
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involve identifying other facilities to resume normal business, providing personal stress 
counseling for staff and conducting targeted public relations campaigns. Market research 
conducted by Burson-Marstellar (Continuity Forum, 2005) of 685 senior officials from 
business and governmental agencies showed the average recovery period following a 
reputation-damaging crisis was 3.2 years. Organizational leaders need to realize that recovery 
is not quick.  
 
Learning  
Crises can create a critical period of learning for an organization. Learning can occur 
during each stage of the crisis-management process. Learning can also occur during or after 
‘near miss’ situations or during or after events experienced by other organizations (Kovoor, 
1991). Stakeholders both on the inside and the outside of an organization are frequently 
motivated to learn and make changes (Kovoor-Misra et al., 2000) after a crisis. Learning 
from an event should help individuals and systems respond quicker to other events and help 
prevent future events from occurring.  
Despite the fact that a crisis can be a motivator for change, Kovoor-Misra and Nathan 
(2000) have found that there is only a short window of opportunity for learning post-crisis. 
They state that organizations go through three successive post-crisis learning phases: 
defensiveness, openness and then forgetfulness. The openness period is the time when most 
learning can occur. Unfortunately there are many reasons that people and organizations do 
not maximize the potential for learning after a crisis. This aspect of preparedness has recently 
been given more attention in the literature. Crisis scholars suggest that there are many 
barriers that impede learning such as desire for normalization, lack of trust, scapegoating and 
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a whole range of defense mechanisms. (Kovoor-Misra et al., 2000; Elliott et al., 2000; Roux-
Dufort, 2000) To maximize learning, organizational leaders must recognize and deal with 
these barriers and do so with an understanding of the importance of time.  
 
2.3c Crisis Types – Creating a Portfolio  
Organizations with crisis-prepared cultures, structures and strategies will be better 
prepared to manage each phase of a crisis. But even organizations with this mindset and goal 
cannot prepare for every possible crisis they may encounter. A model which assists managers 
in identifying which situations to plan for would be a useful tool.  
Fink describes one possible model for selecting which crises an organization should 
prepare. He suggests that organizations plot potential situations on a Crisis Barometer Scale. 
This grid has two dimensions. The vertical dimension indicates the level of impact the crisis 
could have on the organization. The horizontal dimension indicates the likelihood of the 
crisis occurring. Using this model, organizations should prepare for situations that could 
severely impact the organization and have a high likelihood of occurring (Fink, 1986). While 
this model provides one tool for identifying which crises to prepare for, it assumes that the 
individuals placing the situations on the grid are not in denial of what situations could occur. 
For instance, public health practitioners may make the faulty assumption that all people that 
work in public health are caring and trust-worthy. Based on this assumption they may believe 
that an employee would never hurt a client or another employee, thus placing situations of 
workplace violence in the low probability area of the grid.  
Mitroff et al. (1988) suggest that organizations prepare for a variety of crisis 
situations. They suggest that the array of crises can be grouped into a limited number of types 
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and that an organization can minimize its crisis vulnerability by preparing for at least one 
situation in each type. They call the results of this preparation, a ‘crisis portfolio’ (Pauchant 
& Mitroff, 1992). This strategy allows organizations to think through the strengths and 
weaknesses of each dimension, technology, human/social, and structure of their organization, 
and how each of these systems interacts inside and outside the organization. The nature of the 
crisis on these different systems has a great impact on how the crisis should be handled and 
what the ultimate outcome of the crisis will be. Hence, planning for a variety of situations 
will strengthen an organization's ability to react to each unique situation in a timely manner.  
  In order to prevent and respond effectively to crises, an organization must go beyond 
the creation of a crisis-response checklist. Crisis plans that identify the potential warning 
signals and potential response actions for a variety of crisis scenarios for all phases of an 
event are useful. However, organizations will only be truly prepared if their ethical 
orientation, their behaviors, their stakeholder relationships and their culture also support 
crisis preparedness.  
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter outlines the critical concepts of organizational crisis preparedness 
needed to set the stage for this study and outlines some of the shortcomings of literature on 
this subject.  
Three limitations of the academic literature on crisis preparedness were described. 
First, there continues to be a lack of agreement between disciplines on terminology and 
theoretical models for crisis preparedness. Second, the difficulty in studying crisis 
preparedness has led to a gap in comprehensive studies which use multiple data collection 
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methods. And finally, despite a recent interest in preparedness in the field of public health, 
there is a void in research on the levels of organizational crisis preparedness in local public 
health agencies.  
Following the discussion of the limitations of the literature, a summary of how key 
terms have been defined by different scholars and a description of existing models of 
preparedness are presented. Definitions of the terms crisis and crisis management are shared 
as are ways in which scholars have grouped types of crises and the common beliefs about the 
causes and potential outcomes of crises. Two models of preparedness are presented which are 
not mutually exclusive but are often used separately in various studies or commentaries: the 
Onion Model, which focuses on preparedness in a multi-dimensional organization, and the 
Crisis Management 5-Phase Model, which allows users to focus on what is needed for 
preparedness at the various phases of a crisis. Finally, the concept of a “crisis portfolio” is 
described as a way in which to improve organizational preparedness. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Since crises can originate in and impact all dimensions of an organization, an 
organization as a whole must be prepared for crises (Kovoor, 1991). Therefore a multi-
dimensional model of crisis management was used to understand the level of crisis 
preparedness of public health organizations. The model integrates three concepts found in the 
literature: a multi-layered organizational system view, phases of a crisis and a crisis portfolio. 
This chapter provides a review of the key definitions and conceptual framework upon which 
this study is based.  
 
3.1 Definition of Terms 
As presented in Chapter 2, definitions of the terms “crisis” and “crisis management” 
are plentiful. The term crisis is often used synonymously with many other words, such as, 
emergency, disaster, and catastrophe. In an organization, the term crisis can also be used to 
refer to both acute and long term situations that may result in negative outcomes. “Crisis 
preparedness” is also used in similar ways to the terms “crisis management”, “crisis 
readiness” and “contingency planning.”  To understand the value of this research and its 
limitations, it is necessary to understand how these terms are used and defined. Definitions of 
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the terms “organizational crisis”, “crisis management”, “crisis prevention” and “crisis 
preparedness” are presented below.  
 
3.1a Organizational Crisis 
Organizational leaders sense a crisis when there is an urgent threat to a systems basic 
structures or values (Boin, 2004). Boin describes the term crisis as a catchall concept which 
encompasses a variety of “un-ness” events; unwanted, unexpected, unprecedented, uncertain 
and almost unmanageable.  Public health professionals face a myriad of situations with these 
characteristics. Not all of these high threat situations are included in the definition of 
organizational crisis used for this research project. A clear definition of the concept is 
therefore important to understanding the focus of this study. 
For the purposes of this study, an organizational crisis is defined in the following 
way. Any situation that: 
1. is sudden, acute and demands a timely response, 
2. requires responses outside of the organization’s typical operating frameworks, and 
3. is perceived as being a severe threat to the ability of the organization to be effective  
These three key attributes serve to distinguish crises from the many of the other 
challenging situations that face public health administrators as a part of their work as 
managers and practitioners. These characteristics of the definition will be explained in further 
detail now. 
First, for a situation to be described as a crisis, it must be ‘sudden, acute and 
demanding of a timely response’. Crises are often identifiable by a trigger event which occurs 
suddenly and acutely. While these situations are typically preceded by a series of warning 
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signals, they seem to appear abruptly and dramatically, e.g. the Oklahoma City federal 
building bombing or the Malden Mills fire. Crisis situations also have the potential for 
immediate serious consequences, such as public harm or rapid deterioration of public image. 
Since these situations have acute, imminent consequences they are seen as needing a timely 
response. Situations which occur over long periods of time or which may have negative 
consequences sometime in the future are not considered organizational crises in this study. 
For example, in this research study, situations such as changing environmental trends or 
changing federal funding guidelines for public health services are not considered crisis 
situations. Environmental trends, i.e.  the trend of local hospitals to provide new community 
health services may be seen as a threat to the existence of public health departments, however 
it is not a sudden and acute problem. And while it may require action, it does not require an 
immediate response by the agency.  
A crisis situation must not only be sudden and require a timely response; it must also 
require strategies that are different from normal operating procedures. A crisis is a rare event 
that is not part of an organization’s mission-driven business. If the situation can be handled 
by the procedures and services normally provided by the organization, then the situation falls 
within the scope of work for that organization and is not considered a crisis in this study. For 
example, a house fire is a crisis to a homeowner. However, responding to a house fire is 
considered part of the core business of a fire department and hence not an organizational 
crisis for them. For public health professionals, responding to a Hepatitis A outbreak in a 
restaurant or day care is an example of an event requiring quick and immediate action. 
Despite the apparent sudden nature of an outbreak and the need for a quick response, this 
situation is not considered an organizational crisis because responding to infectious disease 
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outbreaks falls within the purview of the health department’s responsibility. This is also true 
for the response to either a bioterrorist event or a natural disaster in a community. 
Responding to such events is considered an important core responsibility of a public health 
agency. However, these situations can become organizational crises for public health 
agencies and other first responders. 
When an organization whose mission includes responding to high threat events, such 
as fires, disease, or natural disasters, causes an event or responds inappropriately or 
inadequately to an event, the organization can experience an organizational crisis. Such is the 
case when a volunteer fireman was charged with arson in Virginia (“Fireman Charged,”  
2006) and when FEMA was accused of a poor response to the devastation in New Orleans 
after Hurricane Katrina (Sullivan, L., 2005). A poor response to a public health problem or 
illegal behavior on the part of a public health employee can also create an organizational 
crisis for a local, state or federal public health agency. A recent example of this is the public 
relations crises now being experienced by the Fulton County (GA) Health Department and 
the Centers for Disease Control for what has been perceived by many as a mishandling of a 
globe-trotting individual with a potentially dangerous TB infection (“Lawmakers rip CDC,”  
2007). When an organization does not effectively carry out its work as perceived by its 
stakeholders, a crisis can occur. 
Natural disasters or terrorists attacks can also create other types of organizational 
crises for local public health agencies. For example, a severe weather related storm or a 
bombing may damage all or some of the public health facilities, including offices, 
laboratories and clinics. Terrorist attacks or naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks, 
such as pandemic flu, may cause such fear in people, that public health workers may not 
 51 
show up for work, hence making it impossible to carry out the essential services of a public 
health agency. Under these circumstances, these events would be considered a crisis at an 
organizational level and would fall under the study of this paper.  
Organizational crises require actions that are atypical of normal work. Responding to 
charges of incompetence or mismanagement may require actions that are outside of typical 
operating frameworks. Likewise, responding to physical threats within the health department 
facilities or to the destruction of equipment and buildings are not normal work activities. 
Responding to these events will require that public health leaders take actions that are 
different than their usual day to day responsibilities. For example, a crisis might require that 
law enforcement be called, that services are established in another off campus location or that 
a press conference is called to apologize for or explain the status of a situation. 
Organizational crises are uncommon events which require response activities that fall outside 
of the agencies’ daily work practices. 
The third criteria which defines a crisis is that the situation must be perceived by the 
stakeholders as a severe threat to the organization’s ability to be effective. A public health 
department will obviously be less effective in providing public health services if a situation 
has caused profound damage to the facility in which services are provided (e.g. the collapse 
of the Cantor Fitzgerald Office on 9/11). However, they may also lose their ability to fulfill 
their mission, if a situation damages their credibility and reputation. The success of a public 
health department is similar to other nonprofit organizations, in that it is greatly affected by 
public perception (Lally, 1993).  Organizational crises can severely threaten the existence of 
the organization by negatively impacting the level of public confidence and trust. In private 
corporations this may manifest itself in a loss in profits or market share, but in a public health 
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organization, the crisis may cripple the organization by diminishing its ability to be seen as 
credible or effective. This in turn, may directly affect its level of financial and community 
support.  A public health department which is considered ineffective is like a private 
organization going out of business. 
 
3.1b Crisis Management 
Crisis management has been defined as a catch-all concept which includes all of the 
activities undertaken by an organization related to crisis prevention and response (Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992; Shaw & Harrald, 2004). In this study, however, “crisis management” is more 
narrowly defined. It is defined here as the approach and activities involved in the containment 
and recovery from an organizational crisis. Hence, crisis management focuses on the 
activities that occur after a triggering event has occurred. This is often referred to as the 
stages of damage containment and business continuity. It includes the time period when the 
crisis is first made know and the immediate efforts for salvage and rescue. It also includes the 
activities that occur for recovery, including those that allow for a full cultural readjustment, 
normalization and learning (Kovoor, Clair & Bettenhausen, 2001). 
Reilly (1989) describes the key activities of crisis management as problem sensing, 
decision-making, stakeholder communication and resource mobilization and implementation. 
Typically these activities are facilitated by the activation of a cross functional crisis team and 
the execution of key activities included in a crisis plan. 
Others (Kovoor et al., 2000) have referred to another set of activities that assist 
organizations and their members with recovery. A crisis may disrupt organizational systems 
in fundamental ways. Operations may cease, personnel may be distracted or unavailable, and 
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facilities may be closed down (Seeger et al., 2005). To recover from such events an 
organization must initiate activities for business continuity including the psychological 
recovery of individuals from trauma and stress (Pearson & Clair 1998). The recovery phase is 
thought by some (Phelps, 1987; Boin, 2004) to be the most under-studied aspect of crisis 
management. 
The success of these efforts should not just be measured by the organizations ability 
to come out the other side of a crisis. Pearson and Clair (1998) suggest more rigorous criteria 
to judge the effectiveness of an organization’s crisis management efforts. They state that 
crisis management efforts are effective when operations are sustained or resumed, 
organizational and external stakeholder losses are minimized and learning occurs so that 
lessons are transferred to future incidents. For a public health agency, outcomes of a 
successful recovery might include: no loss of life or injuries, health department services are 
maintained or immediately reinstated, reputation or image is enhanced or improved, internal 
coordination and integration is strengthened, financial resources for handling the crisis are 
recovered, and new policies are created or lessons from experienced are learned for the 
future. 
 
3.1c Crisis Prevention / Preparation 
The term crisis prevention is defined in this study as the approach and activities 
conducted by an organization to identify, prevent and prepare for potential crises. As 
described by Kovoor et al. (2000) the literature describes prevention activities as those that 
help to address the underlying systemic causes of potential crises, those that allow for the 
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early detection of crises and those that support the application of past learnings to present and 
future realities.  
The activities included in this strategy are conducted prior to the occurrence of a 
remarkable triggering event. It includes the assurance of norms, structures and procedures to 
prevent situations from occurring and to allow for a quick and effective response should 
something occur. Examples of activities that an organization may engage in to identify, 
prevent and prepare for crises include, conducting audits and other forms of problem 
surveillance, correcting problems identified from past experiences, developing a crisis plan, 
providing staff training in crisis communications, and conducting drills of various crisis 
scenarios.  
 
3.1d Crisis Preparedness 
Crisis preparedness is broadly defined in this study and encompasses the concepts of 
both crisis management and crisis prevention. Crisis preparedness is defined here as an 
organization’s ability to prevent, respond to and learn from organizational crises. This 
includes a multitude of formal and informal practices and policies as described above. In this 
study, an organization that is considered crisis-prepared will have human, cultural and 
structural characteristics that support proactive crisis prevention and response activities. It 
will also have a set of organizational strategies for crisis management that address a variety 
of types of crises, the different phases of these crises and the different dimensions of the 
organization that these crises affect. “Crisis readiness” is sometimes used with the same 
meaning in this document as crisis preparedness. 
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The concepts defined by the terms “organizational crisis” and “crisis preparedness” 
will be included in the overall framework used for the study. This model will be described 
next. 
3.2 Crisis Preparedness Framework – DTP Model 
A useful model of crisis preparedness must include those factors deemed important. 
These factors are: organizational system characteristics or dimensions, types of crises, and 
phases of crises (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). Models previously discussed in chapter two, the 
‘Onion Model’, ‘Crisis Portfolio’ and ‘Phases of a Crisis’ will serve as the framework for this 
study. To provide a comprehensive view of these concepts they have been combined to form 
a model which will be called the DTP (Dimensions-Types-Phases) Framework of Crisis 
Preparedness.   
The DTP Model of Crisis Preparedness (see Figure 3.1) provides an over-riding 
schema for crisis preparedness. It summarizes the three concepts that will be used to assess 
an organization’s level of crisis preparedness. These are: 
1. Dimensions of the organizational system: the human, cultural and structural 
characteristics that influence crisis preparedness as well as the presence or absence of 
well established plans or strategies for crisis prevention and management. 
2. Types: whether or not the organization has strategies for a variety of crisis situations. 
3. Phases: whether or not the strategies for each crisis type include activities to address 
potential issues that may arise through the each phase of the crisis lifecycle. 
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Figure 3.1 DTP Model of Crisis Preparedness 
 
 
3.2a Dimensions of an Organization 
The dimensions of an organization which are considered important for crisis 
preparedness are covered by the Pauchant and Mitroff Onion Model described briefly in 
Chapter 2. The concept of dimensional layers is used here to provide a comprehensive 
framework for studying crisis preparedness. Each layer of the model and the interactions 
between each level are important factors to consider. Preparation for the prevention and 
response to crises means that an organization is performing well across all layers of the 
model (Mitroff et al., 1989). For visual purposes the layers of the Pauchant Onion Model 
have been inverted in the DTP Model to highlight the importance of the organizational 
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environment in promoting or impeding the use of an organization’s written strategies. This 
visual change does not change the importance of each layer nor does it alter the way in which 
the model will be used. The layers of the model are discussed below. 
Layer 1 addresses the subjective experiences of the individuals who form an 
organization. In this model, this layer is called “Human Beliefs.” Included here are the basic 
needs of individuals, including the hopes, fears and dreams of the employees. This level also 
focuses on the relationship the employees have with both the organization and the 
environment (Mitroff et al., 1989). Particularly important to crisis management is the 
propensity of individuals to be self-centered and use different defense mechanisms in relation 
to crises and other traumatic events (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). Table 3.1 lists eight 
common defense mechanisms. An organization may be considered crisis prone if it employs 
individuals that deny that crises affect the world beyond their organization or individuals that 
claim that they can handle anything that comes their way. 
 
Table 3.1 Core defense mechanisms 
 
• Denial: refusal to acknowledge threatening realities 
• Disavowal: discredits importance of threatening realities 
• Fixation: rigid commitment to a particular course of action 
• Grandiosity: feeling of omnipotence 
• Idealization:  idealization of a person, object or organization 
• Intellectualization: the elaborate rationalization of an impulse 
• Projection: the attribution of unacceptable impulses to others 
• Repression: the pushing down of threatening impulses into unconsciousness 
• Splitting: the extreme isolation of different elements, fragmentation 
 
Pauchant, T. & Mitroff I. (1992). Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 
Inc. Reprinted with permission from John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
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Similar to the core, Layer 2 represents a largely invisible aspect of an organization - 
but often one of the most important factors in effective crisis preparedness. Layer 2 addresses 
an organization’s culture; it’s unwritten rules, codes of conduct, and informal communication 
patterns (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). This level also reflects the attitudes and beliefs of top 
managers regarding the organization’s potential for crises. For example, some managers 
believe that properties of their organization, the environment, the crisis itself or their prior 
crisis management efforts protect them from experiencing future crisis (see Table 3.2 for a 
list of faulty rationalizations). These faulty rationalizations may hinder crisis preparedness 
efforts in the organization.  
The second layer of the model also reflects an organization’s willingness to learn 
from experiences and past mistakes. Organizations that believe that nothing is gained by 
mulling over past mistakes or believe that they don’t make mistakes will undoubtedly be less 
able to prevent or deal with a crisis. 
Layers 3 and 4 represent those aspects of an organization that are easiest to observe 
and easiest for an organization to change. Layer 3 refers to the structural level of the 
organization and its effects on crisis management. Structure refers to the types and hierarchy 
of employees in an organization and whether or not the organization has in place an 
infrastructure for crisis management. “This includes open and effective communication 
channels among levels and across divisions, as well as job descriptions which specify who is 
accountable for supporting crisis management activities and reporting bad news” (Pearson & 
Mitroff, 1994). Another critical aspect to consider in this layer of the model is whether or not 
the organization has a crisis management team (Mitroff, 1988; King, 2002; Shaw & Harrald, 
2004) and whether or not members of this team practice their different roles. 
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Table 3.2 Faulty rationalizations that hinder crisis preparedness efforts  
 
Group 1 
Properties of the 
Organization 
Group 2 
Properties of the 
Environment 
Group 3 
Properties of the 
Crises Themselves 
Group 4 
Properties of Prior 
Crisis Management 
Efforts 
• Our size will protect 
us 
• Excellent, well-
managed companies 
do not have crises 
• Our special location 
will protect us 
• Certain crises only 
happen to others 
• Crises do not require 
special procedures 
• It is enough to react 
to a crisis once it has 
happened 
• Crisis management 
or crisis prevention 
is a luxury 
• Employees who 
bring bad news 
deserve to be 
punished 
• Our employees are 
so dedicated that we 
can trust them 
without question 
• Desirable business 
ends justify the 
taking of high risk 
means 
• If a major crisis 
happens, someone 
else will rescue us 
• The environment is 
benign; or, we can 
effectively buffer 
ourselves from the 
environment 
• Nothing new has 
really occurred that 
warrants change 
• Crisis management 
is someone else’s 
responsibility 
• It’s not a crisis if it 
doesn’t happen to or 
hurt us 
• Accidents are just a 
cost of doing 
business 
• Most crises turn out 
not to be very 
important 
• Each crisis is so 
unique that it is 
impossible to 
prepare for all crises 
• Crises are isolated 
incidents 
• Most crises resolve 
themselves; 
therefore time is our 
best ally 
• Most (if not all) 
crises have a 
technical solution 
• It’s enough to throw 
technical and 
financial quick-fixes 
at a problem 
• Crises are solely 
negative in their 
impact. We cannot 
learn anything from 
them 
• Crisis management 
is like an insurance 
policy; you only 
need so much 
• In a crisis situation, 
we just need to 
refer to the 
emergency 
procedures we’ve 
laid out in our crisis 
manuals 
• We are a team that 
will function well 
during a crisis 
• Only executives 
need to be aware of 
our crisis plans; 
why scare 
employees or 
members of the 
community 
• We are tough 
enough to react to a 
crisis in an 
objective and 
rational manner 
• We know how to 
manipulate the 
media 
• The most important 
thing in crisis 
management is to 
protect the good 
image of the 
organization 
• The only important 
thing in crisis 
management is to 
ensure that our 
internal operations 
stay intact 
 
 
Pauchant, T. & Mitroff I. (1992). Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 
Inc. Reprinted with permission from John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
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Layer 4 comprises the organization’s written plans and strategies for crisis 
management. This includes their existing programs, procedures and mechanisms specifically 
designed to prevent and deal with crises. Assessment of a health department at this level may 
include a review of the policies in place to deal with infectious disease outbreaks, employee 
theft and facility bomb threats. In may also include an examination of any written guidelines 
for working with the media, of agreements with other organizations for use of facilities in an 
emergency or of personnel policies to prevent misconduct. 
 
3.2b Types of Crises  
While organizations should have a set of crisis plans, no organization can prepare for 
the limitless crisis situations that may occur. It is, therefore, important for organizations to 
find a way to determine which crises to prepare and which to neglect. Mitroff et al. suggests 
that a crisis typology which groups similar crisis situations into a manageable set of types 
could provide a framework by which organizations could comprehensively prepare for crises 
(Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). Using this framework, an organization should prepare for at least 
one crisis scenario in each of the crisis families. Mitroff et al. calls the results of this 
preparation, a “crisis portfolio”. 
 
3.2c Phases of a Crisis 
Preventing and managing crises requires an understanding of the life of a crisis. As 
described in Chapter 2, nearly all crises pass through a series of distinct phases or stages. 
“Regardless of the type of crisis, effective organizational crisis management involves 
managing the five distinct phases through which crises pass” (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). 
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These phases are signal detection, preparation and prevention, damage containment, recovery 
and learning. Mitroff et al. suggests that organizations can increase their ability to manage 
crises by properly managing each phase of the crisis process (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993).  
A crisis-prepared organization will have strategies and activities which address the 
different phases of a crisis. For example an organization that proactively searches for 
potential crises will routinely conduct quality assurance audits, collect and review customer 
complaints and identify organizational strengths and weaknesses in a strategic planning 
process.  An organization that actively prevents and prepares for crisis situations will conduct 
routine training programs for staff (i.e. media training) and will engage in crisis scenario 
drills.  An organization prepared to rapidly contain a crisis situation will have identified 
individuals to serve on a Crisis Management Team (CMT) and will have a process in place 
by which to make rapid decisions; including decisions about resource mobilization and 
communication with internal and external publics. A crisis-prepared organization will finally 
have in place strategies for recovery and learning. These may include plans for providing 
staff and other individuals affected by the crisis with psychological counseling and a crisis 
debriefing meeting with key managers at some point after the immediate threat of the crisis 
has passed. Crisis-prepared organizations prepare for a variety of crisis situations through 
each phase of the crisis lifecycle. 
  
3.3 Other Organizational Attributes 
Previous research has indicated that a number of organizational attributes may 
contribute to an organization’s level of crisis preparedness. Two of these factors, 
organizational size and previous crisis experience are described here. 
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3.3a Organization’s Size 
Much of the prior research on crisis management suggests that an organization’s size 
impacts crisis preparedness levels. However, it is not clear exactly whether or not it has a 
tendency to improve an organization’s readiness to deal with crises or if it distracts from the 
organizations readiness.  On one hand, it is felt that larger organizations may be more ready 
to cope with crisis situations because they have more resources.  They generally have more 
manpower, they have access to specialty equipment (e.g. extra phone lines, fax machines) and 
they tend to have access to more money than smaller organizations. They are also more likely 
to have individuals with particular skills, such as public relations, safety officers, and medical 
staff. Specialized staff members are often not found in small organizations. A study of small 
businesses after Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of the gulf state region highlighted some of 
these issues as impediments to crisis recovery. Of particular note was a lack of crisis 
planning, a vulnerability to interruptions in cash flow, a lack of access to resources and 
serious infrastructure problems (Runyan, 2006).  
On the other hand, some see large size as a barrier to effective crisis management. 
Large organizations often have more barriers to effective communication and may have more 
controls on how and when resources may be used.  Larger organizations may be less flexible. 
They may have more manuals and policies to follow, making it difficult to respond quickly to 
an emerging crisis situation (Reilly, 1991). 
Despite the potential barriers to crisis preparedness from large organizational size, 
empirical data collected during research on the banking industry found strong support for 
larger size contributing to crisis readiness (Reilly, 1987). Size is also expected to influence 
crisis preparedness in public health agencies as well. 
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3.3b Previous Crisis Experience 
Lessons learned from previous experiences can be also be valuable and are thought by 
some researchers (Mitroff & Pauchant, 1992; Spillan & Crandall 2002) to be beneficial to 
improving crisis readiness abilities. Research conducted by Reilly (1987) shows some 
support for past experience enhancing an organizations readiness to deal with crises. 
Similarly, Kovoor’s (1996) research on technology focused organizations and Spillan & 
Crandall’s (2002) work with not-for profit agencies found these organizations to be 
motivated towards greater concern for preparedness with past experience of a crisis. 
Experience can motivate change because a crisis can create an awareness of organizational 
vulnerabilities and can challenge existing assumptions and beliefs that limit preparedness.  
Individuals often rely on past experience to make decisions in the present. 
Organizations, too, rely on established procedures and past experience to handle arising 
situations. Often the way situations were handled previously will be the way they are handled 
in the future (Milburn et al., 1983).  If this is true, past experience may also make an 
organization less crisis ready since the organization may treat all crises as if they were the 
same. One example of this was the inability of small business owners in the Gulf coast to 
recover quickly from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 because of their belief that previous storms 
had been enough experience to be prepared for any crisis (Runyan, 2006).  
Past experience with crisis can be a powerful motivator for change and learning. It 
can also provide a false sense of readiness. Organizational administrators should build on the 
lessons learned from past events. The crises of the future will never be the same as the crises 
of the past. 
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3.4 Summary 
In this chapter definitions of four key terms were shared and the model of crisis 
preparedness to be used in the study was defined. The word “crisis” includes three defining 
characteristics as perceived by a stakeholder; a sudden and acute threat, requires responses 
outside of typical operating frameworks and has the potential to negatively impact the ability 
of the organization to function. Preparedness is defined in very broad terms, including both 
the activities to prevent and prepare for crises but also the activities to effectively respond, 
recover and learn from crises.  
To assess the level of organizational preparedness in local North Carolina health 
departments a multi-dimensional model of preparedness is used. This conceptual model 
combines three pertinent frameworks found in the existing literature; “crisis phases”, “crisis 
portfolio” and the multi-layered, “Onion Model.” The resulting model suggests that prepared 
organizations have crisis mindsets and cultures that support preparedness and they have 
infrastructures and plans that facilitate prevention and response activities for a variety of 
types of crises and for all phases of a crisis lifecycle. This model is called the DTP Model of 
Crisis Preparedness. 
Finally, this chapter describes two additional factors which may be important to 
preparedness levels for an organization; organizational size and past crisis experience. The 
extent to which these factors contribute or impede an organization’s ability to be crisis-
prepared will not be thoroughly reviewed in this study but suggest that more research is 
needed. The study methodology is described in the next chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 4   
STUDY METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS  
   
To improve understanding of the complex phenomenon of organizational crises 
preparedness, a multi- method exploratory study was designed. The study was conducted in 
two phases over the time period of August 1995 to December 1995. Phase I focused on the 
development of a typology of the crises that might be faced by public health agencies. Phase 
II focused on obtaining multiple sources of data to describe the level of crisis preparedness in 
local health departments in the state of North Carolina. Descriptions of the sample groups 
that were studied, the methodologies used and the methods of data analysis are described 
below for each phase of this research.   
   
4.1 Phase I – Development of a Crisis Typology 
The development of a typology of organizational crises was accomplished in two 
steps.   
First, a list of potential crisis situations was developed. Four public health 
administrators, known to the researcher, were asked to assist in the creation of this list. One 
individual was an assistant health director from a large urban health department, two were 
local health directors, one from a rural health department and one from a coastal community 
and the final individual worked in the Office of Public Relations at the North Carolina 
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Department of Health and Human Services. Each of these administrators created his /her own 
list. To facilitate this process, each was given the definition of “organizational crisis” used in 
this study and a list of potential organizational crises developed by the Lukaszewski Group 
(Appendix A). A single list of worst-case scenarios was created by combining each of the 
lists generated by the administrators with a list created by the researcher. All redundant 
entries were eliminated.   
The next step was to develop a categorization framework, or typology, from this list 
of potential crises. A modified focus group methodology was used to sort the list of situations 
into similar groupings or “crisis families.”  The process used to develop the crisis typology is 
described below.   
Three focus groups were conducted in different regions of the state during the months 
of August and September, 1995. Two additional focus groups were conducted to pilot the 
process prior to the study groups. The duration of each group discussion was approximately 
90 minutes and included at least five local public health managers from the participating 
county. The participating agencies were selected to provide diversity in both geography and 
organizational size. The health director was known to the researcher for each of these 
organizations. He or she was asked to select the members of the focus group; including 
individuals with the most interest or understanding of crisis prevention and response 
activities.    
The researcher facilitated each focus group discussion. Initially, each of the public 
health administrators was asked to individually sort the crisis situations into distinct 
groupings (see Appendix B for Focus Group Discussion Guide). The instructions were to sort 
the situations based on similarities in how each crisis should be resolved. Crisis situations 
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placed together in a particular group should be perceived by the participants as requiring 
similar strategies for resolution and management. To facilitate the process, each participant 
was provided the definition of organizational crisis used in this study and a list of sample 
crisis response strategies, such as holding a press conference, providing tours of the affected 
facility and obtaining back-up communication technologies.   
After each individual sorted the situations into groupings, the group discussed some 
potential crisis categories.  Then the group, as a whole, was asked to sort the same situations 
(individually written on index cards) into different categories. During the discussion, 
situations that were felt to be too broadly defined, such as fire, which may be further broken 
down into arson, damage by lightening, or faulty wiring, were expanded.  Finally, each group 
named the final categories or “crisis families” that they had established.   
Crucial to understanding the crisis families identified by each group is an 
understanding of why the crises in each grouping were placed together.  The researcher took 
notes during each group discussion to capture the perceptions of the individuals sorting the 
situations into the groupings. Of particular interest were the ways in which the public health 
administrators found the individual crises similar and the ways in which they found them 
different.  Differences in opinion among group members were recorded if the members were 
unable to agree on a specific crisis category.     
The resulting groupings derived by each of the three focus groups were reviewed by 
the researcher and combined into a draft model typology.  The similarities and differences 
between the different crisis families identified by each focus group were used by the 
researcher in determining this draft. This draft model was then mailed to each of the 
administrators for their approval or comments. As a result of this process a final crisis 
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typology was developed. The results of the focus group process and the final typology are 
shared in chapter 5.   
   
4.2 Phase II: Assessment of Crisis Preparedness 
The second phase of this study focused on the level of crisis preparedness in North 
Carolina health departments. The DTP Model of Crisis Preparedness described in chapter 3 
provided the conceptual framework for this work. In an effort to provide breadth of 
information as well as depth, three types of data were collected and analyzed for this phase of 
the study:   
• Quantitative data from a written survey of local health directors across the state of 
North Carolina 
• Qualitative data from 29 key informant interviews; at least 5 interviews from each 
of five local health departments 
• Archival data from five health departments, i.e. crisis plans, pertinent agency 
policies and training records 
 
The various types of data were necessary to provide the richness needed to describe 
the very complex nature of organizational crisis preparedness. In addition, the use of multiple 
methodologies and various sources of data allowed for some measure of the internal 
consistency of the findings (Patton, 1990). The following section provides a brief description 
of the methods that were used to collect each type of data for this research, including an 
overview of the proposed study setting and participants for each step. In addition, it outlines 
how this data was analyzed to answer the study’s research questions.   
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4.2a Written Survey   
A written survey was used to collect quantitative information on the general level of 
perceived crisis preparedness of local health departments in North Carolina.    
   
Survey Sample  
The survey obtained information on local health departments in the state of North 
Carolina. Seventy-seven (90%) of the eighty-six health departments in the state participated 
in the survey. The number of employees in these agencies ranged from twelve to five 
hundred. Most of the participating health departments provided services to the residents of 
one county. Six of the health departments provided public health services to multiple 
counties. Table 4.1 lists some key characteristics of those health departments included in the 
results of the written survey.   
 
Table 4.1 Health departments by size -employees, counties served and buildings 
 
 Number of Participants 
Number of Employees 
0-50  
51-100 
101-200 
200 – 500 
 
 
20 
26 
23 
8 
Number of Counties Served  
One County 
Multiple Counties 
 
 
71 
6 
Number of Separate Buildings  
1 
2 -3 
 
25 
34 
 70 
4-6 
7+ 
12 
6 
Health directors from each local health department in the state were asked to serve as 
respondents for the survey. In cases where there was no health director, the highest ranking 
employee was asked to participate. Senior management was selected as the informant level 
because of the key role these individuals play in preventing and responding to organizational 
crises. They do this by promoting an organizational culture that leads an organization to be 
crisis-prone or crisis-prepared and by providing the leadership needed to manage a crisis 
when one occurs (Pearson & Clair, 1998).     
As previously mentioned, representatives from seventy-seven (90%) health 
departments completed the survey. Eighty-six percent of the respondents were health 
directors and 81% had over two years of longevity at their health department. Table 4.2 lists 
key characteristics of the survey respondents.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Survey respondents by job title and tenure 
 
 No. of Respondents 
Job Title 
Health Director / Interim Director 
Assistant Health Director / Deputy 
Nursing Director 
Administrative Assistant / Health 
Educator 
 
 
66 
1 
7 
3 
Years at Agency 
0-2 years 
3-7 years 
8-15 years 
16+ years 
 
 
15 
19 
21 
22 
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Survey Instrument and Data Collection Method   
The written survey was the primary method of quantitative data collection. This 
survey was administered to local health directors attending the October 1995 North Carolina 
Health Director’s Legal Conference held at the Institute of Government in Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina. Health directors that did not complete the survey at the conference or those that 
were not in attendance were sent the survey in the mail.   
The survey was designed to identify the level of experience health departments have 
had with the different types of organizational crises and to measure their level of crisis 
preparedness for each crisis family. To do this, the survey included questions which 
addressed each of the four dimensional layers of the DTP Model of Crisis Preparedness. In 
addition, questions were included to obtain information on crisis readiness for ten specific 
response activities and on perceptions of preparedness for the various types of crises in the 
typology. 
The survey instrument used was a modified version of a survey developed by 
Pauchant, and Mitroff (1992). Since this survey was developed primarily for use with large 
private sector corporations, it was pre-tested with members of the intended audience for 
length, clarity of questions, format, sequence and quality of the instructions (Woodward & 
Chambers, 1986.) After the pre-testing, the tool was modified to apply to small public health 
agencies. Changes affected both the length and the wording of some of the specific questions. 
The survey was shortened to forty-four questions. Questions that did not apply to the public 
sector were omitted and questions with inappropriate language were reworded. For example, 
questions such as “Our responsibility is, before all, legal and financial,” and “Prove to me it 
can hurt us financially,” were felt to be inapplicable to the public health system and were 
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therefore omitted from the survey. Other questions such as “Our products are not dangerous,” 
and “Desirable business ends justify taking high risk means,” were changed to “Our services 
are not dangerous,” and “Desirable public health ends justify taking high risk means”.  The 
modification in language allowed the questions to be understood by public health 
professionals yet did not change the original intent.   
The final survey instrument was divided into seven sections (see Appendix C for a 
copy of the survey instrument). The first set of questions pertained to demographic and 
background information. This included information on the title and tenure of the informant, 
the size of the organization, and the number of facility locations.   
The demographic section is followed by a section (Part I) on perceived crisis 
readiness. This section listed ten crisis management responses and asked the survey 
respondents to indicate those which they felt their agencies would be immediately able to 
implement in the event of a severe traumatic crisis, such as the bombing of the federal 
building in Oklahoma.  Some of the responses listed are the ability to mobilize a crisis team, 
the ability to provide services at another location and the ability to evacuate the building.    
The following four sections (Part II) included a series of questions which provided 
information on the four layers of the preparedness model. Each section contains between ten 
and twelve questions. Each question was followed by a 7-point Likert scale. The scale for 
each of the questions pertaining to Layers 1 and 2 of the model (the human beliefs and the 
organizational culture) included three anchors: 1 was “very true”,  4 was “neither true or 
false” and 7 was “not true at all.” For the set of questions pertaining to levels 3 and 4 of the 
model (structure and strategies), the three anchors were 1, “not at all”, 4, “somewhat in the 
process” and 7, “well established.”   
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The final section, Part III, of the survey provided space for the respondents to indicate 
their perceptions of the organization’s level of crisis experience and crisis preparedness. This 
section listed the different crisis types (as determined in Phase I of the study) and asked the 
informant to indicate the number of crises experienced and the perceived level of 
preparedness for preventing and responding to each crisis type. A 5-point Likert scale (1= not 
at all prepared; 5= very prepared) was used to gauge the respondent’s perceptions of their 
organization’s abilities. 
   
Analysis of Survey Data 
A descriptive analysis was performed on the written survey. The number of 
affirmative responses in Part I was totaled and ranked. This provided information on the 
types of responses that the respondents felt their agencies were most ready to implement in 
the event of a crisis.    
In Part II, each of the four sections was given a score by totaling the answers to the 
questions in that section. The resulting scores were then placed on a scale which indicated 
whether the agency was in the “danger,” “questionable” or “safety” zone for each of the four 
layers of the DTP Model. Zone ranges were calculated to reflect the number of questions in a 
section but also to match those used by Pauchant and Mitroff (see Table 4.3). Organizations 
which had any of the four layers in the danger zone were considered dangerously unprepared 
to prevent and respond to crises. Those that had at least one layer in the question mark zone, 
but none in the danger zone, were identified as being questionably prepared for crises. Only 
those with all layers in the safe zone were scored as “crisis-prepared.”   
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Table 4.3 Preparedness zone ranges for each dimensional layer of the DTP Model 
 
Dimensional Layer Danger Score Zone 
Questionable Score 
Zone Safe Score Zone 
Layer I 0 - 32 33 – 55 56 – 77 
Layer II 0 - 35 35 – 60 61 - 84 
Layer III 0 - 34 35 -57 58 - 77 
Layer IV 0 -29 30 – 50 51 – 70 
 
 
In addition to calculating scores for each health department, average scores were 
computed for each of the four layers of the model. These scores were then compared to 
determine which layers of the model were considered the strongest or weakest for all of the 
health departments. To arrive at these scores the average scores for sections 3 and 4 of the 
survey were adjusted. These sections were recalculated by converting the scores to a 77-point 
scale (consistent with sections 1 and 2). With all layers weighted equally, they were 
compared.   
Part III of the survey provided information on the number and types of crises the 
respondent felt the agency had experienced in the last five years and his or her perception of 
how ready the agency was to prevent and respond to each of the different types of crises. 
Group averages were calculated for the total number of crises experienced, the number of 
crises experienced from each crisis family and the scores for perceptions of preparedness. 
Averages were compared to determine the most common types of crises faced by local health 
departments and to identify which of the crisis types health administrators felt most ready to 
prevent or respond. 
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4.2b Health Department Case Reviews    
In addition to data obtained through the survey, the crisis-preparedness levels of five 
local health departments were examined. Qualitative data was collected from these agencies 
through key informant interviews. Archival data was also obtained through a review of all 
crisis-related documents. The information gathered from these assessments served to explain 
and validate the quantitative data obtained from the written survey. It also provided 
additional information on the factors which promote or inhibit organizations from being 
crisis-prepared.   
Five local health departments in North Carolina served as case sites. These agencies 
were selected by the author based on size and geographic location. An effort was made to 
include both large and small health departments from various regions of the state. One of the 
health departments selected served multiple counties in the western mountain region. Two of 
the health departments served largely urban populations, one served a landlocked rural 
community and one served a coastal community in the eastern region of the state. In addition 
to these demographic characteristics, at least two organizations were purposefully selected 
because of their known recent experience with crises. This allowed a richness of data and 
helped to explore the value of past experience on crisis prevention and management activities 
in an organization.    
 
Key Informant Interviews   
At least five individuals from each of the five health departments served as key 
informants for this part of the study. A total of twenty-nine individuals were interviewed. The 
health director at each department was one of the individuals interviewed. The 
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remaining four-to-six individuals interviewed at each location were selected by the health 
director. These people were selected based on knowledge about crisis management efforts 
throughout their agency (Table 4.4). Data collected from these different perspectives allowed 
for an assessment of the validity of the data for each organization.   
 Table 4.4 Key informants by discipline 
 
DISCIPLINE NO. INTERVIEWED 
Health Director 5 
Nursing 8 
Environmental Health 8 
Health Education / Public Relations 3 
Management Support / Clerical 4 
Board of Health Member 1 
 
Data from the key informant interviews was collected exclusively by the researcher 
during a two day site visit to each of the participating health departments. This was 
accomplished during the months of October and November in 1995.      
The key informants from each of the five organizations were independently 
interviewed to determine the types of crises experienced by the agency, key factors of the 
organization that either enhance or detract from effective crisis prevention and response and 
the overall perceived level of crisis preparedness for the organization.      
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner in a setting convenient 
and comfortable to the informant. Interviews lasted between 1 and 1.5 hours. An interview 
guide was developed (see Appendix D) by the researcher using standardized open-ended 
questions and conversational prompts. This increased the comparability of the responses, 
while allowing for in-depth discussions of issues that were deemed important to the 
understanding of crisis preparedness in that organization.      
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Each interview began with a discussion of the purpose of the research and a 
clarification of the key terms, such as "organizational crisis". Following this introduction, 
questions were asked to gain insight into the human, cultural, structural and procedural 
characteristics of the organization that affected its level of crisis preparedness. In addition, 
questions were asked to assess the perceived quality of crisis management strategies used by 
the organization, the availability of resources for crisis management and ability of the 
organization to learn from past crisis experiences.     
During each interview the researcher took handwritten notes. In addition, each 
interview was audio-taped. Since other researchers (Reilly, 1989) have experienced informant 
inhibition when interviews were taped, participants were told that they could turn off the tape 
recorder at any time during the discussion. Notes were filled in by the researcher after 
listening to the recorded audiotapes of each interview.   
   
Archival Document Review   
Crisis-preparedness documents were reviewed to support and validate the information 
gathered through the interviews and the written surveys, particularly as they related to Layer 
Four, written plans and policies, of the DTP Model of Crisis Preparedness.     
Existing written policies and plans relating to crisis management were reviewed and 
collected at the time of the site visits at each of the five agencies described above. Documents 
that were examined included disaster plans, crisis plans, policy and procedure manuals, staff 
development and training records, and media contact logs.      
The audit tool in Appendix E was developed by the researcher and used to identify the 
specific components of each document that was reviewed. Particular components of interest 
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included: the existence of a comprehensive crisis plan and a crisis management team, the 
identification of steps necessary to identify and deal with a variety of crisis situations, a plan 
for both internal and external communication, and a strategy for organizational learning. The 
location of each document was also recorded at the time of inquiry.   
   
Analysis of the Case Data 
The surveys, key informant interviews and archival materials formed the basis of a 
case review for each of the five local health departments examined in the study. A separate 
study database was established for each site (Patton, 1990). Each database included relevant 
documents, including interview notes, document audit reports and the quantitative written 
survey for each agency.     
A content analysis was performed on the qualitative data. The use of recurring 
sentences or phrases were noted and compiled to identify the existence of patterns or themes 
in the data (Patton, 1990).  Specific threads or themes were sorted to align with the DTP 
Model of Preparedness used in the study.  
Archival records were analyzed in two ways. First, a table of existing documents was 
created. This was used to compare the types of crises for which each of the health 
departments had written policies or plans.  Next, the contents of the specific documents were 
reviewed to identify general themes related to the types of information they included or 
omitted. The results from the qualitative analysis and the archival reviews were then 
compared to the results from the written survey analysis to determine the current status of 
crisis preparedness for health departments in North Carolina.    
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4.3 Summary 
This chapter describes the multi-method study design used to explore the level of 
organizational crisis preparedness in North Carolina’s local health departments. The study 
included two phases: Phase I, the creation of a crisis topology, and Phase II, an assessment of 
the level of preparedness to prevent and respond to the various crisis types in the typology.  
Data was collected using a modified focus group methodology, a written survey, key 
informant interviews and an archival document review. The results of these activities are 
presented in the following three chapters.   
 
  
CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS: DEVELOPMENT OF A CRISIS TYPOLOGY  
 
This chapter will present the results of Phase I of the study; the development of a 
crisis typology. These findings specifically address the first two research questions: 
• What are the types of organizational crises that might be experienced by local 
public health departments in North Carolina? 
• Can these various crisis situations be categorized to form a useful framework to 
aid in crisis management? 
The findings will be presented in the order suggested by the research methods. First, 
are the results from the process used to identify a list of potential worst-case scenarios. 
Following this section, are the findings from the modified focus group process used for 
developing the crisis typology. Finally, the typology framework used for the remaining part 
of the research is presented. 
 
5.1 Development of a List of Potential Organizational Crises 
Using the methodology described in Chapter 4, forty-six (46) situations were 
identified as potential organizational crises for local public health departments. Scenarios 
included in the list were as varied as acts of terrorism to rumors of poor public health 
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response and asbestos in the building. Table 5.1 provides an alphabetical listing of these 
scenarios.  
5.2 Development of the Final Crisis Typology 
The list of worst-case scenarios was used by the focus groups charged with creating 
categories of crises. Each of the three groups was able to complete this task. Below are the 
results from the modified focus group process. 
Overall the categories formed by the three groups were very similar. Two of the 
groups identified 7 distinct categories; the other group identified six crisis families. There 
was unanimous agreement of the placement of twenty-six crisis scenarios (57%) into five 
similarly titled categories. These categories were titled: “Personnel”, “Political”, 
“Emergencies / Disasters”, “Legal” and “Plant / Building / Equipment.” 
The categories were most different in their placement of situations that had to do with 
public relations and employee issues. Two focus groups identified a need for a separate 
category for public relations issues, while the third felt that these situations could be included 
with the politically based crises in a merged category called “Political / Image” crises. The 
situations in question included: public anger over a health policy or action, board of health 
member arrested, mass media criticism, activism, and rumor of poor department response. 
Whether or not these situations were in one category or two separate groupings, all three of 
the focus groups agreed that the main characteristic that tied these situations together was the 
potential for the community to have a negative image of the health department. This potential 
outcome would necessitate an effective public relations response. 
The other area of disagreement between the focus groups was in the grouping of 
scenarios related to employees. All focus groups included a personnel category but two 
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groups felt that quality assurance issues should be included as category distinct from 
employee misconduct. The root cause of the items included under “Quality Assurance” was 
incompetence on the part of staff or unintentional error (e.g. death of a client due to 
incompetence, medication errors.) This is distinguished from situations that were intended or 
purposeful (e.g. dismissal of an employee, staff exhibiting racism). One group also felt that a 
third category of employee health issues was also significantly different from the other crises 
to warrant its own category. This group included death of an employee, HIV infected worker 
and infectious disease outbreak in staff as part of a separate crisis family. These differences in 
crisis categories were remedied when the various crisis response strategies were discussed 
and some scenarios that required similar response strategies were then grouped together. 
The final typology of potential crises for health departments agreed upon by the 
members of the focus groups consisted of seven (7) crisis families/ categories. These are: 
“Disaster”, “Legal”, “Quality Assurance”, “Personnel”, “Plant / Equipment”, “Political”, and 
“Public / Public Relations”. Table 5.2 lists these categories, including the placement of the 
individual worst-case scenarios. 
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Table 5.1 Potential organizational crises in local public health departments 
1.  Accidents 
2.  Activism action 
3.  Asbestos in building 
4.  Board of Health member arrested 
5.  Bombing of a Building 
6.  Breech of confidential information 
7.  Bribery of a health worker 
8.  Budget cuts 
9.  Chemical gas release in building 
10.  Client stealing supplies / equipment 
11.  Computer failure, loss of telephone lines 
12.  Death of a client 
13.  Destroying files under investigation 
14.  Dismissal of an employee 
15.  Employee death 
16.  Equipment malfunction 
17.  Fire in the building 
18.  Government action to require new services without funds 
19.  HIV infected health professional  
20.  Inadequate resources to deal with a situation (e.g. not enough vaccine) 
21.  Infectious disease outbreak in staff 
22.  Kidnapping / hostage taking 
23.  Lack of support from politicians 
24.  Mass media criticism of the health department 
25.  Mismanagement of funds 
26.  Natural disaster that affects the buildings: Hurricane, tornado, flood 
27.  Outdated /inadequate equipment, e.g. Autoclave, defective condoms 
28.  Poor response to public health problem resulting in injury or death 
29.  Poor security in facility 
30.  Poorly maintained building, unsafe buildings 
31.  Poorly skilled staff/ unqualified staff 
32.  Privatization of public health services (externally driven) 
33.  Public anger or a public health policy or action 
34.  Rape 
35.  Rumor of poor response 
36.  Sabotage 
37.  Sexual harassment 
38.  Staff exhibiting racism 
39.  Staff molesting client or other worker 
40.  Staff participation in unprofessional activities (unethical behavior) 
41.  Staff promoting political agendas unrelated to health 
42.  Staff stealing supplies, pharmaceuticals 
43.  Terrorism 
44.  Violation of law (e.g. open meetings law, Fair Labor Standards Act)  
45.  Workplace violence 
46.  Wrong medicines given to a client 
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Table 5.2 Crisis scenarios for each crisis family  
FAMILY / CATEGORY SPECIFIC CRISIS EXAMPLES 
DISASTER • Kidnapping / Hostage Taking 
• Chemical gas release in the building 
• Bombing of building 
• Workplace violence 
• Natural disaster that affects the building 
• Sabotage 
• Fire in the building 
• Terrorism 
LEGAL • Violation of law  
• Rape / Staff molesting client or other worker 
• Destroying files under investigation  
• Staff stealing supplies 
• Bribery of a health worker 
• Breech of confidential information 
• Mismanagement of funds 
• Sexual harassment 
• Client stealing supplies or equipment 
• Staff exhibiting racism 
PERSONNEL • Dismissal of a key employee 
• HIV infected health professional 
• Employee death – not caused by a work situation 
• Infectious Disease outbreak in staff 
PLANT AND EQUIPMENT • Poor security in the facility 
• Poorly maintained building, unsafe building 
• Asbestos in the building 
• Equipment malfunction 
• Outdated, inadequate equipment 
• Computer failure, loss of telephone lines 
POLITICAL • Budget cuts 
• Inadequate resources to deal with a situation 
• Privatization of pubic health services (external force) 
• Lack of support from politicians 
• Government action to require new services without funds 
PUBLIC / PUBLIC RELATIONS • Public anger over public health policy or action 
• Board of Health member arrested 
• Mass Media criticism of health department 
• Activism action 
• Rumor of poor response 
QUALITY ASSURANCE  • Poorly skilled staff / unqualified staff 
• Staff participating in unprofessional activities 
• Poor response to health problem – injury/death 
• Death due to incompetence or negligence 
• Wrong medicines given to a client 
• Unintentional accidents 
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Each of the crisis families is distinct in at least one significant way. For example, one 
family includes situations that focus on the organization’s building or equipment while 
another includes situations that are precipitated or caused by external political factors. The 
key differences between the crisis families also reflect differences in needed response 
strategies. Table 5.3 highlights how each of the crisis families is seen to be different and how 
the primary response strategies differ for each group. 
Despite the differences between categories and response strategies, it is important to 
note that there are critical crisis response strategies common to all crises. For example, while 
public relations crises, in particular require a communication strategy, all organizational 
crises will require a rapid, effective communication response. It is also worth noting that 
crises don’t always fit into distinct categories. It is possible, and in fact, likely, that a situation 
would fall into multiple categories. For example, the criminal act of planting a bomb in a 
building could fit into the Plant / Equipment category or into the Legal category or even, the 
Disaster category. This does not diminish the usefulness of the typology but highlights the 
benefit of using it for crisis preparedness. If an organization has prepared for legal crises, 
plant/equipment crises and disaster situations – it will be prepared to respond affectively to a 
bomb threat. 
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Table 5.3 Key characteristics and response strategies of each crisis family 
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
DISASTER Situations with the potential for 
immediate mass destruction and multiple 
casualties. These situations affect 
everyone. Many people are needed for a 
coordinated and well orchestrated 
response. 
Requires the mobilization of multiple 
resources instantaneously. May require 
protective equipment, evacuations, 
psychological counseling, extensive 
communication to multiple target 
audiences. May require the inclusion of 
representatives of outside agencies for an 
effective response. 
LEGAL Situations that include an element of the 
law. Typically an infraction of the law. 
Requires outside expertise from the 
judicial system. 
PERSONNEL Situations that are employee focused but 
are not legal in nature 
Requires an internal response, such as 
changes in work assignments and effective 
communication with staff. Public 
communications require protection of 
employee rights. 
PLANT / 
EQUIPMENT 
Situations that impact on either the 
availability or working condition of the 
organization’s equipment or facilities. 
Requires complete knowledge of the 
facilities, grounds and equipment. May 
require evacuations and changes in service 
delivery locations or strategies. Requires 
outside assistance from technicians and 
other experts. May require obtaining new 
equipment quickly such as generators, 
telephones, computers, laboratory 
equipment, etc. 
POLITICAL Situations caused by external political 
agendas or actions. May involve changes 
in laws, rules or regulations which affect 
the functioning of the health department. 
Will require changes in the service 
delivery and organizational structure. Will 
require effective communication efforts 
directed at policy makers and decision 
makers. 
PUBLIC 
RELATIONS 
Situations focused on the perceptions of 
the community and may result in a 
damaged public image for the agency. 
Requires a focus on public communication 
using both face to face interactions with 
key individuals and mass media outreach 
to the public. 
QUALITY 
ASSURANCE 
Situations caused by or related to staff 
incompetence  
Requires an internal operational response 
to correct the situation and communication 
messages that highlight intolerance of the 
problem and fast actions to remedy the 
problem 
 
 
While each of the focus groups was instructed to sort the crisis situations by the 
similarities in response strategies, groups tended to categorize crises more on the basis of root 
causes rather than response strategies. For example, an employee caught embezzling money 
and an HIV infected health care worker may both need a strong public relations and 
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communications response strategy. However, these situations were put in two different 
categories (Legal and Personnel, respectively).  Each group felt that the root cause of the 
incident would affect how the situation was perceived by outsiders and hence, would dictate 
the types of communication messages delivered and to which target groups. They felt that the 
cause of the incident is an important factor in identifying the most effective response strategy. 
The root cause of a crisis has also been used as a key characteristic in the Pauchant & 
Mitroff crisis topology (1992). The two factors deemed important in their model for 
identifying the appropriate response strategy are: External-Internal causes and Human/Social 
– Technical/Economic causes. An application of the final crisis families from this study to 
those dimensions can be seen in Figure 5.1.  This crisis typology formed the basis of the rest 
of the study. 
 
Figure 5.1 Crisis typology for public health departments  
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This chapter presented the findings of the two steps taken to answer the first two 
questions of the study. Step one was to engage in a process which would generate a list of 
potential organizational crises that a health department may encounter. A list of forty-six (46) 
worst-case scenarios was generated. Step two was to use a modified focus group 
methodology to sort these situations into a categorization framework that would could help 
an organization strengthen it’s ability to prevent and respond to these situations. Three 
separate focus groups categorized the crisis scenarios into a seven family typology. The 
distinct families of crises were titled: “Disaster”, “Legal”, “Quality Assurance”, “Personnel”, 
“Plant / Equipment”, “Political”, and “Public / Public Relations”. These categories were used 
as the basis for the remainder of the study. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS: PERCEPTIONS OF PREPAREDNESS BY HEALTH DIRECTORS 
 
This chapter summarizes the results of the written survey that was given to all local 
health directors in North Carolina. This information will be used with the results from the 
interviews and document reviews found in the next chapter, to answer study questions 3 and 
4. These questions ask about the overall abilities of health departments to prevent and 
respond to a variety of crises and about the common gaps in preparedness found in these 
agencies.  
Seventy-seven (77) surveys out of a total of eighty-six were completed, yielding a 
90% response rate. All returned surveys were used in the analysis. A description of the survey 
respondents can be found in Chapter 4 and a copy of the survey instrument is in Appendix C. 
The survey provided information about the perceptions of readiness from the 
viewpoint of the leaders of local health departments in North Carolina. In addition to 
information about the number of crises that health departments had experienced in a five year 
period, perceptions of prevention and response readiness for the various families of crises and 
for various response activities was captured. The survey also provided some insight into the 
perceptions of health officials as to the culture, behaviors, structure and plans within their 
own health departments. A summary of these findings is presented here. 
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6.1 Overall Experience with Crises 
During the five years prior to administering the survey (1991-1995), local public 
health leaders reported that their health departments had experienced a total of three hundred 
eighty-seven (387) different organizational crises. Totals for individual agencies ranged from 
zero to twenty-five different events. As shown in Figure 6.1, sixteen percent of respondents 
reported that their health departments had not experienced any major organizational crisis, 
while over fifty percent stated that theirs had responded to more than three separate events. 
 
Figure 6.1 Percentages of health departments by levels of crisis experience  
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Seven respondents reported that their health departments had experienced over 
thirteen significant organizational crises during the five year time period. Four of these 
health departments are situated in urban areas, while three are in rural communities. Their 
locations extend from the eastern coastal region of the state to the far western mountainous 
area. Similarly, those that had not experienced any crises are located in various locations 
across the length of the state. None of these health departments, however, are situated in 
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major population centers. Of the twelve health departments that had not experienced any 
large-scale organizational crises, ten had 70 or fewer employees. The remaining two 
agencies employed no more than one hundred fifty individuals. 
 
6.2 Types of Crisis Events Experienced 
During the reporting period, survey respondents reported that health departments in 
North Carolina had experienced every type of crisis in the crisis typology as defined for this 
study. As shown in Figure 6.2, the most frequently cited crisis situations are those that fall 
into the “Political” and “Plant/Equipment” families. Forty-two (42) health departments had 
experienced political crises and forty-one health administrators had indicated that their 
organizations had experienced plant and equipment crises (Table 6.1). Disasters were the 
least frequently reported type of event experienced. Twenty-nine percent (29%) of health 
departments indicated experience with dealing with a situation that included the possibilities 
of loss of life, wide-spread chaos and extreme panic. Some of these agencies, however, had 
experienced more than one of these events as indicated by a total of thirty-eight separate 
disaster events during the time period in question. Natural weather events, such as hurricanes 
in the coastal region, may explain this level of experience for some health departments. 
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Figure 6.2 Total number of crises reported by crisis family (1991-1995)  
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Table 6.1 Number and percentage of health departments reported by crisis family experience 
(1991 – 1995) 
 
Crisis Family Number of Health 
Departments 
Percentage of Health 
Departments 
Political 42 55% 
Plant / Equipment 41 53 
Public Relations/ Public 30 39 
Legal 28 36 
Quality Assurance 26 34 
Personnel 26 34 
Disasters 22 29 
 
 
6.3 Perceptions of Prevention and Response Readiness 
 
Survey results indicate that at the time of this study, public health leaders felt more 
prepared to respond to all the various types of crises than to prevent their occurrence. 
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Survey respondents rated their level of readiness to respond to all seven families of 
crises above the mid point of the 5 point Likert scale. On the other hand, when asked about 
their level of preparedness to prevent situations from occurring they rated 5 of the 7 items 
less than a 3.0 (the midpoint) on the scale.  The overall average score for responding to these 
7 crisis types was 3.35 and 2.71 for preventing them. 
As highlighted in Table 6.2, survey respondents felt more prepared to respond to 
scenarios in the quality assurance and public relations families, than any other types of 
potential situation. They felt least prepared to respond to the chaos that results from disasters 
or high-panic situations. Survey respondents indicated that on average they felt most prepared 
to prevent crises that fall in the “Quality Assurance” family. They felt least prepared to 
prevent the crises that would be classified in the categories of Disasters, Political and 
Personnel (Table 6.3.) The differences between ability to prevent versus respond can be best 
seen in the Disaster, Political and Personnel families of crises (Figure 6.3). 
 
Table 6.2 Respondents perceptions of preparedness to respond to the various types of crises 
(Scale 1 = not at all, 5 = very prepared) 
 
Crisis Family Respondents n = ? Average Response 
Disasters  N=74 3.01 
Plant / Equipment 73 3.18 
Political 74 3.23 
Personnel 73 3.36 
Legal 73 3.41 
Public / Public Relations 73 3.58 
Quality Assurance 73 3.70 
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Table 6.3 Respondents perceptions of preparedness to prevent the various types of crises 
(Scale 1 = not at all, 5 = very prepared) 
 
Crisis Family Respondents n = ? Average Response 
Disasters  70 2.07 
Plant / Equipment 73 2.37 
Political 68 2.43 
Personnel 73 2.75 
Legal 73 2.99 
Public / Public Relations 73 3.01 
Quality Assurance 73 3.38 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Perceptions of preparedness for prevention and response by crisis family (Scale: 1 
= not at all, 5 = fully prepared)  
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shows that respondents felt most able to effectively evacuate the building if needed and to 
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communicate quickly with staff and Board of Health members. Less than fifty percent of 
them, however, felt confident about their agency’s ability to initiate five of the ten actions on 
the list. Overall, they were least confident that they could quickly obtain psychological 
counseling for individuals traumatized by an event or obtain back-up equipment, such as 
phones and generators. 
 
Table 6.4 Number and percentage of health departments perceived as ready to implement ten 
specific crisis response strategies 
 
Activity Number  Percentage Rank Order 
Evacuate the Building 65 84 % 1 
Communicate with Staff and 
Board of Health 
 
54 70 % 2 
Obtain help from other 
agencies 
 
49 64 % 3 
Communicate to Media / 
Public 
 
46 60 % 4 
Mobilize a Crisis Team 42 55 % 5 
Treat Medical Emergencies 38 49 % 6 
Offer services at new location 30 39 % 7 
Set up back up 
communication technologies 
 
25 32 % 8 
Obtain generators and other 
equipment 
 
25 32 % 8 
Obtain psychological 
counseling 
22 29 % 10 
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6.4 Assessment of Dimension Layers 
To further validate respondent’s perceptions of crisis preparedness, the survey 
included questions to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each layer of the DTP model. 
As described in Chapter 3, Layer 1 of the model represents the human beliefs and values; 
Layer 2 represents the culture of the organization; Layer 3 represents the organizational crisis 
structure and Layer 4 reflects the written policies and plans for crisis preparedness. Each 
dimensional layer of an organization must be crisis-prepared for the overall agency to be 
crisis-prepared.  
 
6.4a Mean Layer Scores 
Table 6.5 illustrates the average overall scores for the questions that represent each 
layer of the model. Layer 2 had the highest overall average score. Layer 4, with a score of 43 
points is the weakest layer in the model. The scores for Layers 1 and 2 fall within the safe 
zone, as described in Chapter 4. Both Layers 3 and 4 fall within the questionable range. 
 
Table 6.5 Overall mean scores and zone labels for each layer of the DTP Model (Maximum 
score of 77 points for each layer) 
 
Dimensional Layer Mean Score Zone 
Layer 1 56 Safe 
Layer 2 57 Safe 
Layer 3 44.5 Questionable 
Layer 4 43 Questionable 
 
Table 6.6 provides a closer look at each of the layers of the model for the group. 
Overall, Layers 3 and 4 (Structure and Plans) included the greatest number of health 
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departments falling within either the questionable or danger zones. Over eighty percent of the 
health departments had scores that placed them in these two zones. On the other hand, more 
than 55% of health departments fell within a safe range for Layers 1 and 2. No health 
department had a score that put them in the danger zone for either of these two layers of the 
model.  
 
Table 6.6 Number of health departments by zone for each dimensional layer 
 LAYER 1 
HUMAN 
LAYER 2 
CULTURE 
LAYER 3 
STRUCTURE 
LAYER 4 
STRATEGIE
S 
DANGER 0 0 18 15 
QUESTIONABLE 33 33 48 49 
SAFE 44 44 11 13 
 
 
The survey results also indicated that four health departments scored “completely 
safe” or “crisis-prepared.” All four of the layers for these health departments were rated as 
safe and adequate for effective crisis preparedness. Twenty-five health departments, however, 
had at least one layer of the model scoring in the danger zone. This represents 32.5% of the 
health departments. Eight of these agencies had two layers in the danger zone. None of the 
agencies had more than two layers in the danger zone. 
The four health departments which rated entirely in the safe zone span the state, 
geographically. They range in size from seventy-four employees to one hundred seventy-
seven employees. One is located in an urban setting, the others in smaller communities. 
Despite being scored as safe in this part of the survey, three out of the four respondents still 
identified shortcomings in their readiness abilities. Results from Section I of the survey 
 98 
(specific crisis response activities) revealed that the respondents from these four agencies felt 
that they were not ready to obtain extra phone lines or other equipment, treat medical 
emergencies or arrange for psychological counseling and support for responders or victims. 
One respondent indicated that his/her agency was ready to implement all ten of the crisis 
response activities listed on the survey. 
Health departments of all sizes are included in the twenty-five agencies with at least 
one layer in the danger zone. However, nineteen (76%) of the agencies that have this 
distinction are small, having less than one hundred employees. Fourteen of the twenty-five 
health departments have less than fifty employees. This represents seventy percent (70%) of 
the very small health departments included in the study. 
It is plausible that health directors with more crisis experience would have dedicated 
more time to creating an effective crisis prevention and response infrastructure. However the 
data does not support the hypothesis that more experienced health directors lead agencies that 
are more prepared. The twenty-five agencies with at least one layer in the danger zone had 
various levels of crisis experience. Six respondents (24%) indicated that they had not 
experienced a crisis, while another twelve had experienced three or fewer events. Seven 
respondents (28%), however, indicated much more experience, having been involved in four 
or more different crisis events. None of the survey respondents from these agencies felt ready 
to implement all of the ten crisis response strategies listed in the first section of the survey.  
Below is a closer look at how respondents answered the individual questions related 
to each of the dimensional layers of the DTP Model.  
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6.4b Layer 1 Scores – Human Beliefs and Values 
No health department received a score in the danger zone for this layer of the model. 
Table 6.6 shows that thirty-four had scores within the questionable range, but over half were 
rated as safe. Average scores for each question related to Layer 1 of the model are listed in 
descending order in Table 6.7. These eleven statements represent personal beliefs that can 
make the organization more crisis-prone. A low score represents agreement with the crisis 
prone statement. Of the eleven items in this section, the lowest average scores were for the 
two statements: we focus on prevention” and “other agencies will help out.”  These scores 
both fell below a score of 4, the midpoint of the scale. The highest average scores were for 
the statements: “only bad agencies have crises” and “if you managed one crisis, you’ve 
managed them all.”  
 
Table 6.7 Mean scores for survey questions related to Layer 1 (Human Beliefs)  
Scale 1-7 (1 – very true, 7 – not at all true) 
Question Mean Score 
1. Only bad agencies have crises 6.57 
2. Managed one you’ve managed them all 6.23 
3. Doing of few rotten apples 6.04 
4. We’re too small/big 5.94 
5. Not good to dwell on past 5.74 
6. We can handle anything 5.30 
7. Our services not dangerous 5.18 
8. We can trust our employees 4.66 
9. No time to think about crisis 4.56 
10. We focus on prevention 3.34 
11. Other agencies will help 2.39 
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6.4dc Layer 2 Scores – Organizational Culture 
 
Similar to Layer 1, no health department fell into the danger zone for crisis-
preparedness because of their score for organizational culture. Thirty-three agencies, 
however, received scores that placed them in a questionable zone. As shown in Table 6.8, the 
statement with the lowest score, demonstrating the highest level of agreement with the crisis-
prone statement was: “we have rumors.” On the other hand, respondents most disagreed with 
the statements, “we can’t learn from crises” and “we would not function well as a team in a 
crisis.” These two cultural characteristics would support crisis preparedness in an 
organization. 
 
Table 6.8 Mean scores for survey questions related to Layer 2 (Organizational Culture) Scale 
1-7 (1- very true, 7- not true at all) 
Question Mean Scores 
1. We can’t learn from crises 6.36 
2. Would not function well as team 6.23 
3. Employee suggestions not useful 5.92 
4. Most crises resolve themselves 5.79 
5. Not very flexible 5.53 
6. Each crisis too unique 5.51 
7. We manipulate the media 5.40 
8. Most important – image 4.97 
9. Crisis Management is a luxury 4.90 
10. Small number of decision makers 4.27 
11. We are more reactive 4.17 
12. We have rumors 2.95 
 
6.4d Layer 3 Scores – Organizational Structure 
Survey questions which focused on layers 3 and 4 of the DTP Model provided more 
insight into the health director’s perceptions of the gaps in their organization’s preparedness 
efforts. Eleven questions were asked to clarify the level of structure that was in place to 
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support the agency’s ability to prevent and respond to crises. As described in Chapter 3, 
structures deemed important for crisis preparedness include, the existence of a crisis team, a 
process for identifying problems, one or more trained media spokespeople and a history of 
practicing drills and other crisis simulations. Weaknesses in this layer placed more health 
departments into the danger and questionable zones than any other layer in the model. As 
shown in Table 6.6, eighteen health departments fell within the danger zone in this layer and 
another forty-eight have questionable levels of preparedness because of their shortcomings in 
organizational structure. Not one survey item in this section reached an average rating of six 
or above on the 7 point scale. The two items rated the highest (5.78 and 5.60 respectively) 
were having a “relationship with the media” and having a “history of sharing resources.”  The 
four items with the lowest overall scores were:  
 Services available to deal with stress  
 Rewards for whistle-blowers 
 Existence of a communication plan 
 Plans and conducts crisis drills / simulations 
 
Rewarding whistle-blowers (1.86) and practicing crisis drills and simulations (2.77) 
were reported as the two areas most often neglected by health departments. 
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Table 6.9 Mean scores for survey questions related to Layer 3 (Structure) Scale 1-7 (1 – not at 
all in place; 7 – well established) 
 
Question Mean Scores 
1. Relations with the  Media 5.78 
2. History of sharing resources 5.60 
3. Searches for problems 4.62 
4. Have Trained Spokesperson 4.42 
5. Have a Crisis Team 4.32 
6. Have access to Back-up Communication 4.16 
7. Resources for responding 4.04 
8. Have a Communication Plan 3.53 
9. Services for Stress 3.40 
10. Conducts Crisis Simulations /Drills 2.77 
11. Whistle-blowers rewarded 1.86 
 
 
6.4e Layer 4 Scores - Organizational Plans and Policies 
Eighty-three percent (83%) of health departments fell into either the danger or 
questionable zones in the area of written polices or plans for crisis preparedness. While 
health departments have some written policies, they typically lack policies or plans for a 
variety of crisis situations or their plans do not consider the impact of crisis on the various 
aspects of their organizations. 
When asked about strategies for responding to crises, respondents reported an overall 
low level of preparedness. Similar to the questions relating to organizational structure (Layer 
3), no question regarding written plans and strategies (Layer 4) reached an average score of 
six (see Table 6.10). The highest rated item for the entire survey group was the existence of 
“a method for updating policies” (5.21). An average score of 4.99 for a “policy for handling 
complaints” was the next highest rated item. Weakest scores in the written plans layer based 
on average scores were, “having all crisis management policies in one integrated plan” (2.83), 
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“having procedures for organizational learning” (3.30) and “having a policy for media 
relations” (3.39). 
 
Table 6.10 Mean scores for survey questions related to Layer 4 (Polices and Plans)  
Scale 1-7 (1 = not at all in place; 7 = well established) 
 
Question Mean Scores 
1. Methods exist for updating policies 5.21 
2. Policy exists for handling complaints 4.99 
3. Schedule exists for maintaining equipment 4.58 
4. Staff are informed of crisis management 
policies 
4.21 
5. Procedures are in place for a variety of crises 3.86 
6. Crisis management plans contain strategies 
for different organizational dimensions 
3.58 
7. Crisis management is integrated in the 
strategic planning process 
3.47 
8. Policy exists for media relations 3.39 
9. Procedures exists for Organizational learning 3.30 
10. All crisis management policies are together in 
one plan 
2.83 
 
 
6.4f Overall Organizational Scores 
Overall scores were computed for each health department by adding up the scores for 
all questions on the survey. The highest score one could achieve was three hundred eight 
points. Actual scores for the health agencies ranged from a low of 138 to a high of 271. 
Twenty-one of the twenty-five health departments with at least one layer of the model in the 
danger zone, were in the lowest third of the scores. The other four had scores which placed 
them within the lower two thirds of all the health departments.  
The ten health departments with the highest overall preparedness scores were situated 
in both urban and rural areas. They spanned the entire state, geographically. Despite rating 
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themselves highly prepared, these health departments still identified response activities for 
which they felt ill-prepared.  On average, the twenty-five health departments with at least one 
layer in the danger zone identified on average only 3.3 activities that they are ready to 
immediately initiate, while the ten most prepared agencies identified anywhere from four to 
ten activities, or an average of 6.8 activities. As shown in Table 6.11, obtaining psychological 
services, providing medical treatment, obtaining additional service locations and setting up 
additional communication equipment were the top problem areas mentioned by the ten 
highest scoring health departments. 
 
Table 6.11 Number of top 10 health departments unprepared for specific response activities 
Activity Number of Health 
Departments 
Evacuate the Building 0 
Mobilize a Crisis Team 0 
Communicate with Staff and Board of Health 1 
Communicate to Media / Public 1 
Obtain help from other agencies 2 
Obtain generators and other equipment 4 
Set up back up communication technologies 5 
Treat Medical Emergencies 6 
Offer services at new location 6 
Obtain psychological counseling 7 
 
 
6.5 Summary 
The crisis preparedness survey reveals a great deal of information about the 
perceptions of the level of crisis experience and crisis preparedness in local North Carolina 
public health departments in 1996.  
 105 
Health departments in general have substantial experience with crises. Most (84%) 
health departments had experienced at least one organizational crisis in the five year period of 
1991 to 1996. During this period the seventy-seven survey respondents reported that they had 
experienced three hundred-eighty seven (387) different organizational crises. The most 
frequently cited crises were categorized as “Plant and Equipment Failures” or “Political 
Events”. Health departments had the least experience with large scale, catastrophic events 
including life threatening emergencies (e.g. natural disasters). 
Respondents indicated that, in general, they felt more prepared to respond to crises 
than to prevent them. They reported that they are most prepared to prevent and respond to 
crises that involve quality assurance issues, but least prepared to prevent and respond to 
crises that would be considered “disasters.” They were most ready to initiate the following 
crisis response strategies in the event of a trigger event: building evacuation, communication 
with staff and board of health members and obtaining help from other agencies. They felt 
least prepared to arrange for emotional and counseling support for those traumatized during a 
crisis and to obtain such equipment as back up generators and communication technologies. 
The survey revealed additional details of the level of crisis preparedness in local 
health departments by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the various layers of the 
DTP Model. Only four (5%) of the health departments represented in the survey scored 
completely in the safe range for all layers of the model. An organization with scores in the 
safe range for all four layers should have employees that have values and beliefs that support 
crisis preparedness, they should have organizational cultures and structures that support staff 
in preventing and responding to crises and they should have written policies and procedures 
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which outline their crisis prevention and response strategies for a variety of worst-case 
scenarios. 
Most of the health departments (95%) reported crisis preparedness shortcomings. 
Thirty two percent of the health departments (25) have at least one layer that scored in the 
danger zone; eight of these had two layers in the danger zone. None of the health departments 
scored in the danger zone for Layers 1 or 2: employee beliefs or organizational cultures. The 
health departments that fell into danger zones did so at the structure or written policy/plan 
levels.  
Two commonly held beliefs emerged amongst health directors which might 
contribute to health departments being crisis-prone. Respondents reported that they have a 
strong belief that other agencies will come to help if and when a crisis hits. They also stated 
that they believe they should focus more on the prevention of crises rather than put effort into 
thinking out how they might respond if a crisis hits. While these beliefs might hold some 
truth they actually make agencies less crisis-prepared. Assistance from outsiders may not be 
as quick as expected or desired (Himberger, 2007). The first responders to the incident will 
be staff and others in the immediate vicinity of the crisis. This must be anticipated. Also, if a 
health department only spends time on activities to prevent crises from occurring they will be 
less equipped to take on the role of responder in the event of a crisis.  
The data suggest that, in general, cultures within health departments support crisis 
preparedness. Respondents indicated that employee suggestions are valued, that employees 
learn from crises and that they would function well as a team during a crisis event. However, 
a number of health leaders indicated that rumors are common in health departments. This part 
of the organizational culture could undermine preparedness effectiveness. 
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More gaps in preparedness were identified at the organizational structure and 
policy/plan levels than in the other two layers of the model. Only 14-17% of the respondents 
had scores that would put their agency in the safe range for these layers of the model. The 
remainder had deficiencies that put them in a questionable or dangerous range for crisis 
preparedness. The weakest areas for organizational structure were found to be, rewarding 
whistle blowers, obtaining psychological support services, conducting crisis drills and 
simulations and creating a crisis communication plan. Many health departments also lack 
comprehensive crisis management plans which include all policies related to preventing and 
responding to crises, polices for working with the media, plans or procedures for 
organizational learning and written descriptions for responding to a variety of situations. 
 
CHAPTER 7  
RESULTS: PERCEPTIONS OF PREPAREDNESS BY EMPLOYEES AND REVIEW 
OF ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS  
   
This section highlights the results of the key informant interviews and the archival 
document reviews that were done in the five local health departments. Employee statements 
which describe the organizational culture, human belief systems and agency crisis-
preparedness structure add significant depth to the understanding of crisis preparedness in 
local health departments and are used to validate the findings of the survey of local health 
directors. The findings are presented as thematic insights. General themes on how public 
health officials viewed crises, how they viewed their levels of crisis experience, how 
prepared they felt to prevent and respond to organizational crises and how they viewed the 
various dimensions of their organization that impact preparedness are described.  Concluding 
this section is a description of the types of written policies and procedures that existed for 
preventing and/or responding to crises, including a general review of where these documents 
were located within the agencies, what information they contained and the extent to which 
they were integrated with each other.  
   
7.1 Crisis Definition 
Despite the tremendous opportunities a crisis can bring, health officials believed that 
crises are negative events. With remarkable consistency, those interviewed defined 
 109 
organizational crises in negative terms: dangerous, threatening, upsetting. Only one health 
director suggested that a crisis might provide an opportunity. Despite the fact that a crisis 
may be a motivator for change (Kovoor, 1996; Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000) or a valuable 
source for learning, the literature shows that most share this negative view of organizational 
crises (Forgues & Roux-Dufort, 1998).  
 While the study participants are in agreement that crises are negative events, they 
varied on whether any one particular situation would be defined as a crisis. They did, 
however, identify the same four characteristics that would elevate an event to the level of a 
crisis in their eyes. These were:  
• there are imminent danger and significant consequences,  
• resolution requires quick action,  
• there are feelings of not being prepared and  
• there is knowledge of the event by the outside world, particularly the mass media.  
 
Health administrators describe a situation as a crisis when it poses an imminent 
danger: threatening human life, property, or other things of value, such as credibility and 
public image. Because of the significance of the consequences, these situations are also seen 
as needing quick action.  
“A crisis is a situation that is immediate and life-threatening.”       
“A crisis makes us nervous. It threatens the public’s health or our 
operations. If immediate action is not taken, there is imminent danger.”    
   
“A crisis requires a fast response and we must be ready to mobilize.”  
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Feelings of “surprise” and “un-preparedness” also made public health professionals 
perceive a situation as a crisis. When an event is unexpected and not previously experienced 
or considered, people feel unprepared to react. Research summarized by Goldstein 
(Goldstein, 1994) proposes that “self-efficacy” is an important factor in how situations are 
framed. When a person perceives that he or she has the ability to successfully accomplish a 
goal then they are more likely to see an event as an opportunity rather than a threat. This is 
consistent with the feelings shared by participants in this study. When public health 
practitioners feel ready to respond, they no longer see the event as a crisis. When they feel 
unprepared, the situation is viewed more negatively.   
“A crisis is anything that happens that is not expected, with no existing plan (big or 
small situations.)”   
   
“When I don’t have a book or plan, that’s a crisis!”   
   
“We are most prepared for the situations where we have past experience or 
training.”   
   
Finally, events are also seen to be a “crisis” when the situation is no longer just an 
internal problem. Situations that have become public or include actions that involve people 
outside the agency increase the levels of anxiety and feelings of un-preparedness in public 
health workers. Key informants noted that this is particularly true if members of the mass 
media become interested in the situation and make requests for information. Events that are 
limited in scope to within the walls of the organization, both in terms of awareness and action 
are less likely to be viewed as a crisis.  
 “Situations become bigger crises when they hit the media.”   
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7.2 Types of Potential Crises 
Public health practitioners have not been proactive in identifying the kinds of 
threatening situations that they may encounter while on the job. Not one health leader from 
these five agencies had ever engaged their staff in a “think the unthinkable” brainstorming 
session. Therefore, it was no surprise when initial types of worst-case scenarios that the key 
informants described as possible were very limited in scope. The types of events that first 
came to mind as potential crises were situations that were industry-related such as public 
health challenges, had been experienced in the past by their own agency or had been 
experienced by another social service agency in close geographic proximity. Some of the 
potential crises identified included infectious disease outbreaks, severe weather conditions, 
management / staffing shortages, lack of political support and budget shortfalls.  
When presented with a broader list of worst-case scenarios, such as terrorist attack, 
workplace violence, collapse of one of the health department’s buildings or criminal activity 
by an employee, and asked if these situations were possible, most interview respondents 
stated that anything is possible. Some, however, felt that the probability of these events 
occurring at their health department seemed low. This feeling was most often expressed from 
the public health officials residing in the far western part of the state. As described later, 
perceptions that crises are unique events with very low probabilities can create a crisis-prone 
organization.   
   
7.3 Crisis Experience 
Perceptions of the number of crises experienced by an agency varied from person to 
person. Two health departments involved in the study had recently experienced situations 
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which had made national news. In these two agencies, all individuals that were interviewed 
agreed that their agency had experienced a large organizational crisis. However, the public 
health officials in the other 3 organizations varied greatly in their assessment of the number 
of organizational crises experienced by their health department. Within the same agency, 
some individuals stated that they could not recall experiencing a single crisis in the previous 
five-year period, while others stated that they deal with crises every day. Environmental 
Health specialists most often felt like they had experienced many crisis situations. Comments 
like, “All I do is put out fires,” and “We’ve had lots of crises,” were made by public health 
practitioners working in the domain of environmental health.  
When asked to describe crises that had occurred within the last five years, key 
informants described a variety of unpleasant situations. Situations were described for all five 
agencies that met the definition of an organizational crisis. The larger health departments in 
this study were able to cite many events that were negative in nature. Situations that were 
described included fraudulent behavior of an environmental health employee, lack of political 
support for needed health programs, hurricane or severe weather resulting in damage to the 
health department and to employee homes, public perceptions of an inadequate public health 
response to an environmental concern and physical threats made to staff members. Even the 
health department in the far western part of the state, where informants believed that they 
were immune to many potential crises, shared three recent experiences: a sexual harassment 
lawsuit against the health director, a breech of confidential information and a drug arrest of 
the spouse of the health department’s chief medical officer.  
Experiencing one or more crises may influence how future situations are perceived. 
As mentioned previously, having experience with a particular type of event was mentioned 
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consistently by those interviewed as a significant factor in increasing feelings of 
preparedness. The impact of past experience on feelings of readiness is described in the next 
section.  
   
7.4 Perceptions of Prevention and Response Readiness 
Initial comments made by health officials suggested a high level of confidence in their 
organizations’ abilities to effectively prevent and respond to a variety of crisis situations. 
However, answers to more probing questions about their agencies’ abilities to initiate specific 
response activities hinted at a different level of crisis readiness for various events. For 
example, one health director felt confident that his institution would respond effectively to a 
natural disaster. Yet further questions related to the responses needed to handle this kind of 
event, such as “where will you provide services if your building is devastated?”, “how will 
you obtain more equipment, if needed?” or “how will you support the stress and trauma felt 
by employees?” made him realize that, while his agency is prepared to deal with a community 
crisis, they had not thought out how a natural disaster might affect their own agency or their 
own employees.  
“I thought we were prepared until you presented all of this.”   
“We could evacuate the building but we would not be ready to deal with the 
psychological part of the crisis.”  
   
Overall, key informants were similar in their perceptions of the types of situations that 
they felt most prepared for as well as those that they felt least prepared to prevent or contain. 
The reasons given for why they either felt prepared or not prepared to handle particular 
events were also remarkably consistent. Themes about perceptions of readiness will be 
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presented in the next section.  
   
7.4a – Perceptions of Readiness for Various Types of Crises   
Interviewees felt more prepared to prevent and respond to some events than others. 
The list of forty-six potential crisis situations generated for Phase I of this study was 
presented to each individual during the interviews. From this list there were two events that 
members from all five health departments identified as not feeling prepared to handle. These 
were kidnapping/ hostage-taking and acts of terrorism. At least three other events were also 
identified by most of those interviewed. These were a bombing, a natural disaster, and a 
situation of workplace violence. While all of these events are included in the crisis family of 
“Disasters” (see typology), not all events in this category do the informants feel ill-prepared 
to handle. For example, everyone felt capable of effectively responding to a fire in the 
facility. This will be described in more detail later.  
In addition to knowing how to evacuate the building in case of a fire, interviewees 
stated that they were most comfortable preventing and responding to situations that involve 
quality assurance issues or personnel problems. They claimed to feel more prepared for these 
situations because their agencies have personnel policies, audit requirements, record checks 
and other procedures in place to prevent a variety of employee-related problems from 
occurring. Document reviews in the five studied organizations prove that indeed a wide 
variety of policies and procedures are in place, which outline ways to prevent and respond to 
some events.  
  
7.4b. Factors Influencing Perceptions of Readiness   
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Interviewees described a number of factors which have an impact on their perceptions 
of preparedness. These factors are very similar to the characteristics used by practitioners 
when they define an event as a crisis. Factors deemed important to perceptions of 
preparedness or un-preparedness are listed here to obtain a more thorough understanding of 
where strengths and weaknesses exist in crisis prevention and response capabilities. As seen 
below, the factors almost exactly mirror one another.  
Individuals felt most prepared to deal with crisis situations under the following 
conditions:  
• They had experienced that or a similar situation before, even if it was on a smaller 
scale or during a practice exercise, such as a fire drill,  
• They had been trained,  
• There were policies or procedures already in place that outlined what to do,  
• They felt that someone within the agency, even if it wasn’t themselves, would know 
what to do, or  
• The event required only internal actions and was not known outside of the agency.   
Individuals felt least prepared to handle situations that had one or more of the 
following characteristics:  
• The situation had never been thought about or experienced,  
• The situation has immediate life or death consequences,  
• The situation was felt to have a low probability of occurring, or  
• The situation was known to the outside world and requires a high level of 
communication skills, particularly skills in working with the mass media.  
These lists highlight two themes that warrant elaboration. These are the value of the 
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feelings of familiarity and the impact of “others” on perceptions.  
First, a number of the characteristics identified as having an impact on how prepared 
one feels to handle a crisis have to do with feelings of familiarity. When one feels like they 
have seen or experienced a situation before or that they have prepared for a similar event 
either through training or by writing up policies, they feel a sense of familiarity and an 
increased sense of ability to deal with the situation.  
“The more familiar I am with the situation, the more comfortable I am that we are 
ready to respond.”  
   
Prior familiarity with a situation can help to decrease the number of unknown factors 
or surprises but may not significantly increase an organization’s overall preparedness levels.  
For example, the two health departments in this study that had recently faced crises of 
national significance appear to have gained different levels of benefit from their experiences. 
All of the individuals working in the agency that had been severely affected by a natural 
disaster stated that they had grown significantly in their level of preparedness after 
experiencing this event. Since all employees were affected by the crisis and all components of 
their response system were tested, all staff grew in their knowledge of what would and should 
be done in a crisis. After this event, this agency used their experience to work with all 
employees on crisis-preparedness strategies. On the other hand, the health department which 
had to respond to a significant public relations crisis gained much less from their experience. 
In this case, only the health director and the environmental health supervisors were involved 
in handling the response efforts. Even these individuals admitted that they were not sure how 
other staff members learned of what had occurred or how the health department was handling 
the crisis situation. In general, those interviewed from this agency felt no more prepared to 
 117 
handle like-situations than before the most recent crisis event.  
Given that the knowledge and skills from prior experiences are not always shared 
equally throughout an agency, it was not surprising to hear that not everyone was aware of the 
level of readiness within their own agency to deal with various events. Citing frequent 
practice drills and clearly posted evacuation maps, everyone claimed they knew how to get 
out of the building, if needed. There were a number of other scenarios, however, that 
individuals did not know what to do to respond nor did not know if the agency had a plan to 
tell them what to do. A common belief was that someone else in the agency was more 
knowledgeable about the actions that might need to be taken. Individuals frequently stated 
that even if they did not feel personally competent to handle a particular situation, they 
believed the agency would effectively deal with the situation because they believed another 
person knew what to do and would direct others in a response.  
“The people in the know are the higher ups”  
   
“I don’t know if we are ready to respond to some situations – we may be ready – I 
may just not know the plan. If a husband came in here and grabbed his wife, I don’t 
know the plan.”  
   
The perceived knowledge or skills of others appeared to have a positive influence on one's 
feelings of readiness. The involvement of others can also have a negative impact on 
perceptions. In particular, interviewees stated that they felt less prepared to respond to crises 
if people external to the agency were aware of the situation. Potential external stakeholders 
include individuals from regulatory agencies, local or state politicians, or concerned citizens 
or advocacy groups. Of particular concern, however, was any member of the media. 
Awareness of the event by individuals outside of the agency may increase the feelings that 
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the response should be quicker and that the consequences of poor response will be more 
severe and public. 
“Once the media calls and says it is a crisis, we are less prepared.”    
“I don’t think we would handle a high level of public criticism very well.”    
 
Perceptions of crisis readiness are influenced by a number of factors. Many of these 
factors are related to an individual’s sense of familiarity with a situation or their perceptions 
of the role of others during a crisis. Experience with particular events, prior training and 
involvement in writing crisis policies provide individuals with a sense of familiarity. The role 
of others is perceived both positively and negatively. Feelings that someone in the agency 
will know how to respond to a situation support individual perceptions that the agency is 
prepared. However, perceptions of readiness diminish if others from outside the agency 
become aware of the crisis.  
 
7.5 Views on Preparedness using the DTP Model 
Comments obtained from the key informants also provided insights into the various 
aspects of an organization that affect preparedness. Themes that emerged around the concepts 
and abilities found in each dimensional layer of the DTP Model are presented in this section. 
This includes the common human beliefs about crisis preparedness that influence the 
organizational mindset for preparedness. It also includes perceptions of organizational 
culture, agency structure for preparedness and existing crisis plans and policies.  
 
7.5a Dimensional Layer 1 - Human Beliefs and Rationalizations   
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The ability of an organization to ready itself for a crisis is dependent on the leader’s 
value for crisis preparedness activities. It is the “mindset” of senior executives that 
determines the cultural beliefs in the organization and creates the environment in which crisis 
management is prioritized and supported (Pearson & Clair, 1998). What individuals believe 
to be true sets the stage for how events are perceived and how they are prepared for or 
responded to within organizations. Pearson and Clair posit that “executive perceptions about 
risk that can be characterized as ambivalence about or disregard for crisis preparations will 
hinder the adoption of organizational crisis management practices.” Perceptions about risk 
that can negatively impact the crisis-preparedness orientation of an organization emerge 
through conversation as faulty rationalizations. Four categories of common beliefs used to 
justify the lack of attention to preparedness efforts were described in chapter 3 (Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992). This categorization system is used here to present the most common crisis 
prone beliefs that emerged in this study.  
Statements made by the health officials interviewed in this study suggest that faulty 
rationalizations do exist in some local health departments in North Carolina. Table 7.1 
highlights the ten most common rationalizations that were held by health administrators in 
this study. Five of the ten beliefs frequently mentioned from public health workers were 
related to the properties of the agency. Two other common beliefs were rationalizations 
which focus on properties of the environment and another two reflect beliefs related to prior 
crisis-management efforts. The final common rationalization heard was from Group 3. This 
was that “each crisis is so unique that it is impossible to prepare for all crises.” The most 
common faulty rationalizations that emerged through statements made during the interviews 
are described in more detail below.
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Table 7.1 Most common faulty rationalizations used by key informants  
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Properties of the 
Organization 
Properties of the 
Environment 
Properties of the 
Crises Themselves 
Properties of Prior 
Crisis Management 
Efforts 
• Our special location 
will protect us 
• Certain crises only 
happen to others 
• It is enough to react 
to a crisis once it has 
happened 
• Crisis management 
or crisis prevention 
is a luxury 
• Our employees are 
so dedicated that we 
trust them without 
question 
• If a major crisis 
happens, someone 
else will rescue us 
• Crisis management 
is someone else’s 
responsibility 
• Each crisis is so 
unique that it is 
impossible to 
prepare for all 
crises 
• In a crisis situation, 
we just need to 
refer to the 
emergency 
procedures we’ve 
laid out in our crisis 
manuals 
• We are a team that 
will function well 
during a crisis 
 
 
Group 1 Beliefs – Properties of the Organization  
Public health workers share several crisis prone beliefs which focused on the 
properties of their work and organization. While those interviewed stated that they felt that it 
was important to prepare for crises, they were limited in their views of what kinds of 
situations they might actually experience and whether or not they had the resources to put 
towards crisis preparedness. Pearson and Clair suggest (1998) that if executives do not 
believe their organization is vulnerable to crises, they will not allocate resources to prepare 
for that potential.    
Despite initial comments which suggest administrators believe “anything could 
happen”, additional statements made during the interviews showed that they actually believe 
otherwise. The public health workers in this study do not really believe that they are 
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particularly vulnerable to certain kinds of crisis events. Location and types of employees were 
common reasons given for feelings of immunity to some negative events.  
For those from smaller communities, location seemed to influence their perceptions of 
which crises seemed more likely. All five of the employees interviewed for this study from 
the health department located in the western mountainous region felt that they were immune 
to certain types of crises because of the type of community in which they work. In particular 
they felt immune to man-made crises resulting from evil acts.  
“Some of these situations would not happen here because we are a small community 
with less crime.”    
   
“We don’t have the same type of people as you have in Wake County, etc. 
Mountaineers are less likely to sue or cause problems.”  
   
Key informants from all health departments also made statements which reflected 
beliefs that public health employees would not cause a crisis. For example, public health 
administrators believe that they hire competent, caring, trustworthy professionals. No one in 
the study group had considered preparing for events that might be caused by employee 
failures, such as incompetence or criminal activity. This is partly because they felt that 
policies already exist, but it is also because they do not believe that public health 
professionals would ever do harm or that anyone would want to do them harm.  
“As far as situations that involve unethical behavior – our staff are above this. We 
have good people.”   
   
Even for situations that health workers felt were likely, preparedness efforts fall short 
because efforts to prepare are seen as a “luxury” or not a good use of time. Crisis 
preparedness is not viewed as a way of way of doing the job of public health, but as an extra 
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activity requiring additional resources. Health administrators felt that they don’t have extra 
resources to put towards anticipating, preventing and planning for a variety of crisis 
scenarios, particularly if the events are unlikely to occur. Planning is not a priority.    
“Our main mission is to serve the public, not to spend time preparing for things that 
might happen.”  
   
“If I spent my time writing policies on all these situations, I wouldn’t get anything else 
done.”   
   
 “Someone has to die to increase the priority of issues.”  
    
“Everyone is stretched so thin there is no time to think ahead.”    
   
There were also beliefs that whether or not the agency has planned for events, they 
will take action should something occur and that whatever action was taken would be 
sufficient. In some cases, it was felt that some known or unknown “white knight” would lead 
the response. In other cases, the “white knight” would be the health director because others 
did not want the responsibility. This particular feeling was most often expressed by the key 
informants who described the leadership style of their health director as either authoritative or 
as “hands-off”.  
“We would handle the situations, but, I guess, it would be better if we talked about it 
ahead of time.”     
   
“If the clinic had to be moved we would do it, but we would be reactive.”   
   
“I’m sure the head nurse would know what to do.”   
   
“I would pass on as much as I could to the administration.”   
   
Group 2 Beliefs – Properties of the Environment 
Public health employees also had beliefs that the characteristics of the environment 
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would protect them from having to deal with crises. In particular, there was a belief that, 
should an event occur, then typical first responders would intervene and take charge or that 
“bigger” agencies were more prepared and would come to the rescue. These beliefs were 
particularly evident in the comments made about scenarios involving criminal acts or 
violence. Health department employees felt that the only action that they needed to take in 
these kinds of emergencies would be to call the local emergency responders; they should dial 
9-1-1. In general, they felt that once law enforcement arrives on the scene, it was no longer 
their “crisis” and therefore, they would have no authority or responsibility to initiate any 
other crisis-response activity.  
“We spend too little time on crisis management, but the time spent on this at the 
county level is sufficient.”  
   
“Kidnapping! We’re not equipped to handle that. That’s law enforcement. Public 
health people are not equipped to handle that. That falls under law enforcement.”  
   
There was also the belief that in larger community-wide incidents, such as a severe 
weather event, other agencies would come to the rescue and that the local health department 
would not be responsible for leading the crisis response, even if the event had a significant 
impact on the health department facilities or on the public health employees. With the 
exception of the health department that had been affected by a Category 5 hurricane, there 
was no indication that any of the other health departments in this study had considered what 
actions should be taken to allow their agency to function in the event of a serious disaster or 
community-wide emergency. While most were aware of a community disaster plan and 
response team, their perception of the health department’s role in responding to an event was 
very limited. A common view was that the Director of Emergency Services in their town was 
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responsible for planning and coordinating efforts for community preparedness. The health 
director from a coastal town which had recently experienced a potentially-harmful 
environmental crisis realized, however, that rescue by other outside agencies, particularly the 
federal government, was a fantasy. With this exception, others did not see themselves as first 
responders even when the crisis was in their building(s) and affected their own employees or 
clients. Their beliefs that someone else would take over has contributed to their lack of 
preparedness for some types of crisis situations.  
   
Group 3 Beliefs – Properties of Crises Themselves 
A common belief held by those interviewed that may make health departments more 
crisis-prone was that it is impossible to prepare for some crises. It was reasoned that it was 
impossible to plan for events that are unknown until the facts present themselves. This was 
particularly true for the situations that were perceived as out of their control, such as natural 
disasters, acts of violence by outsiders or political demands made by politicians or other 
community or state agencies. Believing that there is no way to prepare yourself and your 
agency to respond to unknown or unthinkable events is a fatal flaw in being a crisis-prepared 
organization.  
“How can I prepare for things I don’t know of? I never thought of this kind of crisis 
so I don’t know what and how to prepare.”  
   
“You can prepare if you have some warning – like a blizzard is coming but you 
couldn’t prepare for a shoplifting CEO.”  
   
 
Group 4 Beliefs – Properties of Prior Crisis Management Efforts 
Faulty beliefs that relate to prior crisis-readiness activities are found in Pauchant and 
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Mitroff’s Group 4 rationalizations. Two of these rationalizations were repeatedly mentioned 
during the interviews. These are the reliance on prior crisis-management efforts and the belief 
that employees will work well together in a crisis event.  
As mentioned earlier, direct experience with a particular situation or a near-miss, such 
as another agency in the same town or region experiencing a particular crisis, may provide the 
impetus for an organization to create a plan for the prevention of future incidents or for the 
response should the incident occur. As will be described later, all of the health departments 
that served as cases in this study have employee policy manuals and community disaster 
plans. Some even have safety plans or medical response procedures. Many of the existing 
policies undoubtedly were developed after a concern or problem was identified in other 
private or public organizations. Those interviewed appeared to find great comfort in having 
plans or procedures available to them. Worst-case scenarios that are perceived to have been 
addressed in existing policies or plans are seen as less of a problem or, in some cases, not a 
crisis at all. As will be described later, however, the policies or plans that do exist are often 
limited in the types of scenarios that are addressed and in the types of prevention and 
response strategies that are included.  
In addition to the level of comfort that written policies provided, the key informants 
also falsely believed that they were prepared for crises when they could identify an individual 
or team that would take the lead to resolve a particular situation. The lead person for OSHA 
requirements or safety issues was often seen as the “Crisis Person”. “If there’s a problem, 
Mary will know what to do.”  Epidemiological response teams were also seen as the “crisis 
team”.  All health departments had such a team. In all instances, however, these teams had 
responsibility for investigating and responding to infectious disease outbreaks and no other 
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type of crisis.  
A small amount of preparation can be dangerous. As mentioned by Pearson and Clair 
(1998), “Executives and managers can develop too much faith (and a false sense of security) 
in their abilities to successfully prevent dangers when some level of crisis management 
preparation is adopted. Limited preparation actually may reinforce assumptions of 
invulnerability and reduce organizational vigilance.” Having an individual or team with 
responsibilities for a particular type of emergency seemed to inflate the sense of preparedness 
in these health departments.  
Whether or not a specific crisis team existed, all of the individuals that were 
interviewed felt that the employees of the health department would work well together should 
they need to. “We all pull together in times of crisis”.  With the exception of the largest 
health department, there was little evidence that demonstrated that employees from different 
disciplines or work units worked together at all. Research on team effectiveness suggests that 
the lack of prior interactions between members could have a significant impact on how well 
people will work together in a crisis (King, 2002). Prior interactions between team members 
may promote a greater understanding of individual skills, perspectives and interpersonal 
styles. This group familiarity may influence the effectiveness of a crisis team by allowing for 
a more open style of communication so that team members may be better able to resolve 
problems (King, 2002). Creating more opportunities for multi-disciplinary problem-solving 
and team work would greatly support the beliefs held by health department employees that 
they would work well together when needed.  
The health department employees, who expressed the least number of faulty 
rationalizations, as outlined by Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), were from the largest, most 
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complex agency in the study. The public health professionals from this organization had also 
experienced the most chaotic, life-threatening emergency of the five health departments in 
the prior 5 year period. It is not clear whether the employees are less prone to faulty 
rationalizations and defenses because of their experiences or if their leader’s realistic view of 
crisis preparedness efforts has set the tone for their beliefs and values. No matter which came 
first, it is clear from other studies (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Lerbinger, 1997; Alpaslan, 
2004) that the beliefs of the health director and the employees create the culture of the 
organization. The unwritten rules and behaviors in an organization contribute to its level of 
preparedness.  
   
7.5b Dimensional Layer 2 - Organizational Culture   
Despite having similar missions and goals, each of the five health departments in the 
study conducted business in a different manner. How decisions were made, how information 
was communicated, how bad news was identified and acknowledged, how actions were taken 
and the ways in which the employees interacted were all parts of the culture that impacted the 
organization’s ability to effectively prepare and respond to crises. While differences existed 
in how these agencies operated, there were common themes that emerged about their 
organizational cultures. Factors deemed important to crisis preparedness and the themes that 
emerged in those areas are described below.  
   
Leadership / Decision-Making / Proactive vs. Reactive Nature   
Leadership styles varied greatly in these five health departments. In the largest agency 
involved in the study, the health director was seen as the leader of an agency-wide 
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management team. This team consisted of top administrative employees from the various 
service divisions. In two of the agencies, the health director was seen by employees as using 
an unforgiving, autocratic leadership style. The final two agencies were described by 
employees as having health directors that were invisible or, as described by some, neglectful. 
With the exception of the first agency, the health directors viewed their own leadership styles 
slightly differently than their staff members. Most described their style as participatory and 
engaging. What may have been described as “neglectful” by some employees was described 
by the health directors as “having trust in their employee’s decisions”.  
The leadership style of the health director sets the stage for how decisions get made 
and how information is shared throughout each agency. In general, decisions and 
information-sharing occurred on two levels in health departments. Decisions were made 
either by the health director or his/her management team or they were made by the 
supervisory team within a specific service division or unit.  An individual employee’s level of 
involvement in decision-making appeared to be related to the management style of their own 
unit supervisor.  
In situations where staff members felt limited in their power or decision-making 
ability or in situations where they felt that the health director would not support them in 
taking risks, they reported that “crisis response” was not their job.    
“These events are not my problem.  I would pass them on to the health director or my 
supervisor.”  
   
“I would try to pass on responding as much as I could. I would pass it to 
administration.”  
   
The timing and type of decisions that are made can offer some insight into how an 
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organization responds to the changing world. Best practices for a crisis-prepared organization 
suggest that organizations proactively think out the worst-case scenarios including what 
warning signals might be observed, what actions need to be taken and what resources need to 
be available for an effective response. Health department employees were split, even between 
employees within the same agency, as to whether they would call their agency proactive or 
reactive in nature. They were consistent in their views that their health department employees 
are skilled and effective at providing both surveillance and follow-up for potential or real 
infectious disease outbreaks. They were less consistent, however, in their overall assessment 
of the basic “nature” of the organization. To them, their agency was “both reactive and 
proactive.” As one informant states, “We are both. It depends on the situation. We are 
proactive in planning for some program things, but reactive when administrative issues 
arise.”  
 
Communication   
Like the decision making process, the sharing of information also appeared to be 
occurring in a top down fashion within health departments. In most cases, information was 
shared with employees in two ways. The more formal format for information dissemination 
was by way of staff meetings with the division directors or through a memo that had been 
distributed by the administrative office. The second, more common route of information 
sharing was labeled the “rumor mill”. Even in instances where information was thought to be 
shared in a systematic way, some employees felt ill-informed. This was particularly true for 
people working in buildings different from those which house the main administrative 
offices.  
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“People find out information through the rumor mill.”  
   
“The grapevine is accurate and quick. I use the grapevine.”  
“This agency does not seek feedback from staff or clients”   
   
“I’m not sure if information ever works its way up the chain.”   
    
“The people in the outside clinics feel left out. They say that they are not informed.”  
   
Despite the impact crises can have on all employees, in the health departments studied 
there was very little evidence that information about previously experienced crises had been 
shared with employees in a formal way while the crises were occurring. This was particularly 
true in events where the crisis was seen as being caused by employees of the agency, such as 
the case of the sexual harassment lawsuit against the health director and the incident of 
perceived poor response to the environmental disaster. While there may be a lack of formal 
communication by administrative staff during these difficult times, employees do get 
information about organizational crises. They claimed to get their information either from 
each other or from the mass media.  
“How would staff find out about a situation if we had one? It could be that some of 
our staff may read about it in the paper.”  
   
“Staff found out about this incident through the rumor mill”    
   
“I’m not sure how other staff got information on what was going on during this 
crisis.”  
   
 
Tensions   
Tensions and differences occur in any organizations. Tensions that are not resolved 
can create organizational crises or can negatively impact an organization’s ability to respond. 
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Issues causing tensions with health departments included concerns over feeling 
unappreciated, concerns over the actions of others and employee feelings of being left out. In 
addition, some of the health departments appeared to be experiencing tensions related to race. 
Comments focusing on race were made most often from the individuals from the two largest 
health departments. Any tensions can undermine the levels of trust between employees which 
may make the organization more crisis-prone.  
“Race is a polarizing issue here.”  
   
“In my area, I think we do openly discuss issues, but if you talk to a black clerical 
worker you might hear some gripes. There are racial tensions here.”  
   
“Many of the minority staff members feel that they are left out of the decision-making 
process for the health department.”  
   
When asked if their health departments openly talked about topics that were either 
controversial or difficult to discuss, there was a balance of opinions. Some emphatically 
stated that it was easy to talk and deal with difficult subjects while others said that topics that 
highlighted differences or tensions were never openly discussed. Most, however, stated that it 
was more likely that hot topics such as racism, sexism, or whistle-blowing would only be 
between members of small peer groups.    
“Difficult topics … people talk amongst themselves”    
   
Telling Bad News / Whistle-blowing /Learning   
Creating an environment in which employees feel free to talk about bad news and to 
learn from bad situations is important to becoming more crisis-prepared. Informants varied in 
their opinions as to whether or not whistle-blowing and problem identification were valued 
activities within their agencies. Health directors generally claimed that rooting out bad 
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performance, criminal activity or other problems was important to them. “Staff are 
encouraged to tell.” Other employees were less optimistic about the outcomes of speaking 
openly about inappropriate or incompetent activity within their department. Some felt that a 
whistle-blower would be tolerated only if he/she pointed a finger in directions other than 
towards members of the administration.  
“A whistle-blower would be seen as an outcast.”   
   
“We are encouraged to identify problems, but you would be treated like dirt by the 
other staff.”  
   
“A whistle-blower would be tolerated if he or she did not focus on the 
administration.”  
   
Willingness to tell one’s own bad news also appears to be dependent on what the 
news is about. “We don’t like to air our dirty laundry.”  In general, interviewees wanted their 
agencies to be seen as proactive with sharing bad news, but in reality they felt that many 
would not take steps to be the first to announce bad news. Most of those interviewed did not 
believe that members of the health department would try to lie or hide what was going on but 
that they would try to work the issue out internally before informing others.    
“We are not a tell-all agency, although it would depend on the situation.”  
   
“We wouldn’t sweep things under the rug, but we would wait to see how something 
works out before we would tell.”  
   
Willingness to share bad news may not only be related to the topic of the news, it may 
also be related to the audience with whom the bad news is to be shared. In general, public 
health employees did not enjoy sharing information with the media. Interactions with the 
media were generally reactive in nature and seen as an annoyance. The largest health 
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department appeared to be the exception to this theme. “We respect the media and their 
needs.”    
“We see the media as a foe. Our objective is to keep the media off of our backs.”  
   
“We don’t like talking to the media.”  
   
“The media recently called about hepatitis B shots for schools – I don’t have time to 
talk to them.”  
 
   
Willingness to talk about bad news allows for learning to take place. Learning from 
key experiences is a critical activity if an organization is going to have a crisis-prepared 
mindset and culture. While learning undoubtedly occurs on an individual basis after major 
life experiences, organizations could greatly benefit from allowing employees to share 
experiential learnings together. Creating a safe space to talk about negative, high-concern 
issues or events in a safe, non-judgmental environment is one way to promote learning. As 
indicated in the above paragraphs, not everyone agreed that their health department had a 
supportive environment for talking about controversial or tough issues, at least not issues that 
are personally sensitive or which may indicate individual fault or wrong-doing. Despite this, 
however, the interviewees felt that their organizations are “learning organizations.”   Some 
examples were shared about how an agency had used experiences to improve clinic 
operations or had identified the need for additional resources for particular events, such as 
mass vaccination clinics. The overwhelming theme that emerged about organizational 
learning was that few health departments have any formal practices for learning.    
“Learning is casual, not planned.”  
   
In health departments, if learning occurred as a shared experience, such as in a group 
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debriefing session, it was typically done by members of a particular discipline or work unit.  
Even when individuals or groups identified ways to function more effectively, there did not 
appear to be any expectation that the lessons learned would be shared with other health 
department employees. Learning from each other could improve overall agency performance, 
particularly as it relates to preventing and responding to crises.  
“It is common with nurses to learn from past problems.”  
   
“Learning takes place differently in each division.”  
   
Team Work   
The ability to work in teams is important for the prevention and response to 
organizational crises. As described in Chapter 2, the use of crisis teams is a recommended 
strategy by crisis-management experts (Fink, 1986; Pearson & Clair, 1998) for improved 
crisis-response performance. High performing teams include individuals from multiple 
disciplines and with diverse sets of abilities. Being able to lead teams is a critical crisis 
leadership skill.  
 Public Health employees conduct much of their work through the use of teams. 
Despite the use of teams in their work, however, key informants stated that employees from 
different service units did not work together regularly and in some instances didn’t even 
know each other. Most enjoyed their coworkers and felt that the smaller team units within 
their agency function well together. They did not believe, however, that the employees of the 
entire organization viewed themselves as an overall team.    
“Each division is its own kingdom; no one really feels like there is a Health 
Department team – but they like their own division team and feel that they work well 
together.”  
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“We are segmented kingdoms, we do not share resources.”  
   
Individuals who work either in an off-site location or for environmental health 
services were most often cited as being disconnected from the other public health employees. 
Growth in the numbers of staff, ineffective methods of communication with direct line staff 
and differences in geographic location of work space were some of the reasons given for 
employees not feeling connected to each other and for not sharing common agency team 
goals. Despite limited interaction with fellow employees, it was generally believed that, if 
they had to, the public health workers would pull together and be an effective team.  
 “Environmental health services is a separate unit and they are not housed in the 
same building which impacts how they are seen and how they see themselves.”    
   
“The employees in the northwest office may feel that they are the red-headed 
stepchild.”  
   
“We do not usually work as a team, but when push comes to shove, we work well 
together.”   
   
The values, beliefs and unwritten rules of a health department set the stage for how 
the employees conduct public health business. While the health departments involved in this 
part of the study varied greatly, themes emerged from the key informant interviews about the 
cultural aspects of these organizations. These findings illuminate some areas from 
dimensional layer 2 of the DTP model which could make health departments more crisis-
prone. 
   
7.5c Dimensional Layer 3 – Crisis-Preparedness Infrastructure   
Key informants were asked to share their knowledge of the structures that exist within 
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their agency which support crisis preparedness. Specifically they were asked to comment on 
who had job related responsibilities related to crisis prevention and response and what 
structures were in place to mobilize employees for action. They were also asked to share their 
knowledge of the types of crisis training opportunities, drills/exercises, problem-sensing 
activities and support services that were available. Despite differences among the five health 
departments, a number of similarities emerged in the types of structures that were either in 
place or were not.  
   
Crisis Team   
While all crisis management experts suggest the formation of a crisis response team, 
not one of the health departments had one, at least in terms of a core group of individuals that 
is responsible for overseeing the efforts of the agency for the prevention and response to a 
variety of organizational crises. The largest health agency in the study did have a “Ready 
Team” which included key individuals from each building site. While this team was ready to 
respond to a variety of situations, those interviewed did not see it as having responsibility for 
handling crises of a more administrative nature, such as employee misconduct or negligence.  
All of the health departments did have teams that had formed around specific types of 
crises. They all had a team of professionals, often called the epidemiological response team 
or mobilization team, responsible for coordinating responses to infectious disease outbreaks. 
Several key informants also mentioned the existence of a “safety team”, which was 
responsible for monitoring OSHA requirements and other employee- or client-safety issues. 
And while not everyone knew much about the county-level disaster plan, at least one person 
in each agency stated that a member of the health department, typically the health director, 
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was a member of a county-level disaster-response team. For situations that didn’t fit under 
the responsibility of an existing team, the interviewees most often identified the 
“Management Team” as the most likely group of individuals to be called upon to coordinate a 
response.  
 
Chain of Command / Employee Mobilization   
At the time of this study, none of the health departments had written down a chain of 
command for handling crises. Yet most of those interviewed felt that they would know who 
would be in charge should the health director not be available when a crisis hit. Most often 
another senior level administrator, such as the Nursing Director, was seen as the next person 
of authority after the health director. After this person, however, opinions varied within the 
members of the same health department of who might be in charge should the top two 
individuals not be available.  
In the event of a crisis, particularly one that is triggered during nonworking hours, 
agencies need a plan for how they will mobilize their human resources quickly. Due to 
weather-related problems in the past, some agencies had established phone trees but for the 
most part, those interviewed were not aware of any existing plan for how they would assure 
the safety of their employees and mobilize them into action. The largest health department, 
which had experienced a large community disaster, appeared to have given the most thought 
to this issue. Besides a phone tree, they had given key employees pagers and had placed a list 
of phone numbers for the members of the Ready Team at the front desk for immediate 
contact. Despite their efforts, some of those interviewed expressed fear that as time passes, it 
was more likely that lists and plans will be forgotten or become outdated.  
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Crisis Communication   
In these five health departments, an infrastructure for crisis communication efforts 
was either non-existent or very limited. Again, the largest health department had created the 
most thoughtful system for communicating in times of high concern. Their structure and 
efforts for communicating more effectively with the public were relatively new at the point of 
the interviews. Concerns from the hurricane that had hit their area and a current restructuring 
of their agency had created a sense of urgency for creating more structure. They had assigned 
communication responsibilities to a senior-level employee, they had drafted a media relations 
policy, they had established a weekly cable television show, and they had put in place a 
dedicated phone line for employees to receive regular updates on issues of concern. While a 
considerable amount of effort has been put into improving the infrastructure for 
communications at this health department, the structure still falls short of what could be in 
place.  
For the other health departments, the communication needs associated with 
responding to a crisis had not been considered and had not been seen as a priority. No prior 
attention had been given to developing systems that would allow for ongoing communication 
with key stakeholders during an event such as staff, the Board of Health, other community 
leaders or the families of victims.  
For these agencies, working with the media was by far the most feared and disliked 
aspect of crisis communication. While each health department had experience responding to 
media requests for information, “working with the media in a crisis is a last thought, not a 
priority.”  Only one health department had officially selected an individual to coordinate 
media interactions and had identified key spokespersons for various topics. For the other 
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health departments, there was no formal structure in place for interacting with the mass 
media.  When asked to identify the health department spokesperson, the health educator was 
most often seen as the media contact person for general public health topics. In a crisis or in 
times of controversy, most interviewees guessed that the health director would be the 
spokesperson. Responding to the media was seen as the health director’s responsibility 
because he or she was perceived as wanting to control the communications with the media or 
because no one else felt they had the authority or competence to speak effectively.      
“If “60 Minutes” showed up at the office, I’d say, “no comment, you have to speak to 
the health director.”  
   
“The health director talks to the media. No one else does unless he says.”  
   
“There is no written policy. Everyone just knows that the Health Director and 
Nursing Director take the media calls. This is common knowledge.”  
   
Since few of the health departments had formally selected a lead media spokesperson 
it is not surprising that none of them had a crisis team in place with specific responsibilities 
for planning and implementing a communications plan in the event of a crisis. Not one key 
informant indicated that their health department had made any effort to pre-plan for the vast 
number of diverse communication needs that arise during a crisis, including the need for 
media / press packets, message maps for key issues, news releases or draft stakeholder letters.  
   
Psychological and Emotional Support   
Public health professionals felt ill-prepared to deal with the emotional or 
psychological aspects of a crisis. Despite their feelings of inadequacy, they have done little to 
set up an infrastructure that would assist them in meeting the human needs of people 
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experiencing a traumatic event. No agency had considered what process they would use to 
assess and monitor the mental health needs of employees or clients during a crisis. No agency 
had identified a list of mental health professionals that would be called in the event of a crisis 
nor had they determined where counselors might work if they were needed on site. And, no 
agency had provided stress-response training for the supervisors or for other lead staff who 
might be the first to identify or handle the initial effects of trauma on their employees.  
For the most part, interviewees had not considered the need for counseling and 
support services for dealing with crises.  Informants from the two larger health departments 
stated that they would most likely use the county Employee Assistance Program (EAP) if 
they needed to refer employees for support or counseling. Both of these agencies had 
previous experience with referring employees to the county program for personal issues and 
felt that these services would be available to them in the event of a crisis.  The employees 
from the other three health departments were unaware of a similar program in their area. In 
general, they were not clear what mental health services they would utilize from their 
communities, if they needed assistance.  
Based on the interviews, it appears that public health professionals have seen stress 
relief to be an individual responsibility. Even in the counties where EAP services are 
available, there was no evidence that this or any other community mental health service had 
been used to help people through prior organizational crises. In fact, for the most part, it 
appears that individuals have been left on their own to find ways to deal with the stresses of a 
crisis. The health director responsible for responding to the recent environmental concern and 
the subsequent public relations crisis at the health department stated “I know some people are 
stressed out, but I don’t know what to tell staff to do. I tell them ‘just don’t take your stress 
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out on the clients’.”  And he, himself, claimed to be under so much stress during the event 
that he now cannot remember anything that occurred during the four-month time period of 
the crisis. 
“During the crisis we had in our environmental health division, there was no formal 
stress reliever; each individual dealt with it over time. People deal with stress 
around here by either taking a vacation or closing their office door and screaming.”  
There has been virtually no thought given to what kinds of psychological needs might 
present themselves during a crisis nor has there been any consideration of what internal 
structure and resources might be needed to support these needs.  
   
Training / Drills   
Despite the importance of maintaining a competent workforce, there was little 
evidence that public health employees had focused much attention on building individual or 
team-level skills for crisis preparedness. A deliberate effort to identify training needs and to 
develop a plan for meeting those needs was not visible in any of the health departments.  
Crisis related training programs or drills that had been offered to employees were 
almost always mandated by some outside group or policy, such as a state law or a specific 
discipline-related standard. The one exception to this was mass media training which will be 
discussed later.  
Health officials mentioned a number of training programs or educational sessions that 
employees had attended in recent years. Topics of the training programs included CPR, 
hurricane/ natural disaster response, hazardous materials guidelines, media relations, medical 
emergencies and other safety issues. No one mentioned training sessions to build stronger or 
more effective teams, to facilitate the use of systems-thinking skills for working out complex 
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problems or to understand or identify the psychological impacts of crises on people. The 
focus of the training sessions most commonly mentioned fell into the categories of dealing 
with medical emergencies, natural disasters, environmental threats or other public health 
problems such as infectious disease outbreaks.  
Attendance at the programs that were mentioned appeared to be required of particular 
staff members as determined by their position or role in the organization. Typically the 
individuals responsible for representing the health department for community-level disaster 
response had attended sessions on natural disaster response and the person or persons 
responsible for leading the safety committee or for maintaining OSHA regulations had 
attended special training for handling or storing hazardous materials or other safety-related 
issues. These roles were often held by the health director, an environmental health specialist 
or a nurse.  
Training in media relations or working with the mass media was the only training 
program that was mentioned that was not mandated by some outside group. At least four 
individuals stated that they had been trained on how to be interviewed by a news reporter. In 
most cases, these individuals participated in a one-time training program that was a day or 
less in length. In general, the other public health practitioners that were interviewed were not 
aware of who in their agency had received special training in this area. Only the members of 
the largest health department felt that their agency had some level of competency in working 
with the media. In general, media training was seen as a current training need.  
Only two types of practice drills or exercises were mentioned with any consistency 
between the five health departments: fire evacuation drills and community disaster drills. 
Staff members had attended the planned community disaster response drills but had not had 
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any significant role in the planning of these exercises. On the other hand, health department 
employees were responsible for arranging the routine fire evacuation drills as mandated by 
law. While everyone agreed on the need for evacuation practice, many claimed that they were 
not holding as many drills as required. Time and the difficulties around client logistics were 
the most common excuses for not maintaining a regular practice schedule for fire drills.  
Problem Sensing   
Health officials were evenly mixed in their beliefs as to whether or not their agencies 
are proactive and aggressive in their pursuit of potential problems or crises. Whether or not 
they are seen as doing all they can to identify problems, health departments do implement 
some activities to identify issues. Despite the current efforts being made in this area, 
however, those interviewed suggested that there are gaps in the types of problems they look 
for and a haphazardness in the methods that they use for problem assessment.  
Some believed strongly that their agency does not seek to identify the existence of 
problems or look for the early warning signs of potential crises. One reason given for not 
being more proactive in this area was that the current day-to-day problems were more than 
enough to keep public health employees busy. Another reason was that there are not enough 
resources to make a special attempt to identify new issues or to deal with problems once they 
are found. And finally, at least some believe that their organizational culture is to do only 
what is required of them and no more.  
“We don’t look for problems. We tend to ignore warning signals.”  
   
“There are too many other problems to think of what might happen.”    
 
Others believe that their agency does a good job looking for issues or potential 
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problems. The document reviews, in fact, show that health department employees do have 
policies in place for specific problem-identification efforts. Strategies that were mentioned 
for identifying potential issues included record audits, staff meetings, quality improvement 
circles, infectious disease surveillance, staff performance evaluations, community health 
assessments, staff complaints, sanitarian daily reporting records, equipment checks for 
laboratory equipment, and patient satisfaction surveys.  
Despite the variety of activities that health officials engage in to detect problems, no 
one believed that their agency was comprehensive or systematic in their approach. Health 
officials felt that their current signal detection activities were conducted in a haphazard way; 
often lacking integration. Activities for identifying problems were often instituted because 
they were mandated or because a problem had occurred in the past. Best practices for finding 
early warning signals may be a standard procedure in one service area but may not be done in 
other divisions within the same agency. Comments made by health officials suggest that 
problem identification could be improved by integrating the efforts made throughout the 
organization and by making an effort to look for potential problems beyond the obvious.   
“We have a Quality Assurance team but each division works on its own. There is no 
department-wide effort to look for problems.”  
   
The structure for crisis preparedness was described by the key informants in each of 
the study agencies. Of particular interest for this study was the existence of: a multi-
disciplinary, all-hazards crisis team, a training and drill plan, a communication infrastructure, 
an integrated and deliberate set of problem-sensing procedures and a support system for 
dealing with psychological and emotional issues. Written documents are used to support or 
question the perceptions about structure shared above by the key informants. The following 
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section will describe the availability and accessibility of written documents and plans for 
crisis  
 
7.5d Dimensional Layer 4 - Written Plans and Policies   
The written policies and plans that exist in an organization are the easiest part of the 
DTP Model of Crisis Preparedness to see. During the interview phase of the study, health 
officials were asked to identify what plans or policies had been documented in written form 
that related to crisis preparedness and where these documents were housed within their 
organization. Below is a description of the themes that emerged from both the interviews and 
from the document reviews within the five case organizations.  
   
Existing Documents   
Health departments, in general, have a number of written policies that relate to crisis 
preparedness. Table 7.2 lists the titles of those documents identified in each of the five 
agencies. Documents with similar contents are placed in the same row to highlight 
consistency between the agencies.  
Health departments had several written policies or plans for preventing or responding 
to a variety of worst-case scenarios. The most common types of crises addressed in these 
documents were fire/building evacuations, infectious disease outbreaks, natural disasters or 
civil disobedience, chemical/hazardous material exposure, medical emergencies, professional 
standards and expectations for employee conduct.  
The content of these documents, even those with the same title, varied greatly between 
agencies. In most cases, the problem or problems that the document addressed were defined 
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and the basic procedures for responding should the problem occur were outlined. For 
example, the issues related to exposure to blood-borne pathogens were documented by all 
health departments. Each one had outlined the steps needed for preventing exposure to blood-
borne pathogens and for the response should an employee become exposed. The most 
comprehensive document for handling crises in all five of the agencies was the county  
disaster plan.   
Table 7.2 Crisis preparedness documents and plans in the five case health departments 
 
Health Dept #1 Health Dept. #2 Health Dept. #3 Health Dept. #4 Health Dept. #5 
Evacuation Plan / 
Fire 
Fire Safety Plan Evacuation Plan Evacuation Plan Evacuation Plan 
Personnel Policies Personnel Policies Personnel Policies  Personnel Manual Personnel Policies 
  Computer Retrieval 
Plan 
  
OSHA / Hazardous 
Materials Plan* / 
Laboratory Policy 
Manual 
 Hazardous 
Materials Plan 
OSHA / 
Hazardous 
Materials 
Guidelines 
OSHA guidelines – 
Exposure Control 
County Disaster 
Plan* / Emergency 
Plan for County 
Governmental 
Offices 
County Disaster 
Plan 
Civil Defense 
Emergency 
Operations Plan 
and County 
Disaster Plan 
County Disaster 
and Emergency 
Operations Plan 
County Disaster 
Plan 
 County Safety 
Policy 
   
Phone Tree Phone List    Phone List 
Nursing /  
Pharmacy Policies* 
 Nursing Policies  Nursing Policies 
Medical 
Emergency Plan / 
Crash Cart * 
Medical 
Emergency Plan 
Medical 
Emergencies Plan 
Medical 
Emergency Plan 
Medical 
Emergency Plan 
Epi Response Plan 
/ Communicable 
Disease Plan 
Epi Response 
Plan 
Mobilization Plan 
for Infectious 
Disease Outbreaks 
 Infectious Disease 
Outbreak  
Procedure for 
writing news 
releases* 
 Media Relations 
and 
Communications 
Policy 
  
Personal Care 
Division Policy 
Manual (includes  
items with *) 
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The county disaster plans were developed under the leadership of the county 
emergency services department. These plans were written for events such as major 
transportation accidents, natural disasters, acts of war, mass casualties and acts of civil 
disobedience. While some plans appeared more thorough than others, all of them contained 
more information than any other crisis plan found in the health departments. Disaster plans 
typically included the following:  
• list of the responsibilities and contact information for the agencies and people 
involved in the response  
• list of equipment needs, including radios, faxes, pagers etc.  
• description of the chain of command  
• description of how communication efforts should occur  
• list of recovery procedures, including psychological counseling guidelines  
• list of community resources and available medical facilities  
• list of designated safe areas  
• description of warning signals  
• procedures for evacuation and injury response  
• list of the response team activation steps  
• schedule of practice drills  
   
While health departments had access to copies of their county’s disaster plan, not one 
of them had developed a similar document for the multitude of potential crises that could 
affect their own agency. Not one had a single document entitled “Crisis Plan” that 
incorporated the vast number of policies and procedures that existed for specific incidents or 
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emergencies. Nor did any of the existing policies or procedures go into the same level of 
depth as the disaster plans. Overall, the existing health department documents were missing 
the following information:  
• A list of who will respond to the incident (Crisis Team) and what each person’s 
responsibility would be  
• Information about the warning signals that might exist prior to a crisis  
• A list of the resources that exist for recovery, in terms of continued operations and in 
emotional / human recovery  
• A sample of the messages that might be communicated to the various stakeholders, 
by whom, and by what method (Communication Plan, Message Maps, Draft Letters)  
• A list of equipment/facility needs and community resources  
   
While there are several crisis related policies and procedures that exist in each health 
department, few people were truly aware of what existed in their agency. Most knew of some 
of the policies and plans. Most often they were aware of those documents related to their 
work or area of responsibility but they were unsure of what other written procedures existed. 
Most everyone was aware that procedures existed for building evacuations, for infectious 
disease outbreak control and for hazardous material exposure. People were less sure of the 
kinds of policies that existed for employee misconduct, such as sexual harassment, misuse of 
county funds, discrimination, for county-wide disasters or for other safety issues.  
   
Location and Accessibility of Written Plans and Policies   
With the exception of the largest health department in the study, no other agency had 
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a single location for storing all of their policy and procedure manuals. It was common for an 
employee to state that he or she was aware of a particular policy but was not sure where to get 
a copy of it. Even when an individual had an idea of where a manual or policy was suppose to 
be stored, when searching for it, it was no where to be found.  
 Procedures or manuals were most often scattered throughout the agency. Typically at 
least one copy could be found in the work area of the individual or team who had authored 
the document or had primary responsibility for enforcing the policy. It was not clear if a copy 
of any policy manual or crisis plan, other than the county disaster plan, was also located in off 
site/campus location. In general, employees did not have quick access to the written plans 
that existed and might not have access at all to information if an event required that the 
response be coordinated away from the office.  
   
7.6 Summary 
Visits to five local North Carolina public health departments provided a wealth of 
information about the level of preparedness for organizational crises. First, crises were seen 
as negative events that can have significant consequences and require prompt action. Events 
were defined as a crisis when officials did not feel prepared to respond and when individuals 
external to the agency were made aware of the event.  
  Health departments have experienced a wide variety of negative situations. Despite 
this experience, however, most public health officials were limited in their imagination of 
what worst-case scenarios might impact their agency. None of them had ever engaged in a 
brainstorming activity for identifying the “unthinkable”. Past experience, prior discussions or 
a perceived crisis leader helped to create a perception of preparedness.  
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Health officials initially felt relatively prepared for preventing and responding to 
“crises” until they were presented with a list of potential situations and a set of questions 
about the types of response activities they had planned within their agency. They felt most 
prepared to handle incidents involving employees, such as quality assurance issues or 
personnel problems. With the exception of fires, they felt least prepared for the types of crises 
that would be included in the typology family labeled as “Disasters.”  
Several beliefs were held by public health employees that may have limited the 
preparedness efforts within health departments and made them more crisis-prone. The most 
common faulty rationalizations focused on beliefs that were specific to the public health 
industry; specifically, that certain crises won’t happen within health departments or that 
efforts focused on crisis preparedness are a luxury beyond the time or resources for local 
health departments.    
The impact of these faulty beliefs and values could be seen on the organizational 
cultures within these health departments. While the cultures within each of the study agencies 
varied, there were some common themes about “how business is accomplished” which may 
have negatively impacted levels of organizational preparedness. Public health employees 
pride themselves on being prevention-oriented, nonjudgmental and team-focused. Yet 
discussions suggested that the health departments did not function in this way. Work tended 
to be accomplished within specific work units with employees that seldom coordinated or 
learned from people working in other divisions. There were tensions around controversial 
issues and agencies tended to shy away from organization-wide discussions that might open 
wounds or result in finger-pointing.  Much of the official information shared within agencies 
was done in a top down manner or within specific work units. The fastest route for 
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disseminating bad news within the organization was the “grapevine” or “rumor mill.” Sharing 
bad news with the outside world was only done when unavoidable, particularly when the 
news reflected poorly on the agency. Most employees were very wary of the media and their 
motives.    
An overall structure for crisis preparedness within health departments was almost 
nonexistent. Fragments of structure were in place for specific types of crises such as the 
county disaster response teams and the health department epidemiological response 
committees but there was little to no evidence of other existing structures that might help 
with preparing or responding to a wide range of crises. One of the areas in which gaps were 
found was in the infrastructure for communication. There was a void in the level of readiness 
to communicate bad news both within an individual agency and outside with a variety of 
stakeholder groups. While most felt that the mass media plays a significant role in how an 
incident is perceived and how well the agency responds, most health departments had no 
structure in place for working with news journalists, particularly in times of crisis. They were 
equally ill-prepared to respond to the psychological or emotional needs that will play a role in 
both the agency's ability to respond effectively and its ability to recover quickly. With the 
exception of fire drills, there were few drills and training programs that were routinely 
offered to health department employees to build crisis preparedness skills. More preparation 
and practice would help individuals feel prepared.   
Having policies or plans in place also creates a sense of preparedness. Health 
departments had a variety of policies in place that focus on specific situations. There was not 
one agency, however, that had a comprehensive crisis-response plan that reflected an attempt 
to address a variety of potential scenarios or that used a systems approach to preventing and 
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dealing with such events. The county disaster plan which exists in each community could 
provide a model for writing a more integrated crisis-response plan for organizational crises.  
For the manuals or policies that were available, only one health department had 
identified a location for all agency policy manuals. Most documents were scattered 
throughout the agency and were not easily found. The lack of comprehensive crisis plans and 
policies, the scattered locations of what does exist, the variations in how documents are 
written and cared for and the general confusion over what exists are key indicators of the 
state of crisis preparedness in local health departments.  
   
CHAPTER 8  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
While it is hard to determine how many crises an organization avoids by being 
prepared or how well it might respond to any given situation, most experts of crisis 
management believe that it is possible to create an organization that can prevent and respond 
more effectively to organizational crises. The literature contains a plethora of case studies 
that make suggestions for actions that companies could have or should have taken prior to an 
event that would have aided in the early detection of the event or would have greatly 
enhanced the subsequent response efforts and minimized the negative outcomes. Health 
departments are not immune to organizational crises yet no one has studied what situations 
have occurred in local agencies or how well prepared these agencies are to prevent or respond 
to these situations.  
  This study is the first attempt to look at local health departments and determine how 
prepared they are to deal with a variety of organizational crises. This chapter briefly reviews 
the purpose, the main assumptions, the conceptual model and the research methodology used 
to determine organizational preparedness. This is followed by a discussion of the key findings 
of the study, with particular attention to the specific questions posed at the beginning and a 
brief description of the research limitations. 
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8.1. Purpose, Model and Methodology 
8.1a. Purpose and Assumptions  
The purpose of this research was to determine the level of preparedness within local 
North Carolina public health departments to prevent and respond to a variety of 
organizational crises. Specifically, the study attempted to answer the following questions:    
• What types of organizational crises might be experienced by a local health 
department?  
• Can these scenarios be categorized to form a useful framework to aid in crisis 
management?  
• How well prepared are health departments to prevent and respond to the various types 
of crises?  
• What gaps exist in crisis preparedness for local North Carolina public health 
departments?  
   
To gain benefit from this study, it is necessary to believe that an organization can 
influence the occurrence and impact of a wide variety of institutional crises. Even in 
instances where it is impossible to prevent an event from happening, such as a natural 
disaster, individuals must believe that there are things they can do to limit the potential harm 
or destruction that can result from a crisis. In addition to the belief that preparedness is 
achievable, this study is built upon the assumption that health departments are like other 
business organizations; they are multi-dimensional. They are an integrated system of people, 
culture, structure and technology, and policies and procedures. 
   
8.1b. Model  
The DTP Model of Crisis Preparedness was used to determine organizational 
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preparedness levels in this study. The DTP Model, as described in Chapter 3, is an expansion 
of the Onion Model developed by T. Pauchant and I. Mitroff. This model supports a multi-
layered approach to organizational crisis readiness, focusing attention on the Dimensions of 
an organization, the Types of crises and the Phases of crises.  Health departments considered 
crisis-prepared have human, cultural and structural characteristics that support crisis 
management. This includes a mindset and a set of skills within the leader and the employees 
that support preparedness and an organizational structure that promotes crisis prevention and 
response activities in an integrated and efficient manner. In addition, a crisis-prepared health 
department must also have written strategies, such as crisis plans and media relations 
procedures, which provide a systematic framework for responding to a variety of crisis types. 
These plans should reflect thoughtful consideration of all phases of a crisis and the impact of 
a situation on the various dimensions of the organization. Also, the plans must be easy to use 
and accessible to employees both on site and off campus. They should be routinely updated 
and understood by employees throughout the organization.  
   
8.1c. Methodology  
This study was conducted in two phases. In Phase I, a list of potential worst-case 
scenarios was developed and focus groups were used to sort these situations into families for 
the formation of a crisis typology useful to public health agencies. Phase II then used multiple 
methodologies to obtain data on the level of crisis preparedness of local health departments. 
These methods included key informant interviews and document reviews from five local 
health departments in North Carolina and a written survey of local public health directors in 
the state. The various types of data were necessary to provide insight into the very complex 
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nature of organizational crisis preparedness.  
8.2. Key Findings 
This study offers some key insights about crisis preparedness in local health 
departments. In this section the data collected from the written survey, interviews, document 
reviews and academic literature will be merged to identify the key findings for each of the 
four research questions. These findings will be compared to what is known about 
organizational crisis preparedness as written in the literature.  
   
8.2a.What types of organizational crises might be experienced by a local health department?  
This question was answered by asking public health leaders to generate a list of 
potential organizational crises and by asking local public health practitioners what kinds of 
crises their agencies have experienced or might experience. A list of potential worst-case 
scenarios was generated during this study. In the process of creating this list, two key findings 
emerged. First, local health departments experience many negative events which they label as 
crises. Second, despite reporting that they have experienced many such events, health 
directors have given very little thought to the variety of worst-case scenarios that their 
organization and employees may face. These two findings are explored in greater detail 
below.  
Like other corporations and businesses, health departments have experienced 
organizational crises.  Eighty-four percent of health departments had reported experience 
with an organizational crisis during a five-year period. Over 50% of local health directors 
claimed that their agency had experienced four or more such events during this time period. 
The most common types of crises experienced were either political in nature or related to 
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facilities or equipment. During the same time period (1995), ICM reports (ICM Report, 2006) 
the most commonly reported organizational crises in private corporations were 
mismanagement, white-collar crime and labor disputes. Data sets from the years 2005 and 
2006 show a drop in the number of incidents related to mismanagement but an increase in the 
number of crises related to catastrophes and class action lawsuits. These increases might be 
due to the increased efforts by consumers to demand compensation for dangerous products, 
such as tobacco, and to the significance of major disasters, such as hurricane Katrina on 
businesses. Health directors reported some experience with legal issues and disasters at the 
time of this study. One might suspect, however, that they would also be influenced by these 
national trends and report larger numbers of these types of crises now as compared to ten 
years ago.  
The ability to think creatively about the problems one might face is a critical skill for 
crisis leaders. The lack of imagination in government officials has been cited as a key reason 
for the failure to anticipate the tragic events of 9/11 (9/11 Commission Report, 2004; 
McConnell & Drennan, 2006) Executives and researchers from many industries are 
bounded in their creativity and often only make links to what they already know. For 
example, when asked what types of crises they may face, banking executives most often cited 
events such as white-collar crime, hostile takeovers and poor public image as potential crises 
for their organizations (Reilly, 1989). Public health officials involved in this study were also 
limited as to their ability to anticipate a variety of worst case scenarios that could impact their 
organizations. They too, tended to list only industry-specific situations, such as infectious 
disease outbreaks and budget cuts, or crises that have been previously experienced either by 
their organization or a similar organization in close geographic proximity.  
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Data from both the interviews and the document reviews show that for some health 
departments there are significant barriers to “thinking the unthinkable.” First there are a 
number of individual employee-held beliefs that certain situations could not happen or will 
not occur in their agency. Similarly, there are beliefs that spending time thinking about or 
preparing for situations that may or may not occur is time wasted. Finally, even for those with 
the belief that anything could occur and that crisis readiness is important, there tended to be 
limited organizational structures in place that allow for dialogue and actions to occur.  
Existing lists of potential crises developed for other private or not-for-profit 
organizations can aid health leaders in thinking about the unthinkable. Crisis preparedness 
scholars such as Mitroff, Zdziarski and Spillan generated lists of potential crises for studies 
of private corporations (2001), universities (2004) and not for profit organizations (2002). 
While there are many similarities between the list of potential worst-case scenarios generated 
for this study and lists used by other researchers, there are some differences as well. Lists 
vary both in the number and the types of scenarios included.  
Lists of potential organizational crises found in the literature contain between five 
(Fowler et al., 2007) and over one hundred separate events. The Managers Crisis Index 
developed by the Lukaszewski Group, (Appendix A) is the longest list found, with 119 
separate events. Most lists include natural disasters, product failures, inappropriate employee 
behavior or deliberate evil acts of outsiders. Some lists, however, appear to use a broader 
definition of crisis including long-term business threats such as mergers and decreasing 
budget revenues. This is true of the ICM Crisis List (2006). Other lists vary in their 
specificity. Some include situations that are broadly defined, such as “employee misconduct”, 
while others include more specific situations that might be included under this particular 
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heading, such as “employee accepting bribes” or “employee making racial slurs.” A useful 
list is one that includes enough variety to help with creative thinking, but is not so long that it 
is useless as a tool for improving organizational preparedness.  
The two other differences between the list of potential crises generated for this study 
and other lists reflect the differences between public health agencies and other industries. 
First, some situations listed may be relevant to only certain types of businesses. For example, 
the Lukaszewski Managers Index contains “airport security” and “international accidents” as 
potential situations. Since local health departments tend to function at the city or 
county/district level, these situations were not identified as relevant to this study. However, 
with the events of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax threats, perhaps a newer version of a list 
for public health agencies might include global events. Another difference between lists can 
be found in the wording used to describe particular scenarios.  For example, “takeovers and 
mergers” may be found on crisis lists used by private corporations. These events occur in 
public health but may be instead labeled by public health leaders as “privatization”. 
Similarly, problems related to products, such as product tampering and product recall, may be 
described as “service failures” within the public health system.    
Prior to this research study, public health leaders in general had spent little-to-no time 
thinking of the variety of worst-case scenarios that may be experienced by their agencies. 
When given an opportunity to think about the unthinkable and aided in their brainstorming by 
seeing other lists of worst-case scenarios, they were able to identify a list of potential 
organizational crises for public health agencies. The list generated for this study contained 46 
situations and was felt to reasonably represent the types of events that health departments 
could face.  
 160 
   
8.2b Can these scenarios be categorized to form a useful framework to aid in crisis 
management?  
A crisis typology of potential organizational crises was created during this study. 
Below is a description of the final crisis typology categories, how these typology groupings 
are different from crisis groupings created by other researchers and why a crisis typology is a 
useful tool for public health practitioners.  
A crisis typology or framework in which crises are categorized is a useful tool for 
both researchers and practitioners. By grouping crisis events into categories, one can follow 
the trends in organizational crises. For example, ICM has been tracking 16 different types of 
newsworthy corporate crises since1990 (ICM Report, 2006). Each year they publish statistics 
on what types of crises are occurring in businesses, how these numbers compare to previous 
years and which industries have experienced the most crises over a ten-year period. Mitroff, 
et al. (2003) also used their research data on organizational crises to show a disturbing trend 
in the types of crises that are occurring. They demonstrated that man-made organizational 
crises are now increasing in occurrence and are rivaling the destruction caused by natural 
disasters. The chemical gas release from the Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, India, the 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma (1995) and the tragedies of 
9/11 are but just a few examples of significant man-made crises.  
Grouping crises into categories is also useful to practitioners as a tool for prevention 
and response planning. Typologies can be used to expand the thinking by public health 
officials as to what could happen. A typology highlights the wide variety of kinds of events 
that pose threats and reflects the similarities and differences in these events. The ability for 
 161 
crisis leaders to understand the common traits in situations can aid in response planning. A 
typology of events can also make the level of effort needed to improve preparedness feel 
more achievable. No organization has time to prepare for every possible worst-case scenario, 
particularly if the events seem unlikely. Pauchant and Mitroff suggest that organizations 
prepare for at least one crisis scenario from each category or family in the typology. Using a 
framework with a limited number of crisis categories as a guide for preparedness efforts may 
make the work feel less daunting for an organization.  
The usefulness of any typology, however, will be dependent on the mindset of the 
public health leaders that use it. No crisis occurs as planned. Preparing for one specific 
situation in a family of crises should be used to build particular skills and answer specific 
questions that would be useful in preventing or responding to both the specific situation but 
also to other similar, but different crisis situations. The efforts to prepare for one worst-case 
scenario will assure that the agency has answered as many questions as possible up front and 
will allow staff an opportunity to build skills and test strategies for a quicker response to any 
real situation. Public health practitioners who are unable to see how their preparations for one 
scenario can help them respond to similar situations have lost the value of the typology and of 
their preparedness efforts.  
In the current research, the task of sorting the forty-six worst case scenarios into 
categories based on similar response strategies was accomplished with remarkable 
consistency by three focus groups with public health practitioners.  The result was a crisis 
typology of seven different “types” of organizational crises. These categories or families were 
labeled as Disasters, Personnel, Public Relations, Legal, Quality Assurance, Plant / 
Equipment and Political.  
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The typology categories were formed by placing scenarios together based on the need 
for similar response strategies. For example, events which destroy an organization’s facility 
were placed into the same category because they share the need for similar actions (such as 
relocating services, securing the premises, protecting employees and clients from injuries, 
recovering lost or damaged equipment or information) despite having different causes. In 
reality, the focus group participants charged with the creation of the crisis typology found it 
difficult to exclude the perspective of causation in their deliberations. Therefore, an event 
such as a building fire was placed in the “Disaster Family” if caused by a lightening bolt but 
in the “Legal Family” if the cause was arson. Causation can affect the response strategies that 
are needed, particularly in terms of the communication strategies and messages that will be 
needed for an effective response. It was felt that the inclusion of causation in the creation of 
the crisis typology, in the end, did not disturb the usefulness of the final product.  
The actual categories that emerged for this study are different from other typologies. 
The simplest typology is that which divides situations based on the distinction of causation: 
man-made versus natural. Other typologies (Fowler et al., 2007) include only a very limited 
set of worst-case scenarios. These typically include only situations caused by the evil acts of 
outsiders or by nature. They neglect other categories of crises such as tragedies that we can 
bring upon ourselves. Examples of these types of events might include acts of misconduct or 
incompetence. Many of the differences found in other organizational crisis typologies 
however, relate to the language used in different industries (such as public health versus 
private businesses) or true differences between the goals and work of these organizations.  
A typology can allow for better research around the nature and trends in 
organizational crises, but it should also be a useful tool for organizational leaders. It is only 
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useful, however, if it is used to think out and plan for the variety of situations that could 
occur.  
 
8.2c. How well prepared are health departments to prevent and respond to the various types 
of crises?  
A critical finding of this study was that public health departments are not crisis-
prepared organizations. In general, health departments have created some structures and 
policies which should aid in the prevention or response to some types of crises but health 
officials overestimate their overall preparedness abilities. Practitioners feel most prepared to 
prevent and respond to crises related to quality of services, legal issues or personnel 
tragedies. They perceive their agencies to be least prepared to deal with high-stake 
emergencies which fall into the category named “Disasters.” Mitroff, Diamond and Alpaslan 
(2006) found that university officials felt most prepared for fires, lawsuits and crimes. They 
felt least prepared for terrorism, data tampering or loss and ethical issues. Similarly, 
Zdziarski (2001) found that 92% of the universities, in his study, had plans for fires but only 
60-62% had plans for acts of terrorism and kidnapping. Personal beliefs about crises, prior 
crisis experience, reliance on existing structures or people and lack of knowledge of crisis 
preparedness all appear to have a role in the inaccurate perceptions of preparedness held by 
health directors. .  
All sources of data confirmed the existence of some structures and policies for crisis 
prevention and response in local health departments. Community disaster teams, 
epidemiological response teams, and county safety teams exist in most health departments as 
do community disaster plans, medical emergency plans, personnel policies and fire 
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evacuation procedures. These tools typically are limited in their focus and scope but could be 
used to model best practices for preparedness efforts aimed at a variety of crisis situations.  
Unfortunately, there was little evidence that public health officials have been able to build on 
these limited efforts to create crisis-prepared organizations.  
Public health directors rated their agencies more prepared than they actually were to 
prevent and respond to organizational crises. This finding is consistent with findings from 
other research. Sarah Kovoor (1991) found the same to be true with managers in technical 
organizations. When comparing manager’s beliefs of preparedness to actual levels of 
organizational preparedness, she found that the managers of less-prepared organizations 
believed their organizations to be more prepared than they actually were. Pauchant and 
Mitroff (1992) interviewed over four hundred executives from businesses, not for profit 
organizations and governmental agencies and found a discrepancy between perceived 
preparedness levels between the crisis researchers and the executives. The researchers found 
90% of their organizations to be unprepared while 50% the executives felt that their 
company’s efforts at preparedness were sufficient. Fowler et al. (2007) found a discrepancy 
in perceptions of readiness between senior managers and other employees. Executives and 
managers perceived their organizations to be more prepared than employees at lower 
positional levels. An unrealistic view of the current level of organizational preparedness can 
be a barrier to creating a truly prepared organization. This is particularly true if the perception 
is that the organization is more prepared than it actually is. This belief is a faulty 
rationalization held by some leaders in crisis-prone organizations.  
Public health practitioners reported that their perceptions of preparedness were higher 
for particular events when they had experienced or practiced an event, when they felt 
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adequately trained or felt someone else was skilled, when they felt that existing policies or 
plans were available and when they only needed to respond internally versus externally. 
These feelings impacted their sense of preparedness. Perceptions of preparedness however, 
do not always match reality.  
There are three themes from the data that support the conclusion that health officials 
overestimated their level of preparedness. First, the comments made during the interviews 
demonstrate that public health officials are not fully aware of the wide array of potential 
crises that could occur nor are they aware of the various activities that would be needed for 
an effective response. Second, a comparison of the data from the survey and case studies 
highlight a number of inconsistencies about the strength of each of the dimensional layers of 
the crisis-preparedness model including gaps in the types and comprehensiveness of existing 
written plans and documents.  Finally, even those health departments that were rated as 
highly prepared to prevent and respond to organizational crises through the survey identified 
significant gaps in their readiness abilities.  
Health officials have limited knowledge of what types of situations could occur 
within their organizations and are unaware of the multitude of activities that are needed to 
both prevent and respond to these events. This became evident through the one-on-one 
interview sessions with public health employees. Initial comments from the interviewees 
were often positive about their agencies ability to deal with crises. However, within minutes 
of the start of the interviews, this assumption was proven wrong. Many of the 46 crisis 
scenarios presented to those interviewed had never been discussed or thought about. Equally 
apparent was their lack of knowledge about what activities must occur for an effective 
response. They were unprepared to conduct many of the actions needed for an effective 
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response even for the events that respondents claimed to be ready to handle. This was 
particularly true for dealing with issues around psychological and emotional needs, 
communication needs, and equipment and facility needs. Health officials were just unaware 
of the vast array of decisions that need to be made and needs that arise during a crisis.  
Discrepancies between the results of the survey and the in-depth health department 
studies also support the conclusion that health directors have a distorted perception of 
organizational preparedness. Survey results indicated that, overall, health departments in 
North Carolina fall within a “safe” scoring range for impact of human beliefs and 
organizational cultures on crisis preparedness. Layers 3 and 4 averages fell within the 
“questionable” range. Themes that emerged during the interviews and the document reviews, 
however, suggest that the survey results should be viewed with caution. The qualitative 
portion of the study suggests a more disturbing picture of the levels of preparedness. The 
discrepancies between the data sources are described below.  
Qualitative results suggest that health directors may not be modeling a mindset and 
organizational culture that support crisis preparedness. Comments made by health directors 
and other members of their staff imply that not only are their beliefs and cultures “not safe” 
but they may be more accurately described as “dangerous.” As highlighted in chapter 7, 
public health employees repeatedly made statements which reflected at least ten common 
crisis-prone beliefs in their agencies. These common beliefs included that preparedness 
efforts are a luxury, that others will save us, that some events are very unlikely to happen to 
us and that someone in the agency will know what to do. The interviews also revealed 
worrisome general themes about organizational culture within health departments. Survey 
results indicate that health directors felt that they work in a flexible organization. They also 
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felt that their employees would work well as a team in the event of a crisis, that they have a 
history of sharing resources and that they are involved in sharing ideas and making decisions. 
These results are inconsistent with the statements made by employees within the health 
departments. Specifically the health director’s beliefs about how business is conducted and 
how he or she leads the organization were not always consistent with the views of other 
employees. An example of this can be seen through the following comments made by one 
health director and one of his employees:  
Health Director – “I would not penalize staff for getting involved – even it they 
take the wrong action.”  
 
Employee – “Some people do not like the health director. His style is ‘my way 
or no way.’ He will be hard on you if you screw up.”  
   
While each health director has a different leadership style, the health directors seem to 
be more likely than other staff members to think the organizational culture supports effective 
staff performance. Since they are the ones who completed the survey, this might explain why 
the survey results indicate that the organizational cultures within health departments support 
crisis-preparedness efforts. The interviews however, appeared to be much more illuminating 
in terms of organizational culture. Aspects of culture that might make health departments 
more crisis-prone can be found in how decisions are made, how difficult topics are discussed, 
how information is shared, and how learning is accomplished. In addition, there was little 
evidence to support the notion that people would work well together in a multi-disciplinary 
fashion, that resources would be shared if needed or that employees feel safe to discuss 
problems both internally and externally.  
Scores from the survey data for dimensional layers 3 and 4 of the model were lower 
than overall scores for Layers 1 and 2. However, differences found between the survey results 
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and the interview and archival data from the health departments suggested that these scores 
were still higher than they might actually be. Those interviewed described very little in the 
way of structure for crisis preparedness within local health departments. Their comments 
supported the survey results which identified weaknesses in crisis-preparedness structure 
such as the lack of services for dealing with stress, the lack of incentives for whistle-blowers 
and the lack of adequate opportunities to practice drills and simulations. But, the results 
which suggested that crisis teams were in place, that there were strong relations with the 
media and that trained spokespersons were on staff were not supported by the interview data. 
In fact, the interviews suggested that quite the opposite is true. Specifically, the interview 
data highlighted that there were no agency-wide crisis teams that work to handle a variety of 
crisis situations, that relations with the media were more adversarial than collegial and 
that very few people were trained to be competent public spokespersons for the health 
departments.  
The interviews and document reviews also don’t completely support the survey 
results regarding the breath and depth of existing policies and plans which address crises. 
While there may be some health departments that have a comprehensive crisis plan which 
addresses a variety of worst-case scenarios, none were found in this study. Even the health 
department with the most extensive set of documents for crisis prevention and response had 
gaps in efforts. An over-estimation of what procedures exist and their level of 
comprehensiveness may be due to the fact that health departments do have some policies in 
place that address specific potential public health crises. However, there are gaps in the scope 
of what is included in these existing documents, there are gaps in the topics that are covered, 
there are gaps in who knows about the policies and there is an overall lack of integration of 
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what exists and who is accountable.  
The final piece of evidence that supports the claim that health directors in general 
over-estimate their agency’s level of organizational crisis preparedness comes directly from 
the survey. There were four health departments that were rated as crisis-prepared. All four 
dimensional layers of the model were scored in the safe range for these four organizations. 
However, results from other sections of the survey for these agencies suggest a different 
story. This is also true if you look at the ten health departments with the highest overall 
preparedness scores from the survey. Specifically, the survey respondents from all of these 
agencies indicated some gaps in their organizations readiness to perform ten critical activities 
of crisis response.  Arrange for back up communication technologies, treat medical 
emergencies, offer services at a new location and obtain psychological counseling were the 
activities that health directors felt least ready to handle. The health director’s perceptions that 
their organizations are not prepared to perform key crisis response activities suggest that they 
are not as totally prepared as they might believe. 
The public expects that leaders are preparing for worst-case scenarios (Boin & Hart, 
2003). Since public health agencies have recently received large sums of money for 
preparedness one might assume that leaders are preparing and therefore, feel more prepared 
to handle crises. A study conducted by Fowler et al. (2007), found that governmental officials 
perceive themselves as being more prepared for crises than other business executives. Are 
they prepared or are they overestimating their preparedness levels? At the time of this study, 
public health directors also felt relatively prepared for most crises. But this study identified 
many gaps in organizational preparedness efforts. This suggested that local health 
departments were more crisis-prone than crisis-prepared.  
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8.2d. What gaps exist in crisis preparedness for local North Carolina public health 
departments?  
It was once believed that all it took to be prepared for a crisis was having a crisis 
management plan in place. Recent research by crisis and disaster-response scholars indicates 
that there are many factors, in addition to having a plan, that are needed to create a crisis-
prepared organization. Pauchant, Mitroff and their colleagues were the first to propose a 
model of crisis preparedness which integrates the organizational factors deemed important to 
effective crisis prevention and response. All dimensional aspects of an organization are 
equally important to crisis preparedness.  
This study found significant gaps in each dimensional layer of the preparedness 
model. Areas of weakness in crisis preparedness structure and written plans were identified 
by the survey and supported by the interview and document reviews. Concerns about 
individual beliefs and about organizational cultures were identified most so from the 
interviews and document reviews than the written survey. Below is a list of the seven most 
significant gaps in the crisis-preparedness efforts of local health departments in North 
Carolina. These gaps are presented in order of the four layers of the crisis-preparedness 
conceptual model.  
   
Dimensional Layer I – Human / Individual Beliefs  
Gap#1 – Health officials have not thought about the unthinkable  
This study found that local public health officials have a limited imagination with 
regards to the types of potential crisis situations which could impact their organizations. The 
 171 
worst-case scenarios that health officials identified were often related to previously 
experienced situations, mostly industry-related, such as staffing problems, political attacks or 
building failures.  
Ian Mitroff (personal communication, 9/2004) claims that after 9/11, various 
corporations and industries increased the time and effort put into crisis preparedness but that 
their efforts focused primarily on preparing for particular crisis scenarios, ones that had been 
experienced directly or by like-organizations. Very few organizations, in his estimation, had 
used 9/11 as an opportunity to improve their level of preparedness for a broad range of 
scenarios. Nor had they re-organized, to any significant degree, their infrastructure to create a 
more crisis-prepared organization. Drs. Kristine Gebbie (personal communication, 12/04) and 
Steven Keener (personal communication, 3/05) , two public health leaders known for their 
interests in public health preparedness, feel that Mitroff’s assessment of businesses holds true 
for public health agencies, as well. The events of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax threats 
motivated public health agencies throughout the nation to put more time and resources into 
preventing and responding to potential acts of bio-terrorism. Dr. Gebbie feels that while local 
public health departments are more willing to believe that a terrorist event could occur and 
affect the functioning of their agency, public health officials are still unwilling or unable to 
imagine the potential for other types of crises, particularly those that would be internal in 
origin such as acts of employee misconduct.  
   
Gap #2 – Health officials see crisis preparedness as a luxury or as an additional program  
A significant gap to preparedness for local health departments appears to be the 
mindset that preparedness efforts are an additional program that requires additional resources. 
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The interviews with health officials suggested that it is common to believe that crisis-
preparedness efforts are somewhat different from other health department work and that to 
become more prepared would require more resources, including time and personnel.  
Comments made about existing crisis-related activities, such as community disaster 
planning and infectious disease outbreak control, also provided evidence that public health 
employees believe that not all employees share preparedness responsibilities, but that 
someone else in the agency does “it.”  Kristine Gebbie (personal communication 12/04) 
claims that this continues to be the case post 9/11, as many health departments have 
identified particular people to work on preparedness efforts. For some public health leaders 
this has led to frustration and fear. In particular, some fear that preparedness efforts are taking 
away from the resources and focus of the real mission and work of public health, health 
promotion and disease prevention (Guidotti, 2004.) Preparedness continues to be seen as a 
separate program and not as a mindset for doing all public health work.  
   
Dimensional Layer II – Organizational Culture  
Gap #3 – Leadership and management styles create organizational cultures in some health 
departments that weaken preparedness efforts  
   
It is generally believed that the organizational leader has a significant role in setting 
the culture for the organization. The way in which decisions are made and information is 
gathered, analyzed and discussed is indicative of the organization's culture. Organizations 
with crisis-prepared cultures (Wise, 2003; Alpalsan, 2004; Reilly, 1987; Grenny, 2007) have 
been found to be more successful at avoiding and responding to organizational crises.  
In this study, there were no health departments with survey scores in the danger zone 
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for crisis-prone cultures. However, the interviews with public health employees at the five 
case sites highlighted some general themes about the cultures within health departments 
which might make them less prepared for crises. Particular concerns include the way in 
which decisions are made, the way in which information is processed and communicated 
with internal and external stakeholders and the inability (as seen by some but not all 
employees) to talk about controversial topics, such as race. Unless public health leaders 
create cultures within their organizations which empower staff to be involved, they will 
continue to see preparedness as someone else’s work, they will be silent when they see crisis 
warning signals flashing and they will circle the wagons when a crisis hits.  
   
Gap #4 – Organizational learning is haphazard; employees are not reaping the total benefit 
from each other's knowledge    
In many states, the belief that 40-60% of the public health workforce will retire in the 
next five-to-ten years is of considerable concern to public health leaders. Given the potential 
for significant losses of organizational memory and skills, health departments should be 
investing time and resources towards finding ways to capture the lessons of experience from 
each and every employee. Organizations that are skilled at transferring knowledge between 
employees will have a significant advantage over others in finding and developing new 
public health leaders within the ranks. Unfortunately, this study found weaknesses in the 
transfer of knowledge between employees within local health departments. This is a 
particular problem for those wishing to build a crisis-prepared organization. As stated by 
George Santayana (1905), “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat 
it.”   
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Robert and Lajtha (2002) suggest that continuous learning processes designed to 
equip key managers with the capabilities, flexibility and confidence to deal with sudden and 
unexpected problems/events is the key to being a crisis-prepared organization. This study 
highlighted a gap in formal learning structures within local health departments. While 
individuals stated that they feel like they learn from real work, there was little evidence that 
health departments have a culture that supports learning. For example, there was no evidence 
that health departments had structures in place which would facilitate learning from key 
events or for cross-disciplinary learning between employees. Regularly scheduled debriefing 
sessions, team work using action learning skills, and employee training programs on how to 
have difficult conversations are examples of activities that might help public health agencies 
promote a culture of organizational learning.  
Thousands of dollars are being spent on the creation and implementation of disaster 
drills and exercises. To maximize learning from these experiences both individuals and 
organizations have to know how to learn and how to share the lessons of experience with the 
next generation of public health leaders.  
   
Dimensional Layer III – Organizational Structure  
Gap # 5 – Existing Infrastructure for Crisis Preparedness is very limited and not well-
integrated  
  While the written survey and key informant interviews identified some fragments of 
crisis-preparedness structure within local health departments, what exists is very limited in 
scope and not at all integrated. The five most glaring gaps include the lack of a core crisis-
response team with clear roles and expectations, the lack of skilled spokespersons and 
communication strategies, the lack of practice using drills or simulations, the inadequate 
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structure for emotional or trauma related services and the lack of coordination of all crisis 
prevention, response and learning efforts.  
  The existence of a core multi-disciplinary team to lead and manage crisis-related 
activities within an organization is critical to crisis readiness. Health departments tended to 
have teams that respond to specific kinds of events such as infectious disease outbreaks, but 
there was little evidence in this study, that health departments had a multi-disciplinary core 
team that was ready for any event or that such a team could be created in the heat of chaos. 
Research on team effectiveness (King, 2002) suggests that the lack of prior interactions 
between members could have a significant impact on how well people will work together in a 
crisis. Prior interactions between team members may promote a greater understanding of 
individual skills, perspectives and interpersonal styles. This group familiarity may influence 
the effectiveness of a crisis team by allowing for a more open style of communication and 
may allow team members to be better able to resolve problems (King, 2002). Creating more 
opportunities for multi-disciplinary problem-solving, learning and team work would greatly 
support the beliefs held by health department employees that they would work well together 
if needed.   
The lack of effective organizational structures to support both internal and external 
communication was also a significant finding in this study. While the survey results showed 
that health directors felt ready to quickly communicate with employees, Board of Health 
members and the media in the event of a crisis, most health departments had no formal 
structures in place that would allow for the vast array of communication needs that arise in a 
crisis situation. No health department appeared to have a system for rapidly alerting potential 
victims to dangerous situations (Seivold, 2007), for systematically communicating with key 
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individuals off campus in ways other than telephone or for quickly developing 
communication strategies and materials. There was also little evidence of structures, other 
than possibly a phone tree, that would allow for frequent and deliberate communications with 
all stakeholder groups during an event or during the long process of crisis recovery.  Training 
of staff for communication roles was also limited. While some employees had participated in 
short workshops on working with the media there was no strategic expectation that key 
individuals would maintain a high level of proficiency at working with the media, 
communicating difficult messages or understanding the message needs of diverse 
populations. Organizations will never know ahead of time the exact crises that will occur and 
which communication channels and systems will be working when they hit.  
To be crisis-prepared, organizations must have in place fully trained communication 
specialists with access to information and with abilities to share appropriate information in a 
timely fashion with all stakeholders. Health departments should develop Message Action 
Plans (Springston & Lariscy, 2005) which identify message elements, stakeholder audiences, 
communication channels and timelines, evaluation methods and roles of key staff. This study 
identified the infrastructure for all aspects of crisis communications to be weak in local health 
departments. 
Drills and simulations are also an essential component to an organization’s 
preparedness strategies (Mitroff, Pearson & Harrington, 1996). They are used to build skills 
and to assess system deficits as well as individual or team strengths and weaknesses (Yusko 
& Goldstein, 1997). One of the most common drills held in organizations including 
elementary schools is the fire drill. Because of the frequent practice of evacuation from a 
building most people feel confident that they can escape a fire. In this study, responding to 
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fires was the only crisis from the category of “Disasters” that respondents felt competent to 
handle.  This study revealed that there were very few drills or exercises other than fire drills 
that were routinely practiced. This has been reported to be a problem in other businesses as 
well. A study by the Industrial Society of UK reported that just after 9/11 (Personnel Today, 
2002) 48% of businesses with disaster plans had never practiced a drill. A year later, the 
American Management Academy reported that 58% of US businesses had not conducted any 
drills since the 9/11 tragedy (Galiflanakis, 2003).  The use of drills and simulations can be a 
powerful aspect of an organization’s crisis preparedness strategies and should be conducted 
more often and in a systematic manner by local health departments. 
Due to the chaotic nature of crises and the significant potential for loss, many people 
experience cognitive limitations and negative psychological outcomes during and after an 
event (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Distress resulting from trauma can cause intense soul-
searching (Dutton et al., 2002) and a reassessment of core beliefs and assumptions (Pearson 
& Clair, 1998). Failures to assess and deal with the emotional impact of crises on workers 
could result in decreases in organizational productivity, increases in legal action by 
employees who develop post-traumatic stress disorders and increases in health care costs 
(Conte et al., 2007). This study found that public health officials felt ill-prepared to handle 
the emotional sides of crises. While some reported that they may refer traumatized staff to 
county personnel resources, they also claimed that no other organizational discussions had 
occurred to determine how the emotional needs of stakeholders would be identified, treated 
or compensated. Rowitz (2006) in his book, Public Health for the 21st Century: The 
Prepared Leader, presents a sample strategy for preparing and responding to the mental 
health needs of victims of one type of crisis; terrorism. Perhaps this model can help 
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organizations prepare for other types of events. 
Organizational structures, such as training programs, crisis teams, chain of command, 
practice drills, and mental health services, should support crisis preparedness instead of 
weaken it. Health departments have given little thought to what systems are needed and how 
existing structures should be coordinated and managed. Mitroff (2005) suggests that crisis 
preparedness activities be integrated with other crisis and strategic level structures such a 
Total Quality Management, Safety and Issues Management and Strategic Planning. Public 
health agencies should also coordinate their preparedness efforts with activities related to 
disaster preparedness, public relations and knowledge management. Integration and synergy 
between structures is needed for effective organizational preparedness.  
 
Dimensional Layer IV – Policies and Plans  
Gap # 6 – Crisis-preparedness portfolios in local health departments are limited    
As mentioned previously, health departments have created plans and policies to 
address the occurrence of some types of crises. Despite this, none of the health department in 
this study had created an organizational crisis portfolio which included preparations for a 
wide variety of worst-case scenarios. The most common types of crises addressed in these 
documents were fire / building evacuations, infectious disease outbreaks, natural disasters or 
civil disobedience, chemical / hazardous material exposure, medical emergencies, 
professional standards and expectations for employee conduct. Crisis-preparedness portfolios 
which are limited in the types of situations addressed are a common issue across industries. 
Zdziarski (2001) found that less than half of the universities he surveyed had a quality crisis 
portfolio. Reilly found that banks limited their crisis preparedness efforts to crises related 
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specifically to the banking industry. Ian Mitroff stated in a personal interview (2004) that 
even after the events of 9/11, corporations that put resources into preparedness efforts did so 
only for industry-related events or specific tragedies that were recently experienced by other 
corporations. A recent event can serve as a motivator for crisis planning (Barton, 1993; 
Kovoor- Misra, 1996; Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000.) This is particularly true for planning 
for like-events. A prepared organization, however, should be routinely thinking out 
prevention and response strategies for a variety of situations.  Health departments do not have 
diverse crisis portfolios in place. 
 
Gap #7– Existing policies and documents are limited in scope and scattered throughout the 
agency  
In addition to the limited types of crises that health departments prepared for, the 
plans and policies that do exist are limited in their scope and comprehensiveness. Kovoor 
(1991) found that the technical organizations in her study did not plan for the non-technical 
aspects of crisis preparedness. Zdziarski (2001) found the content of most crisis plans in his 
study of major universities was focused primarily on just one phase of a crisis, the immediate 
response phase. He found that ninety-eight percent of crisis plans addressed the actions 
needed at the time of the crisis, while only 64% contained information about the pre-crisis 
phase. Documentation of how and what constitutes an early warning sign, how 
communication efforts will be implemented and how employee stress and mental health 
issues will be dealt with were often missing in the health department plans reviewed in this 
study.   
The process of obtaining and reviewing key documents during the onsite visits also 
illuminated the lack of coordination and oversight of what does exist. Kovoor-Misra et al. 
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(2000) stated that if an organization is functionally structured, crisis management plans 
within it are likely to be functionally segmented with little or no integration. That assertion 
was supported by this study. Written documents for preparedness efforts were scattered 
through out each agency visited and no employees were able to identify the location of all 
existing crisis-preparedness or crisis related documents. Shaw and Harrald (2004) propose a 
new framework for organizations which links the numerous functional units, such as business 
recovery, incident command, safety and security management and risk management, into an 
integrated crisis management and continuity program. Their framework could serve as a 
model for public health departments. 
   
8.3 Limits to the research 
While there is much to learn from a study of this nature, the results need to be viewed 
with an understanding of the limitations of the research design. Many of the weaknesses of 
the study design came about from the difficulty of studying the complex phenomenon of 
organizational crisis preparedness and the lack of theoretical and empirical literature in this 
area, particularly relating to small, governmental agencies. In addition, the value of the results 
to the practice community is limited by the extended time it took to complete the study. 
These limitations are discussed here. 
One of the most obvious weaknesses pertains to the construct of crisis preparedness. 
Crises are complex, chaotic events that may impact all dimensions of an organization. A full 
assessment of an organization’s level of crisis preparedness requires a thorough 
understanding of all of these dimensions. Organizational culture, human beliefs and systems 
integration are difficult to study in a broad-brush manner. Therefore, you will observe that 
 181 
this study was limited in its ability to go beyond the surface layer of understanding for any 
one dimension of a public health organization.  Important skills such as the ability of public 
health workers to lead multi-disciplinary teams, to learn from past experiences or to mobilize 
resources were examined only superficially. It is difficult to study the complex phenomenon 
of crisis in the complex world of an organization.  
The fact that crises are seen as rare and stressful events makes it difficult to study 
preparedness in real time. Identifying an organization that is about to experience a crisis is 
obviously impossible and gaining access to an organization during an event would be 
difficult, particularly for an outside researcher. Ideally, one would want to evaluate the 
response and outcomes of a current crisis on an organization that was pre-assessed to be 
prepared (or not) using our theoretical model of crisis preparedness. The health departments 
in this study were not actively responding to a current crisis. It is not far-fetched to believe 
that some health departments, right at this minute, might be missing the warning signals of a 
crisis which is lurking around the corner.  
The inability to assess preparedness in real time also limited the ability to check the 
validity of the tools and methods used in this study. To address this concern, two things were 
done. First, multiple data sources and collection methods were used. The use of both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods provided a way to check the accuracy of the 
data collected by any one method. A second strategy used to increase the validity of the tools 
used in this study was to use instruments that had been previously developed and tested in 
other research studies of organizational crisis preparedness. For example, the survey tool was 
modified from a tool developed by Pauchant and Mitroff for their work with private 
companies. The interview guide and audit tool were developed from reviews of interview 
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guides and record audit tools used by Pauchant & Mitroff (1992), Pearson & Mitroff (1993), 
Reilly (1989), Kovoor (1991), Wisenblit (1989) and More (1994). Discrepancies found when 
the survey results were held up to the results from the interviews and the document reviews 
highlight the need for more complex study designs for research that assesses preparedness.   
Despite the use of triangulation of data sources and research methodologies, the 
quality of data may be limited by the fact that all data collection and analysis was done by a 
single researcher. Patton (1990) states that multiple investigators or analysts can help to 
reduce the potential bias that comes from one person. In this study, using a single researcher 
may have contributed to the collection of incomplete or inaccurate data. For example, if the 
key informants did not find the researcher credible or trustworthy, they may have limited the 
information they provided or changed their viewpoints to share what they thought the 
researcher wanted to hear. The limited number of study analysts may have also biased the 
way in which the data was viewed and analyzed. This one researcher may have been biased in 
the way in which she viewed some of the qualitative data. Two or more persons 
independently analyzing the same qualitative data set and comparing their findings would 
have strengthened the research design (Patton, 1991).  
The value of this research is also limited by the fact that it focused on only one type of 
organization small, community-based public health departments in North Carolina. This 
prevents the findings from being generalizable to other types of organizations, including 
other state or federal public health agencies. In addition, the limited number of health 
departments in which qualitative data was collected also limits the inferences one can make 
about other North Carolina health departments and other types of public agencies. While 
some of the factors influencing preparedness, such as the types of crises experienced and the 
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types of barriers to preparedness, may be unique to the sample studied, the model used to 
examine crisis preparedness can be used by any organization. The need to search for early 
warning signals is important to any public or private agency. Also, the recommendation of 
preparing for a limited number of potential crisis situations that vary in their focus is a 
realistic and valuable goal for any organization.  
Finally, it is important to recognize that this study was conducted over ten years ago 
and much has changed in both the world and in the field of public health in North Carolina. 
Since 1995, the United States has experienced several significant community-wide disasters, 
such as the terrorist attacks in 2001 and the gulf coast tragedies from Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita. There has also been a re-emergence of infectious diseases and an increase in concern for 
potential evil, intentional acts using biological, chemical or radiological agents. These events 
have catapulted public health into a role of first responder and have changed the field of 
public health in significant ways. Given these trends, public health disease surveillance and 
public health disaster preparedness have become central to health department planning and 
operations. 
Other events or trends have also occurred which have had an impact on the 
functioning and efficiency of local health departments in North Carolina. Two such changes 
warrant particular attention. First, it is worth noting that in 2002, North Carolina became the 
first state in the country to require that all local health departments become accredited. This 
process requires that all agencies review their mission, operations, policies and strategic 
issues. It is expected that such a process will improve overall performance of these agencies 
including how these organizations are managed and how they provide the essential services 
of public health. Second, the demographics of the state have been changing to include a more 
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ethnically diverse population. The demographic trends are influencing the skills needed by 
health workers and services offered by health departments, particularly the need to have 
culturally competent staff and programs that can serve a multi-lingual and multi-cultural 
population. Related to the demographic changes is the growing concern over a potential 
leadership gap in the local and state public health workforce due to the impending retirement 
of senior public health officials and the lack of emerging leaders to fill these positions. 
Successful recruitment of new public health workers and the development of a skilled 
leadership pipeline for each health department has become an important priority for the state.  
Over the last decade there have been many changes in the world and in the NC public 
health system. These changes have undoubtedly influenced the way in which public health 
organizations function today. Because of this, it is also likely that if this same study were 
conducted now it would lead to different results than those found twelve years ago. 
Therefore, the findings from this study should be used with an understanding of the more 
recent events and trends affecting public health and public health agencies. 
 
8.4 Recommendations 
While the field of organizational crisis preparedness is still developing, past research 
has identified a number of actions organizations should take to improve their abilities to 
prevent and respond to crises. Pearson and Mitroff (1993) have listed twenty-nine steps that 
characterize key elements of the best crisis management programs. These actions include 
strategic, structural, diagnostic, communication and cultural efforts. To successfully 
implement these crisis preparedness strategies, an organization may need to first develop a 
positive polarity to crisis management (Robert and Lajtha, 2002). For local health 
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departments this might mean finding a senior level champion who can assure that 
preparedness is discussed and supported at strategic levels. Table 8.1 includes a list of some 
other actions that local health departments can take to strengthen different aspects of their 
preparedness efforts. 
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Table 8.1 Suggested activities to improve organizational crisis preparedness 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND MINDSET 
• Assess the culture of your organization for crisis preparedness 
• Integrate crisis preparedness into strategic planning processes 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
• Create a “core” agency crisis team and identify specific responsibilities 
for each member 
• Create structures and training for knowledge management and shared 
learning  
• Create an infrastructure for crisis communication e.g. develop a media 
relations policy, identify and train key spokesperson, review agency 
values for telling bad news, develop specific message maps and sample 
letters for key stakeholder groups for a variety of situations 
• Identify training needs for crisis preparedness; use didactic and action-
learning models 
• Assure psychological support services are available for individuals 
affected by key events 
 
STRATEGIES AND PLANS 
• Create a crisis portfolio by developing a comprehensive crisis-
preparedness plan for at least one worst-case scenario in each of 
the seven crisis families.  
• Assure integration of crisis-preparedness efforts throughout the agency, 
including an integration of documents and activities 
 
 
 
8.5 Summary 
The purpose, assumptions and methodology for this study were summarized in this 
section. Following these brief descriptions, the major findings were presented, the limitations 
of the research design were discussed and a list of recommendations for enhanced 
preparedness was made. Major findings include the following:  
• Local Health Directors are not thinking about the variety of crisis situations that could 
impact their organizations.  
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• A list of potential crisis scenarios for local public health departments can be created 
and those situations can be categorized to form a seven-family crisis typology which 
can be used as a tool for organizational preparedness.  
 
• Health departments do have fragments of crisis prevention and response structures in 
place which should be built upon for a higher level of crisis preparedness.  
 
• Local public health directors over-estimate their organization's level of preparedness 
because they under-estimate what could happen, what responses are needed and what 
resources will be available in the event of a crisis. They also over-estimate the 
usefulness of past experience and the thoroughness and effectiveness of existing 
structures or procedures for a variety of crisis situations.  
 
• Local health directors feel most prepared to both prevent and respond to situations 
related to quality assurance, legal issues or personnel concerns. They feel least 
prepared to deal with high stakes emergencies such as terrorist acts, workplace 
violence or kidnapping.  
 
• Public health departments in North Carolina have, in general, significant gaps in their 
preparedness capabilities, including gaps in all dimensions of the DTP Model of 
Crisis Preparedness. Many public health employees have beliefs about preparedness 
that make their agencies more crisis-prone.  Also, the way in which real work is done 
as illustrated by methods of making decisions, communicating information and 
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dealing with workforce tensions make health departments more crisis-prone. There 
are gaps in the organizational structures for crisis prevention and response, including 
lack of skills training, emotional support structures and workforce integration and 
relationships that would support preparedness. Finally, while there are some crisis-
related procedures and documents, few, if any, demonstrate a systems approach, 
including the recognition of the dimensions of an organization and the phases of a 
crisis. The documents that do exist are typically scattered throughout the agency and 
are seen as unrelated to each other and under the responsibility of separate individuals 
or teams.  
 
CHAPTER 9 
IMPLICATION AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE   
 
Organizations have experienced crises since the beginning of time. But only in more 
recent years has the world gained a respect for the devastation that a crisis can have on 
institutions, people, nature, and communities. The argument for enhanced preparedness is 
further supported by the predictions of futurists who claim that changes in technology, 
population, medicine, terrorism, global connectedness and world climate will produce 
“inevitable surprises” which we should now anticipate (McConnell & Drennan, 2006).  Local 
health departments have not been immune to crises and will undoubtedly suffer the 
consequences from future events if they don’t find ways to prevent them or respond quickly 
to them. How prepared are our local health departments for future crises?  
This study takes a comprehensive look at the levels of organizational crisis 
preparedness in local health departments in North Carolina. While it is meant to be 
exploratory and descriptive in nature, it undoubtedly generates more questions than answers. 
Some of the questions that it brings forth would make interesting topics for future research. 
Those ideas for future study will be discussed in this section, as will the value of this study to 
public health practice and other areas of academic interest. 
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9.1 Contributions of this study 
Organizational crises have become a significant problem with implications for both 
organizations and society at large. Despite the severe consequences of crises, the literature 
has demonstrated a lack of common definitions and theoretical models. Testing of existing 
models and studies which reflect application of these models to practice is an even bigger 
gap, particularly in small organizations (Boin, 2000). The few empirical studies that have 
been conducted to assess organizational preparedness have generally been targeted towards 
large, private corporations. Research that helps to address some of the gaps in our 
understanding of crisis preparedness would benefit all organizations as well as society as a 
whole.  
This study contributes to the existing literature of crisis preparedness by adding to the 
knowledge of conceptual frameworks for organizational crisis preparedness, but more 
importantly it can contribute to the practice of public health. How it contributes to these two 
areas is described below.  
   
9.1a Contributions to Crisis-Preparedness Literature  
The study contributes to the crisis preparedness literature in three significant ways; it 
adds to the conceptual models of organizational crisis preparedness, it uses a more 
comprehensive approach to studying organizational preparedness than most studies and it 
explores preparedness in a different type of organization:  local, governmental public health 
agencies.  
This research begins by proposing a new categorization system of crises, one that is 
appropriate to public health departments. The significance of this is twofold.  
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First, the methodology used for forming the crisis categories or families was different 
than that used by others crisis researchers. Second, the resulting typology is different from 
previous models found in the current crisis literature.  As described earlier, most of the 
existing crisis typologies have been developed based on the viewpoint of the researcher 
(Reilly, 1989; Zdziarski, 2001; Fowler, 2007). These scholars have typically sorted crises into 
groupings based on certain dimensions that they felt were important. This study developed a 
crisis typology by asking public health managers to form crisis groupings based on how the 
situation should be resolved. The benefit of creating the typology in the method described is 
that it allowed the practice community a voice in the development of a tool which is meant to 
aid them in their work. This methodology resulted in a 7-family categorization system that 
can aid public health administrators and practitioners in building crisis-prepared 
organizations. 
The crisis typology was one aspect of the overarching conceptual model used in this 
study. This model also adds to the existing literature because it is an expansion from other 
preparedness frameworks. As described in Chapter 3, the DTP Model of Crisis Preparedness 
merges three preexisting models into one useful visual framework. This includes the Onion 
Model which promotes the understanding of the core dimensions of an organization that 
impact preparedness, the Crisis Typology which identifies seven crisis families and Crisis 
Phases which outlines the phases all crises go through. This new model not only provides a 
more accurate picture of the depth to which crises affect an organization, it also provides a 
structure by which an organization can improve its level of preparedness. The DTP model, 
while it is generous in its applicability, is not a step-by-step prescription to what an 
organization should do to prevent or manage a specific crisis. There are plenty of crisis 
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management checklists in the literature. It is best to use this more comprehensive framework 
as a way to create an organizational mindset for preparedness.  
The comprehensive nature of the theoretical model suggests that the methodology for 
studying preparedness must be equally comprehensive in its approach. This research used 
methodologies that provided a greater level of breadth than most studies. Most of the other 
studies which attempt to assess the level of preparedness within an organization or within 
several organizations from a single industry use a written survey to obtain the perceptions of 
a single individual, typically a senior staff member. The survey instruments used in many of 
these studies tend to be narrow in focus, asking only questions about the existence of 
organizational structure, such as a crisis team or written documents such as a crisis plan.  
Investigation of the core beliefs of leaders and the culture of the organization as they relate to 
preparedness is a step beyond what most studies take. This research, however, used 
quantitative and qualitative data as well as archival documents to study this complex 
phenomenon. It also assumed that the perceptions and understandings of crisis readiness may 
vary from person-to-person within an organization, leading to the decision to seek 
perspectives from multiple people within a single agency. The comprehensive approach to 
studying crisis preparedness used in this study may be a model for future research.  
The final contribution of this work to the literature is that it adds to the types of 
organizations that have been studied. At the time of this research, there were no other studies 
documented in the literature on organizational crisis management that focused on local, 
governmental agencies.  Still today, it is the only study that can be found in the literature with 
this specific focus.  The dearth of studies of crisis preparedness in public health agencies is 
remarkable given the challenges facing them today. Not a single article adding to theoretical 
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models or providing assessments of organizational crisis preparedness in health 
departments has appeared in either the Journal of Public Health Management & Practice or in 
the American Journal of Public Health in the last three years (2004-2006).  Lou Rowitz’s 
book, The Prepared Public Health Leader, (2005) appears to be the first published work to 
share concepts and models of organizational crisis preparedness with the public health 
community. The only other published studies or commentary that relate to the theme of 
organizational crisis preparedness focus on crisis communication in public health agencies 
(Wise, 2003; Springston & Lariscy, 2005) or on the devastation a natural disaster can have on 
a public health agency such as the effects of Katrina on the New Orleans City Health 
Department (Stephens, 2007).  
In the last five years, however, some other studies have been published that are worth 
noting. First, there have been a few studies focusing on preparedness levels in small 
businesses or not-for-profits (Spillan et al., 2002; Runyan, 2006; Fowler et al., 2007) and 
some which have looked at preparedness in schools or universities (Zdziarski, 2001; Mitroff, 
Diamond & Alpaslan, 2006). While the types of organizations studied in these papers are 
more similar to public health agencies than the large, private organizations investigated in 
past studies, they are still different in their missions and levels of resources. These studies 
also suffer from the same limitations of many studies; they are limited in scope, methods and 
applicability.  
During this same five-year time period, there have also been a number of articles or 
commentaries written in scientific journals about specific issues or skills related to public 
health preparedness, such as strategies for mass vaccination, epidemiological surveillance, 
quarantine or isolation measures and risk communication. National assessments of the public 
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health system’s level of disaster preparedness have also been conducted. These assessments 
of preparedness, however, also focus primarily on the existence of indicators found in layers 
three and four of the DTP preparedness model: structure and plans. For example, the 2005 
Trust in America’s Health report on federal and state public health readiness, assessed levels 
of readiness by using ten indicators of preparedness, including the existence of trained lab 
scientists, adequate hospital beds, a CDC-compatible electronic disease surveillance system 
and skilled registered nurses. These studies are very limited in the comprehensiveness of their 
methodology and of the indicators used to assess preparedness. The yearly evaluation of 
preparedness by Project Public Health Ready does start to identify cultural and relationship 
barriers that impede preparedness in a community, but it does not specifically examine the 
mindset, internal structure and capabilities of the local health department. More studies which 
focus on the capabilities of health departments to lead or assist in disaster response are 
needed. But the public health academic community must also recognize that the effectiveness 
of the public health agency in a community-level response is based on the assumption that the 
local agency is also not in crisis itself.   
What happens when the public health agency IS the crisis? What happens to the 
abilities of a health department to be a bio-terrorism response leader when the health director 
has been fired for public drunkenness or embezzlement? Large-scale community crises have 
motivated the country to invest more resources in public health agencies for crisis 
preparedness. Unfortunately, the links between community preparedness and organizational 
preparedness have not been made to the fullest extent. This study can be the start of a more 
thorough understanding of overall crisis preparedness in public health departments.  
   
 195 
9.1b Contributions to Public Health Practice  
In addition to its theoretical contributions, this study also provides practical 
applications for public health administrators. It provides a framework by which public health 
managers can assess and improve their organizations level of crisis preparedness. 
Specifically, this study focuses attention on how organizational characteristics promote or 
impede a health department’s ability to prevent or respond to various types of crises. While it 
is not a checklist for what should be done, the theoretical model of preparedness can help 
public health leaders find realistic solutions for improving preparedness. For 
example, identification of potential situations, conducting organizational culture surveys, 
developing crisis plans, providing staff trainings in crisis management and conducting routine 
crisis-scenario drills are sound tools of preparation.  
The identification of potential areas of weakness in levels of preparedness in local 
health agencies can contribute to improvements in public health practice. It is very easy to 
observe whether or not an organization has a disaster plan or an organizational crisis plan. It 
is possible to create a plan if one doesn’t exist; any agency can hire a consulting firm to 
create a crisis manual that accomplishes this goal. But the goal of having a “plan” is the 
wrong goal. Public health leaders need to create a “preparedness mindset” that begins with 
their own beliefs and leadership abilities. This study identifies some of the gaps that might 
exist within public health organizations at a level that is not easy to see but which can result 
in effective infrastructures, abilities and plans.    
This study contributes to public health practice beyond crisis preparedness. The 
framework provided in this research may also be a useful model for public health 
professionals dealing with other controversial or urgent public health issues, such as tobacco 
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use, AIDS and bio-terrorism. The multi-dimensional approach provides a method by which 
an organization can systematically think about strategies for preventing and responding to the 
systems barriers and conflict inherent in these issues. In addition, it forces thinking about the 
impact various interventions have on various dimensions of the organization and on the 
community. The public health issues of today are complex and multi-dimensional. Dealing 
with them in a systemic manner often seems impossible. The framework provided in this 
study may provide some order and guidance to dealing with the many controversial public 
health problems our communities face.  
   
9.2 Future areas of study 
Over the last six years there have been several tragic events of state or national 
significance. Since crises can be motivators for change, one might wonder what impact these 
events have had on organizations both in terms of the changes they have made and in their 
level of commitment toward continued crisis planning. 
Kovoor-Misra and Nathan (2000) have suggested that the opportunity for post-crisis 
learning is time sensitive. Others have also highlighted the fact that there are a number of 
barriers, including the need for normalization (Roux-Dufort, 2000) and a range of political 
realities, that interfere with meeting the ideal crisis preparedness planning goals in real-life 
(Boin & t’Hart, 2003; McConnell & Drennan, 2006). Research conducted by M. Alpaslan 
and colleagues of the preparedness efforts of Fortune 1000 companies demonstrates the 
difficulties in maintaining a focus on preparedness in the face of these barriers (Alpaslan, 
2004). A survey sent to companies prior to the events of September 11th, 2001 and each year 
since, show an initial increase in preparation for terrorist events. However, just two years 
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after 9/11, preparation activities for these events had fallen to where they were before the 
attacks.  
A repeat of this study would provide valuable insights into the ability of health 
departments to transfer knowledge and skill from one situation of crisis to others. It would 
also provide a wealth of information on the usefulness of the recent crisis experiences as a 
motivator for long term changes in organizational culture, structures and skills in these 
organizations. If such a study found that very little has changed with regards to preparedness 
levels in local health departments, the value of these events and the recent investments into 
public health preparedness will be minimal. It would be a tragedy if the public health 
community is not improving their capabilities with each crisis event that is experienced. 
Given the limitations of the current literature on organizational crisis preparedness 
and the absence of literature and studies of public health agencies, there are many questions 
that still need to be answered. The gaps in this study suggest that there are many 
opportunities for future study. Questions which could be addressed in other studies can be 
group into three categories: those which focus on a better understanding of the conceptual 
models and definitions of organizational crisis preparedness, those that allow for an 
expansion or change in the study methodologies and those that provide a better understanding 
of preparedness efforts in public health departments. Included in Table 9.1 is a list of 
potential research topics that would aid in our understanding of organizational crisis 
preparedness.  
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Table 9.1 Potential future research topics on organizational crisis preparedness 
Research to Advance Conceptual Models and Definitions  
 
• Define organizational crises as opposed to disasters and emergencies  
• Investigate the need for an additional typology for other urgent public health 
crises  
• Test the typology with crisis preparedness experts and academics  
• Test the usefulness of the DTP model with Community Disaster Preparedness  
• Examine in more detail how the specific organizational characteristics (such as 
size, culture, leadership) impact preparedness efforts  
 
Research to Advance Methodologies for Studying Crises 
 
• Further test the usefulness of the survey instrument with an n>1 for each 
organization  
• Expand the study sample; include other states, larger health departments, state 
or federal agencies  
• Include other stakeholders in the study to examine their perceptions of the 
organization's level of preparedness and their own role in crisis prevention and 
response (with the health agency)  
• Post-mortem case-study reviews of particular crisis events  
 
Research to Study the Application of Crisis Preparedness in Public Health 
Practice  
 
• Determine the impact of nationally-recognized crises (9/11, Anthrax, Katrina) 
on the current preparedness levels in local health departments  
• Identify the most common types of organizational crises experienced by a larger 
sample of public health agencies  
• Clarify the role and competencies of the crisis leader in prevention and response 
activities  
• Investigate the response and recovery strategies used by various health 
departments that have experienced organizational crises  
• Investigate the reasons that some agencies are more prepared than others  
• Assess the organizational crisis-preparedness levels of health departments of 
those that have been identified by Project Ready as Prepared  
• Examine in more detail the impact of real experience and simulated experience 
(drills, exercises) on crisis preparedness  
 
The complex nature of crises, both in terms of their causes and their outcomes, 
necessitates that a comprehensive approach be used when studying levels of organizational 
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preparedness.  This study contributes to the literature but also highlights the many gaps in our 
understanding of preparedness at an organizational level, particularly in local health 
departments.  The results can serve as a useful set of baseline measures for tracking 
improvements in preparedness levels of local North Carolina health departments. Given the 
nature of work for public health agencies as crisis/disaster responders, it is critical that health 
departments always function at the highest level. Assuring that they are able to prevent and 
respond to their own organizational crises is necessary so that they may carry out their 
important work. Public health leaders need to understand that crisis preparedness is not the 
business of exceptions (Roux-Dufort, 2007). It is exceptional business!  
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APPENDIX A:  THE LUKASZEWSKI CRISIS LIST 
Abortion  Divestiture Multiple use issues 
Accidents Downsizing New product failures 
Acquisitions Drug/ Chemical abuse New product 
Activist action Embezzlement No Comment 
Acts of God Employee injury Noise 
Adverse govt. action EPA hearings Nuclear emissions 
AIDS Equipment malfunction Odor emissions 
Aircraft crashes Extortion OSHA 
Aircraft safety Falling reputation Political problems 
Airport security False accusations Premature disclosure 
Ambush interviews Falsification Product recalls 
Analyst presentations Federal investigation Product tampering 
Annual meetings Fiberglass Proxy testing 
Anonymous accusers Fire Public testimony 
Asbestos Foreclosure Quote out of context 
Bad debts Government intervention Rationalization 
Bankruptcy Govt. spending accidents Rumors 
Chapter 11 Grand jury investigation Sabotage 
Chapter 7 Grassroots demonstration Scandal 
Chemical abuse Hazardous material accidents Security Leaks 
Chemical dependency Hostage taking Sexual addiction 
Chemical spills Image distortion Sexual harassment 
Civil unrest Inaccessibility Shifts in value 
Competitive     
misinformation 
Inconsistency Sixty minutes 
Congressional testimony Indictments Special interest groups 
Contamination Insider activities Attacks 
Corporate campaigns International accidents Strikes 
Corporate control International competition Takeovers 
Corporate governance International issues Technology transfer 
Cost overruns Irradiation Television interviews 
Counter-espionage Irritated reporters Terrorism 
Crashes Judicial conduct Transplants 
Customer misuse Labor Problems Transportation accidents 
Death-customer Landfill siting Unethical behavior 
Death - employee Lawsuits Vandalism 
Death - key executive Layoffs Visual pollution 
Demographic changes Leaks Whistle blowers 
Depositions Leveraged buy-outs  
Deregulation Liquidation  
Discrimination Lying  
Disparagement Mergers  
Source: Pauchant, T. & Mitroff, I., (1992). Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization, San Francisco:  
Jossey-Bass. Reprinted with permission from John Wiley & Sons. 
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APPENDIX B: TYPOLOGY FOCUS GROUP GUIDE 
 
Crisis Typology Focus Group Guide 
 
Estimated time: 1.5 - 2 hours 
Participants: 5 Public health professionals 
 
Objectives: 
1. To sort crisis situations into categories based on the criteria listed below. 
2. To create a name for each grouping of situations that is descriptive of the type of 
crises found in that category. 
3. To understand the reasoning behind categories; including the similarities of 
situations placed in the same category and differences between the different 
categories. 
 
Sorting Criteria: 
The situations should be sorted based on similarities and differences of how the 
situation should be responded to, such that if an organization plans for one crisis 
situation in a particular category it is relatively prepared for other situations in the 
category. 
TIME DISCUSSION MATERIALS NEEDED 
10 minutes Introductions 
• Welcome/ Thank you 
• Introductions -researcher & participants 
• Purpose of Meeting/ Objectives 
• Format of Meeting 
Tape recorder, cassette 
tape, pencils 
10 minutes Definition of ‘Organizational Crisis’ 
Discussion of Sorting Criteria 
Discussion of possible responses 
Handout- definition, 
criteria, sample 
responses 
20 minutes 
 
45 minutes 
Individual Sorting of Crisis Situations 
 
Naming of Categories & Group sorting 
Crisis situations - list 
and grid 
Index Cards 
5 minutes Conclusion - Discussion & You will receive 
follow-up letter - Please return 
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An organizational crisis is defined as any situation that: 
• is sudden, acute and demands a timely response, 
• requires responses that are outside of the organization’s typical 
operating frameworks, and  
• is perceived as a serious threat to the ability of the agency to be 
effective 
 
Sorting Criteria: 
The situations should be sorted based on similarities and differences of 
how the situation should be responded to, such that if an organization 
plans for one crisis situation in a particular category it is relatively 
prepared for other situations in the category. 
 
Sample Crisis Management Responses: 
• Press Conference 
• Rapid formation of a crisis team to think out responses 
• Installation of telephone lines, fax lines for rapid communication 
• Change in how facility used or need to find new space, evacuation 
• Temporarily - stop providing service 
• Protective equipment needed 
• Legal advice needed 
• Special communications with public, board, media, families, etc. 
• Assistance from other agencies 
• Extended work hours 
• Psychological Counseling for stress and/or grief 
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APPENDIX C:  SURVEY TOOL 
 
Donna R. Dinkin, MPH 
6206 Clarkwood Circle Greensboro, NC 27410 
 
 
November 6, 1995 
 
Dear Health Director: 
 
I am writing to ask for your assistance in completing the attached survey on “Crisis 
Preparedness”. This survey is being conducted as part of a research study which will assess 
the extent to which local health departments in North Carolina are prepared for various types 
of organizational crises. In return for your assistance you will receive a confidential summary 
of how your results compare to the state as a whole at the April Health Director’s meeting. 
Please complete this survey by Friday, November 17th and mail it to me in the enclosed 
envelope. 
 
Organizational crises are rare events which focus on the “organization”. Well known 
examples of organizational crises are the mismanagement of funds at the United Way, the oil 
spill from the Exxon Valdez, the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger and the 
contamination of Johnson & Johnson’s tylenol. Other examples of these kinds of crises 
include: bribery of a worker, workplace violence, terrorism, unethical staff behavior and 
massive loss of computer records. For this study an organizational crisis is defined as any 
situation that: 
 
- is sudden, acute and demands a timely response, 
- requires responses that are not part of the organization’s typical work and 
- is perceived as a serious threat to the ability of that agency to be effective  
 
The following survey asks for your perceptions of your health department as it is, not as you 
think it should be. Your responses to this survey will be completely confidential and they 
will be aggregated so that individual identification is not possible.  
 
Thank you  for your cooperation. 
 
 
 
Donna R. Dinkin, MPH 
Doctoral candidate - Public Health Leadership 
UNC-CH, School of Public Health 
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Crisis Preparedness Survey 
 
Health Department: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Job Title: _____________________________ Years at this organization: ___________________ 
 
Total Number of Employees in agency (include full and part-time/contract): _________________  
 
Total Number of Facility sites: ______________________________________________________ 
 
Directions: Indicate (√) on the table below which crisis management activities your agency has a plan for and 
would be most prepared to do immediately if you were to experience a crisis like the bombing of the Oklahoma 
Federal building: 
 
 Communicate with the media & the public 
(including families of victims) 
 Set up back up communication technologies, 
i.e. radio, extra phones 
 Mobilize a multi-disciplinary crisis 
management team 
 Obtain assistance from other agencies, e.g. 
FEMA, police, hospitals, security  
 Obtain psychological counseling for those 
traumatized 
 Obtain electrical generators, flash lights and 
other equipment 
 Treat medical emergencies  Evacuate the building 
 Offer services at new locations  Communicate with staff & Board 
 
Directions: Please answer the following questions by circling the appropriate numbers. 
 
 Not at  
All 
Somewhat in 
the process 
Well – 
Established 
1. Do you have a multi-disciplinary team 
established to handle crisis situations? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Do you have the resources needed to be 
able to quickly respond to a crisis? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Do you have support services for 
employees under stress? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Are “whistleblowers” formally rewarded in 
your agency? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Does your agency make a special effort to 
look for potential problems? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Have relationships with the media been 
established? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Are backups in communication 
technologies available?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Is there a person in your agency trained as 
a media spokesperson? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Is there an explicit communication plan to 
be used in times of crisis? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Are crisis simulations conducted in your 
organization?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Does the organization have a history of 
sharing resources across divisions/units? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Directions: Please evaluate to what extent most of the managers in your health department believe 
in each statement by circling the appropriate numbers. 
 
 
 
Very  
true 
Neither true 
nor false 
Not true 
At all 
1. We don’t have time to think about crises 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. If a crisis happens, other agencies in the 
country or state government will assist us 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. We are too small to experience a large 
crisis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Nothing good is served by mulling over 
past crises 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Our services are not dangerous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Our employees are so dedicated we can 
trust them without question 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. We focus on preventing crises instead of 
responding to them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. If you’ve managed one crisis you’ve 
managed them all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Only bad agencies have crises 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. We can handle any crisis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Crises happen by the wrong doing of a 
few rotten apples 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Directions: Please evaluate to what extent, in general, most managers and employees in your  
organization believe in each statement by circling the appropriate numbers. 
 
 Very 
true 
Neither true 
nor false 
Not true  
at all 
1. Rumors are common in our agency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Employee suggestions are typically not 
useful because employees have a narrow 
view of the organization 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. We are more reactive than proactive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Crisis management or crisis prevention is 
a luxury 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. The most effective way to make major 
agency decisions is to have a small 
number of key managers make them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. We are not a very flexible organization 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. The most important thing in crisis 
management is to protect the good image 
of the health department 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Each crisis is so unique, it is impossible 
to prepare for it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Most crises resolve themselves. Time is 
our best ally 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. We know how to manipulate the media 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Crises are solely negative in their impact. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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We cannot learn from them 
12. We would not function well as a team 
during a crisis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Directions: Please answer the following questions by circling the appropriate numbers. 
 
 Not  
at all 
Somewhat 
Established 
Well 
Established 
1. Is crisis management integrated into the 
overall strategic planning process? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Has the organization created procedures 
to handle a variety of different crisis 
situations? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Does your organization have a written 
policy on media relations? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Does your organization have a set 
procedure on how to handle complaints? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Do you have a routine method of 
updating policy manuals? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Are all staff well informed of the 
policies you have in place to prevent or 
respond to crisis situations? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Do you have a routine schedule for 
maintaining and updating equipment? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Do crisis plans include technical, 
economic and legal considerations? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Are all policies and procedures related to 
crisis management put together in a 
comprehensive crisis plan? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Are there specific procedures in place for 
your staff to learn from past experiences 
and mistakes? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Directions: Below is a list of 7 different categories of organizational crises. Please indicate in the 
space provided the total number of times your organization has experienced Crises from each 
category over the last 5 years (DO NOT INCLUDE MINOR INCIDENTS).  Please also indicate 
on a scale (1-5) your perception of how prepared your organization is to prevent and to deal (in a 
timely & effective manner) with the kinds of situations in each category.  
 
PLEASE FILL OUT THE ENTIRE TABLE EVEN IF YOU HAVE NOT 
EXPERIENCED ANY CRISES. 
                   (Scale: 1 = not at all prepared, 3 = moderately prepared, 5 very prepared) 
Crisis Types Total 
number of  
CRISES in 
last 5 
years 
Prepared 
to Prevent 
(Scale 1 -5) 
Prepared to 
Respond 
(Scale 1-5) 
1. Disasters: Life or death situations requiring multiple 
responses (e.g. internal/external communication, facility 
evacuation, security, psychological counseling for staff) 
e.g., terrorism, workplace violence, natural disaster that 
affects building, bombing, etc. 
   
2. Personnel: Situations involving staff but not necessarily 
caused by the agency, e.g., death of key employee, HIV 
infected worker, mass illness in staff, etc. 
   
3. Political: Situations caused by political forces external to 
the agency, e.g., privatization of health dept., severe 
budget cuts, lack of support from politicians, etc. 
   
4. Quality Assurance: Situations that focus on the delivery 
of poor or inadequate services (the organization’s 
product) e.g., wrong meds. to client, death of client due to 
incompetence, poor response to public health problem, 
etc. 
   
5. Legal: Situations caused by either a staff member or 
client breaking the law, e.g., embezzlement of funds, rape 
of employee/ client, bribery of health worker, Unethical 
behavior of staff, etc. 
   
6. Public / Public Relations: Situations which focus on the 
relationship of the health dept. to external groups, e.g., 
Mass media criticism, public anger at health dept., Board 
of Health member arrested, etc. 
   
7. Plant/ Equipment: Situations which focus on buildings 
and/or essential equipment, e.g., Computer or telephone 
failure, Poor security in building, unsafe building 
structure, outdated equipment, etc. 
   
 
Thank you ! 
 
Modified version of survey by Pauchant, T.C. & Mitroff, I.I., Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization, San 
Francisco, Jossey-Bass. Copyright © 1992. 
 208 
APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Date:  ______________ 
 
Name:  _____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Title:  ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Agency: ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Number of Employees (Individuals & FTE): __________________  
 
Number of sites: ________________ 
 
Introductions: Introduce self and purpose of project. 
 
Thank you 
Name 
Doctoral program/ purpose of visit 
Process of research/ how this data will be used 
No wrong answers 
Reason for Tape Recorder 
Feel free to turn off recorder at any time 
 
Could you help me to understand your responsibilities in your position? 
Number of years in this position?/with this agency?/ in public health? 
 
 
 
 
 
CRISIS DEFINITION 
How would you define “crisis”? (CHARACTERISTICS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Define Organizational Crisis / Share Typology  
 
PAST EXPERIENCES/ LEARNING 
Could you give me some examples of crises that have occurred within your organization in the past? How did 
the agency respond? What was your role? How did the staff feel during this situation? How did you learn about 
the crises?  How did the agency learn about the crises ? Overall, how do you think the agency responded?  What 
does the agency do differently now (if anything)?  How could the agency have improved it’s response? 
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PREPARATION 
 
Do you think it is possible to prepare for crises? How important do you think it is to prepare ahead of time for 
crises? 
 
 
Which of the following crises is your agency most/ least prepared to prevent? to deal with? Why? What are the 
barriers to being more prepared? Which do you believe are likely / unlikely to occur? Why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRISIS STRATEGIES 
Does your agency routinely look for potential crises or threatening situations? How do they do this? (ex. TQM, 
Strategic planning, audits, review of complaints)  
 
 
 
 
 
Does your agency routinely monitor the peformance of equipment? of staff? How is this done? How would you 
find out if something was not working well? 
 
 
 
 
 
Does your organization have any written plans/ procedures that tell employees what to do in case of a crisis? 
Who has access to these plans? 
 
 
 
 
Do these plans cover a variety of potential crisis situations? 
 
 
 
 
Do you have a crisis management team? Who is on it? 
 
 
 
 
Do you ever have any kinds of drills to prepare for emergency situations? 
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How does this agency handle the media? Do you have a policy or procedure on how to work with the media? 
Who would be the spokesperson in the event of a crisis? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does this agency provide media spokesperson training?  
 
 
 
 
How is information shared in this organization? Give examples of times when all staff need to receive a 
particular piece of information - how is this information communicated to them? What are the channels of 
communication? 
 
 
 
 
 
How would the individuals in each of these groups get their info. in the event of a crisis? Who would be the first 
group informed? 
 
 County Commissioners 
 Board of Health 
 Employees (mgrs vs staff) 
 Clients 
 Media 
 
How quickly do you think your agency would be at responding to a crisis? 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you feel comfortable that there are people in this organization that have a clear understanding of the steps 
that are needed to effectively deal with a crisis?  Are you one of these people? 
 
 
 
 
Overall, how would you evaluate the crisis management efforts in your health department? (too little, sufficient, 
too much) What part of handling a crisis do you feel that your agency is least prepared for? (Why? not enough 
resources, not enough training, haven’t thought out the strategies before hand?) 
 
 
 
 
CULTURE 
In your agency, is it fairly easy to talk about difficult subjects (things that might be disturbing to you or others)? 
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How do people relieve stress? In what ways does the organization help people relieve stress? 
 
 
 
 
What would happen to a whistleblower in your organization? 
 
 
 
 
 
Describe top managements leadership style (authoritative, participatory?). Would it be effective in the time of a 
crisis? 
 
 
 
 
 
Does this agency seek feedback from others (staff, clients etc) and incorporate this feedback into strategies for 
improvement? Why? Why not? 
 
 
 
 
Do different units/ divisions/ professionals work well together? 
 
 
 
Do you feel that this agency makes an effort to learn from past mistakes/ successes? How do you do this? 
 
 
 
Would you say that generally this agency is proactive or reactive? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time 
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Crises in Public Health Departments 
Please indicate (√) those situations which you feel your agency is 
prepared for and those (if any) you feel would never occur. 
Prepared Will not 
occur 
Terrorism   
Bombing of building   
Wrong medicines given to client   
Dismissal of employee   
Mass Media criticism of Health Department   
Bribery of health worker   
Staff participating in unprofessional activities (unethical behavior)   
Sexual harassment   
Staff molesting client or other worker   
Staff stealing supplies, pharmaceuticals   
Client stealing supplies/ equipment   
Equipment malfunction   
Mismanagement of funds   
Destroying files under investigation   
Staff exhibiting Racism   
Staff promoting political agendas unrelated to health   
Employee death   
HIV Infected Health professional   
Workplace Violence   
Rape   
Sabotage   
Poorly maintained building, unsafe building    
Asbestos in building   
Chemical gas release in building   
Poor security in facility   
Computer failure, Loss of telephone lines   
Outdated/Inadequate equipment, i.e. autoclave, defective condoms    
Privatization of public health services (externally driven)   
Lack of support from Politicians   
Gov’t action to require new services without funds   
Public anger over public health policy/action   
Infectious Disease Outbreak in staff   
Kidnapping/ Hostage Taking   
Fire in building   
Inadequate resources to deal with situation (e.g., Not enough vaccine, not 
enough appt. times for people in need) 
  
Poorly skilled staff / unqualified staff   
Death of client   
Rumor of poor response   
Natural Disaster that affects building: Hurricane, tornado, flood    
Budget cuts   
Board of Health member arrested   
Breech of confidential information   
Poor response to public health problem resulting in injury/death   
Activism action   
Accidents   
Violation of law (e.g. open meetings law, Fair Labor Standards Act)   
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APPENDIX E: DOCUMENT AUDIT TOOLS 
 
 
Agency: _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Specific Crisis Planned For: Documents Reviewed 
(Updates / Authority) 
1.   
 
2.   
 
3.   
 
4.   
 
5.   
 
6.   
 
7.   
 
8.   
 
9.   
 
10.   
 
11.   
 
12.   
 
13.   
 
14.   
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Document Review – Data Collection Sheet #1 
 CRISIS TYPE 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Method of Signal Detection        
Method of Identifying that a crisis 
has occurred 
       
Identifies a checklist of things to do 
or a sequence of steps that need to 
be taken under specific 
circumstances 
       
Identifies members of a CMT & 
roles 
       
Includes a chain of command 
 
       
Specifies a crisis control center 
 
       
Specifies materials/ equipment 
needed and where to get it, i.e. extra 
phones 
       
Identifies a single spokesperson & 
phone access  
       
Includes list of media  contacts/ 
phone numbers 
       
Identifies other stakeholders & steps 
to  communicate with each of them 
• Employees 
• BOH/ County Commissioners 
• Clients 
• Public 
• Media 
• Other agencies 
• Other/ Family members 
       
Identifies how phone inquiries will 
be handled 
       
Includes contingency plans for other 
facilities or replacement services 
       
Includes counseling/ stress reduction 
services for employees 
       
Has plan for follow up/ learning 
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Document Review – Data Collection Sheet #2 
CRISIS TYPE: 
 Name of document with 
needed information 
Comments 
Method of Signal Detection 
 
  
Method of Identifying that a 
crisis has occurred 
 
  
Checklist of things to do or a 
sequence of steps that need to be 
taken under specific 
circumstances 
  
Members of a CMT & roles 
 
  
Chain of command 
 
  
Location of crisis control center 
 
  
Materials/ equipment needed 
and where to get it, i.e. extra 
phones 
  
Spokesperson & phone access  
 
  
List of media & contact info 
 
  
Other stakeholders & steps to  
communicate with each  
• Employees 
• BOH/ Co. Commissioners 
• Clients / Public 
• Media 
• Other agencies 
• Other/ Family members 
  
Plan for handling phone 
inquiries 
 
  
Contingency plans for other 
facilities or replacement services 
 
  
List of counseling/ stress 
reduction services  
 
  
Plan for follow up & learning 
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